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ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE

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OF THE

THIRD VOLUME.

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MEMOIRS

OF

GENERAL PÉPÉ.

CHAPTER I.

1820.

Errors of the Government of Naples with respect to Sicily—A military expedition to that island being decided on, the command of it is given to Florestano—The Commander-in-Chief, notwithstanding the small number of his troops, refuses the assistance offered him by Messina and Catanea—He sends back a Messinise battalion and begins his operations—Demonstrations of the Carbonari—Contest between the troops and the people of Palermo—Florestano fights his way into the city—The people make a second attempt to assault the camp—Melancholy case of Cianciulli—Murders perpetrated by the Palermitans—Florestano grants the island the most advantageous conditions in his power—The General enters Palermo—The King sends rewards to Florestano—The King, the Parliament, and the Ministers do not respect the conventions made by the General with the Sicilians—Florestano returns to Naples, and returns the order of St. Ferdinand, requesting permission to quit the military service.

It is now my purpose to resume the thread of Sicilian affairs. I have already in the preceding chapters spoken of the rebellion at Palermo, and of the intention of the Neapolitan Government to send troops under the

command of my brother to that island. The people of Palermo, finding that they were not molested in any way, set about propagating the insurrection by means of proclamations, and by sending about the country their armed multitudes, who, commanded by the Prince San Casaldo, threatened Trapani, and committed the most unheard-of excesses in Catalnassetta and in other places, which were not, like Trapani, able to resist those Vandal-like hordes. Messina, Catania, and other considerable cities, did not side with the revolt of Palermo. But Montreale, Paternico, Corleone, Caltagirone, Vizzini, Nicona, Castrogiovanni, and other large communities warmly supported the revolution. The rebels of Palermo (since such is the name given to a people who rise without successfully attaining the end they aim at) exercised all the acts of sovereignty, and amongst others, they sent Ambassadors to Naples. These were designated by the name of the Palermitan commission, and were men of respectability. The object of their mission was to effect an arrangement on this basis:—that Sicily should remain, in fact, separated from the kingdom beyond the Straits, although joined in confederacy and governed by the same dynasty. They were likewise to receive the Constitution of Spain, in preference to that of England, but with a separate parliament.

The Court, the Congress and the Ministers declared at first that such a demand was inadmissible; and afterwards, the revolution acquired such strength as to oblige them to come to a determination to employ an armed force to repress it. The means of repression adopted were worthy of so weak a government, and the reply given to the Palermitan commissioners was as tame and irresolute as those who framed it.

As I have already said, the command of the expedition to Sicily was offered to Florestano. My brother refused this charge, but the King himself interfered, so that it was impossible to disobey. Colletta likewise states that my brother accepted this honour in spite of himself. But as this historian rarely relates any fact with entire truth, he adds, that Florestano was selected for this command on account of his name; thus wholly keeping in the background all recollection of his so justly esteemed military career. Amongst the reasons which rendered him reluctant to assume this command, was his extreme unwillingness to hear the same name "rife and general in the public ear," upon the two shores of the Straits, which circumstance was calculated to awaken the supposition that my brother and myself were actuated by feelings of ambition rather than by disinterested patriotism.

Although I was at that time Commander-in-Chief of all the forces of the United Kingdom; I cannot recollect minutely all the particulars of this expedition; the more so, that Florestano was afterwards little pleased to talk upon this topic. Nevertheless, although my narrative may cause the reader to desire more numerous facts, such as I relate will not be wanting in exactness. The squadron put out to sea towards the end of August, and was composed of one vessel of the line, two frigates, two corvettes, twelve gun-boats, and several transports. These vessels had on board two regiments of infantry, the Palermo and the Bourbon; a regiment of mounted rifles commanded by the able Colonel Celentani; the squadron termed holy, and six pieces of artillery, in all about six thousand men, instead of nine thousand, as is asserted by Colletta. This historian, in page 249, generously gives us the assistance of several battalions

of the Calabrese militia; when not a single armed man, either militia or simple Carbonari of Calabria, crossed the Straits.

These false assertions recal to my memory that the Vendita of Calabria wrote to the high Vendita of Naples, disapproving of the war made against the people of Palermo, because that population was prevented from acting according to their wills; and I was obliged to suggest reasons for combatting these sentiments, which although most liberal in appearance, were calculated to lead to the total destruction of our own liberty as well as that of Sicily.

Florestano landed at Melazzo and moved on towards Messina. He reviewed the few troops he found there, which, together with others stationed at various points of the island, amounted to about three thousand. Thus, with the six thousand newly landed, the Neapolitan troops amounted to nine thousand men. The General arranged that three thousand of these should garrison those provinces in which half of the population sided with the insurgents; and that six thousand and sixty men should be drawn up under the walls of Palermo. Here again Coletta adds to the number of our troops who fought against that city, stating that they formed a body of nine thousand men. Colonel Costa, an excellent soldier, with only two battalions, had already routed the numerous hordes of Prince San Cutaldo, and Florestano ordered the Colonel to accomplish their dispersion and then join him in his camp. This effected, these two battalions made up the already indicated number of six thousand and sixty men. With this small army it was necessary to subjugate the capital, in the event of its refusal to yield upon conditions. Its population, increased by a considerable number of

countrymen who had hastened to its defence, amounted to nearly two hundred thousand men. It was surrounded by strong walls, which could be defended by four hundred pieces of cannon, calculating those on the batteries and others lying in the arsenal. Those who carried arms within and without the walls of the city amounted to about forty thousand men, and were commanded by officers who had previously served in the army.

Florestano's first intention had been to land at Roccella, which is at a distance of two short marches from Palermo, so as not to allow the people time to organize themselves and to receive assistance. Had this been done, Palermo would have been subdued without much effusion of blood. But my brother thought it indispensable to review the few troops remaining in Messina and its neighbourhood, and to learn in that city, which was adverse to the insurrection that had taken place, the latest intelligence respecting the state of public opinion throughout the island, and then adopt such expedients as might appear best adapted to fulfil the object of his expedition.

It is true, that from the two great cities of Messina and Catanea, and from the numerous population favourable to us, the General might have obtained such considerable aid as would have left no room for doubt as to the conquest of Palermo; for these two cities offered him the assistance of many battalions of militia. But he had a horror of plunging this noble island deeper in civil war; the more so, that it could only lead to the ruin of the United Kingdom, by increasing the aversion which unfortunately already existed between the two populations, and which must be regarded as the primary cause of their common weakness and

misery. In confirmation of this honourable refusal, I must state that he sent back to Melazzo a battalion of volunteers of Messina. If, at a later period, several of these were seen mingled with the dead and wounded, after the battle of Palermo, it arose from the fact, that this battalion which had been sent by the General, was immediately on its arrival at Messina, ordered to proceed to the camp under the walls of Palermo. This order proceeded from the authorities of Messina, who were actuated thus to act, either by a desire of ridding themselves of their enthusiastic and restless youth, or from the hatred which animated them against Palermo. Florestano, wishing by every means to discourage the civil war, to which the inhabitants of the island were more than ever inclined, so arranged that the light company of Messina should remain in flank of his camp. It happened, nevertheless, that one day when the contest had become general, they rushed separately into the engagement, and several of them were killed and wounded.

In the meanwhile, Florestano, on the 17th of September, reached Cefala, which is twenty-four miles from Palermo. He was met on his arrival there by a deputation from the Junta of Palermo, which was composed of General Rugiero Settimo, the Prince Trabia, and the Duke of Cumia, who presented him with a letter from the Prince of Villafranca, President of the Junta. The General manifested a desire of conferring upon the public affairs with the President himself, who being informed of this wish, politely hastened to the camp, from whence he wrote to his colleagues, that he was satisfied with the intentions of Florestano, who was desirous of entering the capital on the 25th of the month, and he promised that the Palermitans should

have no cause to regret compliance with this requisition. The lower orders of the people, who at that time were uppermost in the capital of the island, were either unwilling to return to their original condition, or else they distrusted the members of their Governmental Junta; for they flew to arms and assaulted the civic guard, composed of seventeen thousand respectable citizens. Contests were carried on in every quarter of the town between the posts held by the civic guard and the populace. In the Piazza Bologna, where the residence of Prince Villafranca stood, the struggle became most violent, and after lasting for two hours, the guard was beaten and the palace ransacked. Another time, the doors of the prison, in which the Junta had confined about four thousand galley slaves, were burst open by the people, and the prisoners set at liberty. After an engagement of eight hours, the civic guard was dispersed; the citizens who had composed it sought refuge within their houses, and the populace remained arbiters of every thing. To understand properly to what a pitch of uncontrollable ardour the multitude had attained, it is necessary to recollect that they had already murdered the two Princes of Aci and Cattolica. Nothing was to be seen in the streets but people of the lowest class, intoxicated with their victory, dragging in triumph the cannon they had taken from the civic guard, and numerous dead bodies of the citizens of that militia. A little after, the populace rushed out of the city in the wild hope of triumphing in a like manner over the Neapolitan troops and their chief.

The General, informed of these sad and unexpected events, advanced with his small army towards the capital. This city lies upon the sea-shore, to the north of the island, at the foot of a chain of mountains which

surround it inland. Upon one of these, which is named Monte Caputo, stands the city of Montreale, so near to Palermo, that it appears one of its suburbs. The General encamped before the capital, and extended his right as far as the sea, in order to keep open the communication with his fleet, from which he derived ammunition and provisions, and which, moreover, served him as a hospital for his wounded: his left lay as near to Montreale as the number of his forces would admit. It was not, however, in his power greatly to extend his forces, not only from the necessity of directly opposing the people of Palermo, but from the necessity under which he found himself, of resisting the bands from the country, whose number counterbalanced the absence of discipline and want of the habit of war. Whilst he was trying the strength of his troops by light skirmishes against the numerous bands within the walls of the city, and the considerable one without, an unexpected accident occurred to him.

It is in the nature of the human heart, that every sect, although it be exclusively composed of men of worth and intellect, should endeavour to acquire the greatest degree of importance. The regiments under the command of Florestano had been among the first to declare themselves in favour of the Constitutional cause in Naples, so that amongst them the doctrines of the Carbonari flourished. This sect sent a deputation to the General, with the intention of giving him advice respecting the present state of things. Florestano, unaccustomed to such monstrous instances of want of discipline, threatened to decimate them in the event of their renewing so hazardous a step, in the more than doubtful situation in which he found himself. These

Carbonari remained faithful to the constantly enforced doctrine of their sect in favour of the public welfare; and on account of the name of Pépé, and still more from beholding their leader constantly in the first ranks of the fight, instead of incurring his displeasure they gained his approbation by fighting with the utmost bravery. One day, Major Cianciulli, at the head of the squadron termed holy, was ordered to attack a body of the enemy, well provided with artillery, which was without the walls of the city. As the defence carried on from the walls, and from several houses without the walls, was most fearful, the squadron followed the Major with hesitation. This officer, throwing away his sword with indignation, turned round to his men, and said, "You may be patriots, but you are not soldiers!" By uttering these words, he committed a grievous error. He might, at least, have said, "Your indecision to face a danger, however great, makes me doubt your patriotism." Generally speaking, the honour of soldiers should be regarded with the same circumspection as is due to the purity of woman, which should never be questioned until it is impossible to avoid doing so.

After having dispersed the hordes of peasantry which had poured down from the mountains, confirmed the discipline of his own troops, and confined the rebellion within the walls of Palermo, Florestano proceeded to enter that city, notwithstanding the vigorous and obstinate opposition maintained by the people; and forcing a passage through the Botanical Garden, along the Strada Reale, he reached the monastery of La Pietà. Here his mind was undecided between the alternative of setting fire to the noble capital and ordering the fleet to bombard it, or of effecting a retreat, in the hope that

in a little while the town would surrender out of gratitude for his magnanimity in declining to fire the city. The love of the public welfare, and the benevolent feelings of a citizen prevailed with him to give up a military triumph, and he withdrew to his camp. This day cost much blood to the Sicilians, as well as to the assailants.

To dissipate any suspicion of partiality on my part when treating of the acts of a dearly beloved relative, I will quote the words of Colletta, whom no one will suspect of flattery towards Florestano, who knows what feeling that historian entertains towards his brother. Colletta says thus: "Public affairs were in this confusion, when a letter containing joyful intelligence from General Florestano Pépé brought some consolation with it. This General had several times encountered the Sicilian rebels, had put them to flight, taken their colours and artillery, and restricted the revolution to Palermo. Whilst he was stationed with his army upon the overhanging hill, he might easily have cut off the water for the consumption of the city, but actuated by feelings of humanity, he allowed the inhabitants the benefit of it for six hours a day. After three contests, he became possessed of Flora, and of one of the gates—that of Carolina, so that he might have penetrated into the city, had he not been withheld by compassion for our countrymen of Palermo, rebels though they were, anticipating every hour their voluntary submission. The magnanimity of the General was greatly extolled, because it was a proof of power, and because acts, either of great generosity, or of ferocious cruelty, give equal pleasure to the people."

Monsieur Famin, Counsellor of the General Consulate of France in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, in his

important pamphlet, so full of regard towards the Sicilians, says of Florestano, in page 173: "Il désirait traiter Palerme comme Henri IV. avait traité les Parisiens: il rendait les moulins occupés par ses troupes, il ramenait le cours des eaux détourné par ses soins." I do not in the least question the courteous intention of the writer of this comparison. But great things compared with little, often weaken praise, and by stimulating a spirit of envy, excite derision. I must elucidate the difference of the moral sentiments which actuated that great King and the poor Neapolitan General. Henry IV. expected a crown, but the General who besieged Palermo was not ignorant, that by nobly fulfilling his duty he would neither give satisfaction to the Court, to the Ministers, nor to the parliament. What was still worse, the very people of Palermo, instead of being grateful to him, and attributing his moderation and his retirement from the city to generous sentiments, thought that these proceedings on his part were attributable to the circumstance of the small number of his troops, so that, instead of being penetrated by his forbearance, they became more audacious. This audacity was carried to such a pitch, that one day the people formed themselves into a numerous body, and marched to assault the camp. This act of unexpected presumption well pleased the Neapolitan chief, who drew back his advanced posts, as if with the intention of avoiding the encounter, and put in order several squadrons supported by the infantry, to move behind the assailants and cut off their retreat, in which case there would have been an end to the resistance of the Palermitans. But the enemy warned of the fate which awaited them by several old soldiers who fought in their ranks, instead of advancing,

turned back and re-entered the city. Florestano continued to show himself a most benignant enemy, ordering the powerful Neapolitan fleet not to injure the city by the discharge of the bombs, but to direct a few against the earth for the mere purpose of exciting fear. This generosity did not exist in the heart of the General alone, but was shared by all his subordinates, as was shown by his former aide-de-camp, the brave Major Cianciulli. This officer perceiving in the opposite party some disposition to cease hostilities, cast aside all personal feeling, and advanced in the midst of the enemy, who made him prisoner, and kept him, for some moments at least, in danger of his life.

This want of good faith greatly irritated the Neapolitan troops, and caused much concern to their leader, who not to risk the life of an officer so dear to all, was obliged to use an artifice with the enemy, and he formed the design of blowing up one of the gates of the city, so as to surprise those who guarded it. But before long, the Major was set at liberty and returned to the camp to the great joy of all. The danger from which he had escaped had been most imminent, and he had manifested under it the utmost degree of calmness, for a few moments before a most respectable man, named Mercurio Tortorici, had advised the people to suspend hostilities, for which he had been most barbarously torn to pieces, and his limbs carried in triumph through the streets, until they were cast into the sea. At the same time, several Neapolitan soldiers who had been taken prisoners, were shot by the furious populace, amongst whom a rumour had been spread, that the enemy was going to raise the siege previously to their embarkation for Naples.

Amid this popular frenzy, Prince Paternò, a venerable

old man, equally distinguished by the intrepidity of his heart, his noble birth and his great wealth, exercised all his ingenuity, both in words and acts, to persuade the people to be the first to make offers of peace. As whenever the multitude place confidence in a man at all, it is sure to be in an unlimited degree, Paternò not only prevailed on the people to make peace, but they empowered him to negociate it with such conditions as he might judge the best. Florestano, fully convinced that as long as dissension between the two people existed, the United Kingdom could never maintain its independence, and that the blood shed in civil warfare prepares the soil for the growth of lengthened discord and profound hatred, was greatly rejoiced at the first letters of Prince Paternò asking for peace. But this joy of Florestano at seeing so fratricidal a war change into a desire for peace and union, did not arise, as states the historian Colletta, from the unfavourable condition of his troops, but from his ardent desire to behold the rancour which had so long existed between the Sicilians and Neapolitans give way to a feeling of fraternal affection. Colletta, misled equally by his inexperience in military matters, and his natural want of truth and candour, writes, that the peril of the conquerors was greater than that of the conquered, that the camp was ill-situated, and that the Neapolitan soldiers were discontented from their own innate wickedness. Neither of these circumstances, related by him in his usual pompous style, was true. The discipline and the desire of serving their country, which existed in the Neapolitan camp, were so established, as to make the soldiers surmount all the difficulties which surrounded them.

It was decided that the Sicilian negociators and

Florestano should meet together on board the English vessel, the Racer. Accordingly, the Prince of Paternò who had been made President of the Junta, with several of its members, proceeded on board on the part of the people. Florestano, accompanied by General Prince Campana and Major Cianciullo, appeared for the Neapolitans.

The Palermitan negociators produced a copy of the instructions that the minister had given to the General Commander-in-Chief of the expedition, in which amongst other things was stated, that the Government would not make any opposition to a separate parliament being granted to Sicily, upon condition, however, that the majority of the Sicilians should express such a desire. The copy of these instructions had been given to the Palermitan deputies, who as I have already stated, had been to Naples and had taken up their residence in the palace of Count Tureno at Posilipo. My brother could not have refused to grant them all the conditions in his power, without manifestly acting against his principles, which tended to effect a durable reconciliation between the two nations. Nevertheless, he knew how to turn the dissension amongst the Sicilians to the advantage of the United Kingdom, for in consenting that Sicily should have a separate parliament from that of Naples, he made the condition that such should be the case, if the majority of the deputies in the island should declare that they wished it, adding at the same time, that the deputies should be elected one for each community without reference to the number of inhabitants contained in it, so that Palermo, notwithstanding its population of nearly a hundred and eighty thousand, was only to have one deputy. The General while exacting this second con-

dition, upon which the Neapolitan Ministers had not reflected, was quite certain that the majority of the deputies would vote in favour of a single parliament for the United Kingdom. In this manner his concession, whilst it satisfied the self-love of the Sicilians, and destroyed, for a certain time at least, all hostile feeling between the two nations, avoided the monstrous anomaly of two parliaments, which for several reasons were not compatible with the Constitution of Spain, in favour of which both of the populations divided by the Straits had so warmly declared themselves.

Conformably to the other articles of the treaty, the army entered Palermo, having at its head, General Campana, the Chief-Commander not wishing to expose himself to the accusation of desiring to display himself. He refused to order a general disarming of the people, that he might not be supposed feeble, but contented himself with ordering the restitution of all the arms and horses belonging to Government.

But could the General suppose that after having effected a result of so much utility to the public cause, the Government would disapprove of the concessions granted by him to the Sicilians, although they did not exceed in any degree the instructions given him by the Government itself? I must here mention how the Minister Zurlo endeavoured to change the sense of the instructions given by him to the General who commanded the expedition to Sicily. He said, that the Government, when it declared that it did not oppose the establishment in the island of a parliament separate from that of Naples, did not thereby mean to sanction the concession of such a claim. Nor was the pride by which the ministry and parliament were so childishly infatuated mollified by the knowledge that the votes

of the Sicilian deputies would not have been favourable to the establishment of two congresses instead of one. They disdained to admit that the islanders should possess the right of deliberating upon such a question, forgetting, I will not merely say every principle of justice, but what is worse in such a case, every instigation of policy in the situation of the United Kingdom at that period.

The following is the mode in which the Government fell into the mad course which contributed so greatly to the destruction of the liberty of the Two Sicilies. Several parliamentary deputies, actuated by an ardent longing to elevate themselves out of the obscurity in which they had been involved, and to acquire favour with the inexperienced multitude, began to throw great blame upon the convention, saying amongst other things that no treaty ought to be formed with rebels. The whole assembly supported this absurd opinion, thinking to show their strength of mind. The ministry re-echoed the voice of the Parliament, to ensure their support, they being the arbiters of its political existence. Amongst the other errors of the Ministry, it allowed a letter signed by many inhabitants of Messina, in which they did not dissemble their enmity to Palermo and their desire for the debasement of that city, to be read in full Congress. The deputies said that we ought to avail ourselves of this dissension to control the island more easily. Not a single voice was raised in this assembly to say: "If we wish to facilitate to Austria and the Allied Powers the means of destroying our liberty, we cannot employ better means than thus to foment discord between ourselves and the Sicilians. Such fatal discord has been, and alas, will long be, a cause to prevent the inhabitants of this island from

liberating themselves from the yoke of absolute power. Again, there was not a single deputy of the parliament who said, "Since we intend to act rigorously towards these our countrymen, let us withdraw from Palermo the troops who have entered there by virtue of a treaty; then after making Palermo submit by main force, we will dictate laws to the conquered." The frank energy of such a proceeding would have excited sentiments of admiration if not of love in the Sicilians; and the petty pride of our parliament would have been elevated into a virtue which might have led to the reconciliation of the two people. But their availing themselves of the result produced by Florestano by the exercise of a due mixture of valour and sagacity, and yet not admitting the concessions granted by him, which by no means exceeded the power given him, and which tended to ensure the general welfare, naturally filled the hearts of the Sicilians with contempt and indignation. Moreover, seeing us willing to profit by their civil discord, without which we could never even have dreamt of subjecting the island, the indignation of its inhabitants was of course brought to a climax.

Thus, instead of obtaining the fifteen thousand men which had been freely offered by the Sicilians in support of the common cause, it became necessary to leave ten thousand of our own amongst them; and what was far worse, to encourage the hatred of one half of the population against the other, and all this to the detriment of the freedom of both people. Another circumstance was still more injurious than the necessity of leaving so numerous a garrison in Sicily, and was one of the most efficient means of plunging us again into servitude. The parliament which was so unwilling at a later period to remove to Calabria, would at that time

readily have consented to remove their sittings to Palermo; but even this chance of salvation failed through our headstrong and blameable conduct towards Sicily.

If the ignorance of the parliament not a little contributed to effect these evils, the royal family had a great deal to do in bringing them about. The Court exulted at the first intelligence of the insurrection at Palermo, thinking thereby to obtain support against the Constitutionalists; but when they saw that the instigations of persons devoted to themselves only produced effects injurious to their interests, they began to be seriously alarmed. The first idea was, to oppose the revolutionists of Palermo by those of Naples, and this was the reason why they gave my brother the corps which had been the first to declare for the cause of liberty. But on perceiving that both within and without the walls of Palermo, the enemies of absolute power on both sides fought bravely without bestowing a thought on the reigning dynasty, the Court became completely bewildered. It was pleased, nevertheless, by the foolish conduct of the parliament, which was impressed with the idea that were Sicily to be treated kindly it would completely shake off the Bourbons. On this occasion Ministers, Generals, and even a few deputies of the parliament began to dabble for the first time in the intrigues of the Court. Perhaps, indeed, the circumstance of their impunity at that time, hardened and prepared them to act still worse at a more critical juncture, when the cause of freedom was just expiring.

When Florestano received intelligence that the Government had resolved not to ratify the concessions he had granted, he was, through Cardinal Gravina, presented by the King with the highest order of

St. Ferdinand, which is the first in the United Kingdom, to which was annexed a rich pension. My brother started immediately for Naples, where he arrived on board a frigate. His first care was to write to his Majesty that he could not accept so flattering a proof of his satisfaction, nor any other recompense; but on the contrary, he requested to withdraw from the military service, as such a course was the only means left him of proving his sincerity to the Sicilians, and of manifesting his gratitude for the trust they had placed in him, and for the numerous marks of regard they had shown him on several occasions.

The following is the spirit of his letter, taken from that portion which relates to military matters:—

"Sire,

"Your Majesty is not ignorant of my unwillingness to assume the command of the expedition to Sicily, and that I only accepted this charge in strict obedience to your orders. Nevertheless, it was my good fortune to see my endeavours turn to the advantage of the Sicilians, and of the United Kingdom, without at all exceeding the instructions given me. The troops who accompanied me, although restricted in number, and deprived of many things essential in war, obtained decisive victories over the numerous force of the popular party in Palermo, and of the surrounding peasantry who were up in arms, and animated by no common ardour in support of a cause, which they regarded as just and national. I derived no advantage from this superiority, as I looked upon it as a sacred obligation to spare as much as possible the blood of the citizens, to avoid the destruction of their capital, and above all, not to plunge the Sicilians into all the misery of a civil war.

"Rewards, when coming from the hands of your Majesty, increase in value, but I grieve that the situation in which I have been placed, not only precludes all possibility of my accepting them, but obliges me, moreover, to request your Majesty's permission to withdraw from the army. In this manner only can I prove to the Sicilians that they are not deceived in placing full confidence in my honour."

Florestano ended this letter and the report annexed to it, by recommending to the King those officers and privates who had signalized themselves under his command.

Let me conclude this mournful chapter with the following observation. Had the people of the United Kingdom in 1821, in defence of their frontiers and their liberty, shed the same blood that stained the soil of Sicily in 1820, it would have sufficed not only to preserve the honour, but to purchase the freedom of the South of Italy.

CHAPTER II.

1820.

I accept the office of Inspector-General of the Militia Legions and Guard of Security—No attention is paid to the labours of the Commission in regard to the selection of the superior officers on active duty—The army is divided into factions—The Minister of War is accused of not having purchased guns, which were extremely necessary—The palace of the King is secretly fortified —The foreign diplomatic corps endeavours to spread the belief that the kingdom is in a state of anarchy.

I HAVE already stated that I had resigned the command of the army, and that I refused all the offers prodigally made me by the Government. But had I remained inactive in the situation in which the nation was placed, my course would have been in contradiction to my proposition of co-operating by every means in my power for the public welfare. There was a question of appointing me to the post of Chief of the Staff, or organizer of the Militia Legions and Guard of Security, which amounted to about two hundred and fifty thousand men. As Chief of the Staff, the army would again have come under my command, for the Vicar had only a nominal power. The Minister of War said to his colleagues, to several Deputies of the Parliament, and to the King, that were I to have the

control of the army in the name of the Duke of Calabria, as well as indirectly of the Militia, in which all were Carbonari, the whole forces of the United Kingdom would be concentrated in one man. In this respect the Minister was right, and I myself was by no means aware which of these two offices would best enable me to serve the public. The army was the sheet anchor of safety, but with the King, the Vicar, and the Ministers opposed to the new order of things, it would have been an impossible undertaking to make it flourish, and from the bad condition in which it then was, to render it worthy of the noble cause which it had to support, and under such difficult circumstances. The National Guard, under three denominations, had been in part badly organized, or did not exist: the battalions which I had formed and brought to Naples, alone deserved the name of military corps. Whilst I was meditating upon these things, I received the following letter from the Minister of War, in the name of the Vicar:

" War Office, Naples, October 14, 1820.

" To His Excellency Lieutenant-General Don Guglielmo Pépé.

" General,

" His Royal Highness the Duke of Calabria, Vicar-General of the Kingdom, anxious to give your Excellency some token of his approbation of the zeal you have manifested in the exercise of your functions, as Commander-in-Chief of the army, has deigned by a decree, dated yesterday, to nominate you Inspector General of the regiments of Militia, the Legions, and

the Guard of Security, both foot and horse, of the city of Naples. I inform your Excellency of this with great satisfaction, for you to guide yourself thereby.

"CARASCOSA."

It was impossible to refuse acceptance of the charge of organizing and arming all the citizens accustomed to warfare, or to the interior service; the more so, indeed, that there existed very few organic laws, and as it was essential to give vigorous and important orders, without having any authority to do so, no other General would have ventured to assume such a responsibility. Besides, it would have been difficult to any other General to make himself obeyed, not being able to give effect to the orders to be executed by referring for their validity to any existing laws, which not only were wanting, but could not have been passed before the expiration of several months. I began my operations, founding them, in the absence of laws, upon the orders of the day, which I wrote and published. Although I exacted much, I was never blamed by the press or taxed with abuse of power. All the citizens, rich and poor, submitted to my hard (and for them) novel discipline, so desirous were the people of preserving their liberty at the cost of any sacrifice. Nor let it be believed that the results I obtained in the course of the first three months were of an ephemeral nature; for I will hereafter relate how, by means of a mere telegraphic order, eighty battalions departed on one day from the provinces on this side of the Straits alone. If, instead of three months, fortune had but granted me six, and at the same time had inspired energy in the parliament; in spite of the base treachery which surrounded us, we should still have been celebrated in

the annals of those histories of nations who have acquired and retained their freedom.

The Minister of War, who was obstinate in not believing the return to their flags of the men who had once been dismissed, as he wrote to me in the letter I published in a preceding chapter, made the army amount to fifty-four thousand men, of which four thousand four hundred were cavalry, comprising the train of artillery. The ministers and the Vicar were accustomed to laugh among themselves when I told them that the discharged soldiers would return in great numbers. I was informed that they said : "these men will spontaneously quit their wives and children to please General Pépé." As it had formerly been necessary to employ force, and even manacles to oblige the conscripts to march, the Government could not now believe that out of sheer patriotism the discharged soldiers would quit their wives and families to return of their own free will to their banners.

I have already spoken, in a former page, of a commission of Generals and superior officers, from which were selected officers above the rank of Major to take commands in the active army. Many who were reputed incapable of commanding battalions or regiments, were excluded. The Government no longer heeded this excellent institution, and as the rejected officers became my personal enemies, they were on that very account employed, and several amongst them, notorious for their incapacity, obtained promotion. How could we protect our independence against the allies with such an army as this? That this account of our national misfortunes may not be regarded as exaggerated, I must relate one of the many occurrences which took place at this unfortunate period. The Duke of Laviano, Colonel of cavalry, was

voted by the Commission I have mentioned as incapable of holding the command of a regiment. This made him my declared enemy. At the meeting of Santa Maria in Porto, Carascosa, although aware of this declaration, proposed that he should be elevated to the rank of Major-General.

When I was apprized of this, I told the Vicar that his Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Duke of Campo Chiaro, would relate to his Highness a particular circumstance which he knew respecting Laviano. Campo Chiaro accordingly informed the Vicar that owing to Laviano's military conduct at the battle of Wagram, he had been dismissed the service. During that campaign, he had been sent by Joachim to the staff of General Berthier, and Campo Chiaro was then Ambassador at the Court of Napoleon. The Vicar seemed struck by this account, and said that Laviano should not receive any promotion. Who would believe that only two days afterwards he was promoted to the rank of Major-General? When I told the Vicar that such promotions disheartened the army, he hid his face with the tail of his coat, and seemed to believe that he could make amends for the disgrace of his conduct by such a fool-born jest as this.

I said, in a preceding chapter, that I look upon secret societies as a counter poison, that is to say, a bad remedy for a greater evil. Thus the Carbonari, in ordinary times, would have been injurious to society, and still more injurious to the army. But since the Carbonari did exist, since they had co-operated so powerfully for the overthrow of the absolute government, should we go to war with such a drawback, could we derive any advantage from it? Not only is my opinion in the affirmative, but I can support it by facts. When

I commanded the army, I never left any fault or any crime unpunished; and the second time I commanded one of two corps of our army, the Carbonari never caused me the slightest trouble. It will be seen hereafter if the other Generals found the Carbonari of the regiments intractable; I found them in the corps under my orders extremely docile, and I derived great advantage from them in the same manner that I had done from the Carbonari of the capital and provinces. That a thousand useful things might be derived from the Carbonari is asserted even by the most ruthless of their enemies. General Carascosa thus expresses himself in page 191 of his history.

" L'impartialité qui m'est imposée par un travail historique, m'oblige cependant à convenir que l'existence de ces chefs de Ventes, répandus sur tout le territoire, et dépendant tous de l'assemblée générale, produisit sur un autre rapport un bien très-remarquable. Le désir qu'on eut de donner à la révolution un aspect de moralité, fit disparaître des campagnes tous les malfaiteurs. On fut jusqu'à permettre à quelqu'un d'entre eux d'être admis dans la Charbonerie, et ils vivaient des secours qu'elle leur donnait. Les autres craignaient et se gardaient bien d'enfreindre ses injonctions de ne pas troubler la tranquillité des campagnes. En outre le service public recevait une grande impulsion toutes les fois que l'assemblée générale recommandait aux Charbonneries provinciales. Par exemple la loi du 3 Septembre avait rappelé au service militaire les congédiés, ainsi que nous l'avons dit précédemment. Or l'assemblée générale excitée par le Général Pépé, en ayant recommandé l'accomplissement aux Charbonneries de chaque commune, des milliers de congédiés rejoignirent en très peu de temps. Il est vrai que

presque tous les riches, ainsi que les Charbonniers furent exempts de ces envois forcés; mais enfin cette opération fut faite avec vigueur, et la marche simultanée d'un grand nombre d'hommes trompa tellement l'étranger, qu'ils la crurent absolument volontaire. Je citerai encore quelque faits à l'égard desquels la coopération de la secte fut avantageuse: d'abord le trésor avait des besoins, et désirait recouvrer des contributions; on fit alors des circulaires aux assemblées provinciales, toujours par l'organe de l'Assemblée Générale, et l'on obtint de suite des sommes considérables qui furent envoyés à Naples. Il est encore vrai, que dans cette opération, il y a eu aussi beaucoup de partialité; les Charbonniers reçurent toutes les facilités pour le paiement de leur quotipart; et la charge de payer sur-le-champ et sans aucune considération tomba sur les autres citoyens. Par exemple encore s'il arrivait quelque désertion nombreuse, on n'obtenait jamais mieux l'arrestation des déserteurs que par des circulaires aux Charbonniers. Il était alors presque impossible d'échapper, soit en chemin, soit dans chaque commune des déserteurs, parce qu'ils étaient poursuivis par la vigilance des milices, et des légionnaires, qui stimulaient sans relâche les Charbonniers. On doit à la vérité convenir encore ici, pour ne pas fausser le tableau, que les déserteurs qui appartenaient à la secte étaient libres de retourner dans leurs foyers, aussitôt qu'on avait fait les signes réciproques de reconnaissance."

Had the partiality which Carascosa mentions existed, it would have been by his own account more than compensated by the advantages which the State derived from the Carbonari. But such partiality, which might be more aptly termed injustice, could not bear upon the citizens who were not Carbonari, for if the sectarians,

who amounted to about three hundred thousand men, had been exempted from the payment of taxes and from military service, the Government must have gone up to the moon in search of recruits, and money to fill the treasury. The chiefs of the Carbonari were mostly respectable and worthy citizens of their provinces, and at the proper place I shall state that not one amongst them refused to march to the frontier, and that one and all laid aside their own private interest for the sake of the public weal. The reader will have remarked the sentence where Carascosa says, "Le désir qu'on eut de donner à la révolution un aspect de moralité, fit disparaître des campagnes tous les malfaiteurs." He therefore supposes that morality did not exist, and he compares this exorbitant number of Carbonari—mostly young and courageous men, burning with ardent patriotism—to a restricted congregation of Jesuits conspiring to excite the contrary belief to what they really think and practise. This is the first time, I believe, that ever a man speaking of his own countrymen has said, "they actod well, but it was all hypocrisy."

In the meanwhile, the army was organized into four divisions of infantry, the first at Gaeta, under the orders of General Ambrosio, the second in Capua, under those of General Arcovito, the third was in the Abruzzi, and they made me assume the command of it, although I was then residing in Naples, and occupied with the organization and command of more than two hundred thousand National Guards. The fourth division, composed of the royal guard, was under the orders of General Filangieri. I had three chief officers of my staff; Colonel del Carreto, afterwards Minister of the Police for the division in the Abruzzi, Colonel Nicolo Caraccioli di Roccaromana for the seven regiments of

the Guard of Security in Naples and its province, and Colonel Wispeare for the numerous militia and legions of the kingdom. Fortunately I was endowed with an iron constitution: I slept but little, gave only a few minutes to my meals, and yet the hours of the day were never long enough. I was obliged to keep up a constant correspondance with the high Vendita of the Carbonari. The grand masters of the order, who in various parts of the kingdom amounted to about a thousand, often honoured me with their letters, the Ministers of State did so likewise. I recollect, the Minister of Grace and Justice, Ricciardi, once wrote to ask me if I thought it prudent to continue in his function a Bishop who was accused of being opposed to the Constitutional mode of Government. Even the Cardinal of Naples commenced an epistolary correspondance with me; but I cut it short by sending an aide-de-camp with a verbal answer, for the good Cardinal filled his letter with theological questions which were not the better for being ill-digested.

A man who is in possession of royal power is not often to be greatly trusted. Let us admit, that King Ferdinand, and his son, the Vicar, wished to act in an honourable manner towards the nation, how could they do so, surrounded as they were by courtiers and ministers, who made them believe themselves in continual peril of their lives? In the kingdom there existed several hundred Carbonari Vendite, and out of such a number, it was impossible that some should not propose strange things, as for instance, the proclamation of a republic. Although the ministers gave no credit to the report of such an attempt, they nevertheless persuaded the King and royal family that they were in peril, and proposed a remedy: and what was this remedy? To strengthen the outer doors of the royal residence, to

re-arrange the drawbridge of the Castel Nuovo and that contiguous to it, and finally, to fill about three thousand sacks with earth, and to barricade the streets which surrounded the palace. This inconceivable stupidity of the Ministry is related by Carascosa in page 221 of the first portion of his book. "Mais le ministre qui ne perdait par de vue aucune de ses devoirs, etc." All this was done to curry favour with the King and the Duke of Calabria, who seeing themselves protected by the Sovereigns of Europe, thought they were about to regain their absolute power. The ministry could not give credit to these republican attempts; for, some days before, having spoken to me upon the subject in presence of the Vicar, and having moreover mentioned the existence of a moveable column of the Carbonari at Catanzaro, and of a league Sannita, I proved to them that both the column and the league only existed upon paper, and were mere devices. I offered to summon to the capital all the Carbonari chiefs who lay under suspicion; besides which I proposed writing an article, and causing others to be written in the papers of the most liberal principles, in which all those who spoke of a republic would have been stigmatized as men promoting their own private interests, and as enemies of their country. As none are so deaf as those who will not hear, the ministers to enhance their own merit, continued to give a substance to this shadow. The sacks of earth and the other expedients, which they sought to keep concealed, became known to the Carbonari, who began to menace the Court and the ministers, whom they looked upon in the light of public enemies. My life was like Penelope's web, all the efforts made by me in the light of day for the public welfare, were destroyed in darkness by men who sought their own interest.

If to preserve the favour of the Court, the ministers

endeavoured to propagate the idea that the nation was in a state of anarchy, the ministers of the foreign powers, to please their masters, calumniated our social condition still more. It required an unequalled degree of audacity to declare that anarchy existed in a country in which one might safely travel in every direction without an escort; where crime had almost disappeared; where the taxes were paid beforehand, and where the members of the royal family rode about the capital, and went hunting without ever being accompanied by a single soldier. When I or any other citizen pointed out these ameliorations in our social state, the men devoted to absolute power replied that the people acted thus from hypocrisy, and to preserve their freedom without resorting to war. As if a multitude had ever been found capable of hypocrisy!

The absolute Princes of the north, alarmed at the three revolutions of Spain, Naples and Portugal, and fearful that the example of the South of Italy would be followed by the remainder of the Peninsula, began to think of themselves, and partly to justify the invasions which they had been cogitating from the very first days of our insurrection, they affected to credit the reports forwarded to them by their ambassadors. France and England, being governed by a Constitution, could not with any degree of decency declare themselves against a people who had extorted a Constitution from their King. Austria, Prussia and Russia, unable to direct their army against Spain without crossing France on one side, to prevent any new movement between the Tronto and the Alps, determined upon invading the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. As Austria had the nearest interest in such a war, the question was being discussed at Vienna.

Many amongst our younger deputies, who were sincere patriots, began to perceive the intentions of the King, the selfishness of the ministers and various Generals bent upon seconding the King and Vicar in their evil designs. One of the deputies, the Marquis Dragonetti Aquilano, a man full of information, although unused to speak in public, proposed to the Congress that I should be again put in possession of the chief command of the army. In support of his opinion, he adduced the dangers which threatened the country, and the consequent necessity of entrusting its defence to a General whose heart and soul were with the public cause. He added, that as it was a question of our existence, it was essential to shut our eyes to every other consideration. To this the legal deputies replied, that we must not increase the irritation of the Allied Princes, and that we were better able to oppose them with moderation than with force. That the nomination to command rested with the executive power, and that were the parliament to deviate from the Constitutional path, it would be difficult to foresee what might be the consequence. Thus the proposal of Dragonetti was without effect.

At this time, the Duke of Campo Chiaro, Minister for Foreign Affairs, acquainted the parliament that the Pope had demanded fifteen thousand men from Austria, and that the Duke of Calabria had warned the Pontifical Court, that if an Austrian corps were to enter the States of the Church, the Neapolitan army would immediately cross the frontier. The minister was applauded by the Congress.

During these successive days, as I have been told, the General who commanded the Royal Guard presented himself to the British minister, Sir William

A'Court, and offered, during the night, to arrest me, the most compromised of the patriots, and the parliamentary deputies who were opposed to the modification of the Constitution; adding, that at break of day another Constitution would be proclaimed according to the will of the King. Before taking such a step, the General wished to be assured by the British Vice-Admiral that in the event of his non-success, himself and the royal guard would be received on board the fleet which lay in the Bay of Naples. The British minister could not obtain such a promise from the Vice-Admiral, who stated that his orders were limited to the protection of the royal family. Such an attempt could not have succeeded, and according to my opinion, might perhaps have conduced to our safety by enabling us to abandon a system of half-measures. I was informed of this fact in London, six years later, by a person attached to the English Embassy, who, obliged to preserve the secret at the moment these events were passing, merely warned me, through the Marquis Letizia, to beware of the Generals. I have no other proof of this conduct of the General of the royal guard than what I have stated. He was a great friend of the English and Russian ministers; but this circumstance is not, I confess, conclusive.

CHAPTER III.

1820.

Manœuvres of Austria and the King of Naples—A first attempt to modify the Constitution is made by the Court—The King sends a message to the Parliament—A conspiracy against the Constitution is formed by the few partisans of the Court—Fears of the Parliament, before whom I am summoned—I tell the deputies not to allow the departure of the King, and propose means to prevent the possibility of his flight—The Parliament permits the King to depart — New oaths taken by the King—His departure—Noble conduct of Prince Henry of Prussia towards me.

The Princes assembled in Troppau did not dare decide in favour of war, for if once the principle were admitted that the absolute powers had the right to interfere in the liberty of other nations, it would have been no easy matter to foretel the consequences. If Austria alone had undertaken to invade Naples, and had encountered an insurrectionary and national war in the kingdom, how could the invaders have felt certain that the remainder of Italy, and even France—where conspiracies were constantly taking place—would have remained quiet?

If Russia and Prussia had put their forces in motion to come to the assistance of Austria, most probably the

whole of Germany would have been thrown into a state of agitation; and perhaps France would not have looked upon the assemblage of so many powerful armies without displeasure. As these powers did not dare to begin by employing force, Austria commenced by sending four notes. The first, which was confidential, contained a declaration relative to the Neapolitan revolution, and was directed to the President of the German Diet, with a charge to communicate it to the cabinets of the German Princes. In this notification, the Emperor of Austria declared that no loss of time should take place in putting into execution the most forcible measures to protect, not only his own States in Italy, but likewise the whole of Germany from the march of revolutionary principles. A second note was addressed to the Princes of Italy. In this he offered them his protection against any aggression which might be attempted by the Neapolitans. The third was directed to the great powers, urging them to concert together upon the measures to be taken relative to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The fourth official note was addressed by the cabinet of Vienna to that of Naples. In it the Emperor accounted for having assembled so powerful a body of troops in Italy. The first reason adduced, was the preservation of peace and tranquillity in the Austrian provinces, as well as in the rest of the Peninsula. The Austrian army in Italy did not amount to less than sixty thousand men. It was reported that this power was in want of money to carry on the war for which it was preparing. This circumstance was probably correct, for many years afterwards, in France, I became aware that Louis XVIII. had lent Austria thirty-five thousand millions of francs, which sum was extremely

useful to his successor, Charles X., when driven into exile by the French.

Sweden, Switzerland, the Low Countries and Spain had acknowledged the Constitutional Government of Naples. The liberal party all over Europe had received a stronger impulse from the movement of Naples than from that of Spain. In the midst of the uncertainty which existed at Trappani, the King of Naples, discontented to reign through the agency of a Vicar, and unwilling to take the reins of a Constitutional Government into his own hands, secretly demanded assistance from the Allied Princes.

Whilst he was secretly writing to the Princes assembled at Trappani, himself and the Vicar were sounding the hearts of the Parliamentary Deputies to see if they would be disposed to adopt certain reforms tending to diminish the liberty granted by the Constitution of Spain. I was loudly accused of opposing myself to such reforms. Writing on this subject, Colletta says: "The mode itself would have been easy, since the parliament was to be consulted upon the subject of reform. But at the same time, the sects became more and more perverse, and General William Pépé, trusting to the acclamations at the reviews of his troops, and to the vaunts of the sectaries, was inflated with such presumption, as ardently to desire war, and to look upon the existence of peace as shameful and pernicious." This statement of the historian is a decided falsehood. I was of opinion that we ought to encourage union in order to be strong, for our freedom could only be defended by force of arms, and not by supplications. According to my views, that was not the propitious moment to modify the very deficient Spanish Consti-

tution; for I felt certain that in such a case the nation would have divided into two parties, and the one unfavourable to reform, identifying itself with the King, would involuntarily have favoured a foreign invasion. Nevertheless, I said I should be the first to exhort my fellow-citizens to adopt the Constitution of France instead of that of Spain, if the French Government, with the consent of the Chambers, would declare that they would support it, even with an army, should the occasion need it. But none of the powers of Europe ever offered to act as mediators between us and our enemies, imposing the condition that we should modify our Constitution. The Court intrigues only tended to divide the nation, so as to cause it to offer fewer obstacles to the invader. I therefore opposed myself to these disloyal machinations, nor have I ever repented so doing. The acclamations of which Colletta speaks had no weight upon my mind, for from my earliest age, inured to oppose the Austrians, I was fully conscious of what they were capable; and, on the other hand, I had learned in Calabria and Spain the little reliance to be placed on armed multitudes.

In the midst of these intrigues, there arrived three letters from the Emperors of Russia and of Austria and the King of Prussia. These letters had been solicited by King Ferdinand, and were to invite him to proceed to the Congress of Laybach, where the affairs of Naples would be discussed. According to the Constitution, the King could not quit the kingdom without the permission of the parliament. It was however decided, at a council of the ministers and of the ambassadors, that the Congress should be informed that, as the King had been summoned by the three Sovereigns, it was his intention to depart. But in accordance with the advice

of the wary Vicar, the parliament was informed by a message, of the invitation sent to the King by the three Princes, and of his acceptance of it, because by so doing he might act as a pacific mediator between the Allied Kings and his people. Besides this, the King made a solemn promise, that he would employ all the means in his power to obtain another statute, founded upon the following bases:

1. Individual liberty, secured by fundamental laws.
2. That no tax should be established without the consent of the national representatives.
3. That all the public expenses should be accounted for.
4. That the laws should be made by the King, conjointly with the national representatives.
5. That the judicial power should be independent.
6. That the ministers should become responsible.
7. That a civil list should be fixed.

The King moreover declared that he would not allow any one of his subjects to be molested on account of the late political events. In the meanwhile, he requested that the parliament would not adopt any new measures during his absence, and that four deputies should be selected to accompany him to Laybach as counsellors and witnesses.

On the 6th November, the ministers did nothing but hold conferences with the deputies with whom they were best acquainted, to induce them, by means either of promises or arguments, to receive with favour the message, which was in fact presented the next day. The protection of the Allied Princes so encouraged some Generals, that they laboured to effect the destruc-

tion of liberty by means of force, in the event of the parliament not consenting to what was demanded in the message.

That no doubt may be entertained respecting what I advance, I will re-produce the words of one of the conspirators, the Minister of War, Carascosa, who says in his History, page 237: "En attendant, l'on avait résolu que si la proposition n'était pas accueillie, il fallait absolument faire un effort pour renverser les anarchistes en opérant un autre 9 Thermidor. On insista beaucoup auprès du roi pour faire un tel acte de vigeur devenu trop nécessaire, mais on hésita, on perdit du temps, on ajourna."

Whether this conspiracy had got wind, or whether some treachery had manifested its existence to the sect, many Carbonari, honest and respectable men, came to entreat me not to pass the night in my house. I refused to accede to their entreaties, and was told the next morning that they had passed the whole night in arms watching over my safety. I passed that night, indeed, without sleep, not from any fear of a counter-revolution by such feeble conspirators, but on account of an uninterrupted succession of visits from the superior officers of the army and of the militia, as well as of the parliamentary deputies, who came to propose extreme expedients to me. Had the conspirators had the courage to unmask themselves, it is possible that the condition of my unfortunate country might have assumed another aspect. They would have been annihilated in a few hours by the National Guard, the soldiers, and the people, and a revolution, active and efficacious, would have begun on that day. The parliament would have been compromised; the army

purged of corrupt courtiers; and had we then fallen under the direct or indirect attacks of the powers of Europe, we should at least have fallen with honour. But the sad fate of Italy willed that the enemies of our national liberty should with a twofold infamy await the arrival of the foreign invader who was to oppress them.

As soon as the ministers had read to the parliament the message of the King, and the letters directed to him from Laybach by the three Sovereigns, loud cries of "the Constitution of Spain, or death!" proceeded from the seats occupied by the deputies, as well as by the public. It was not that they discerned the repression of liberty in the articles specified in the King's message; but the sight of a King annulling of his own accord the Constitution to which he had sworn solemnly on the 1st of October, manifested on one hand the little consideration in which he held the country, and the small confidence that could be placed in him on the other. Experience eventually proved how little faith was to be placed in such miserable devices. The indignation against the King and the allies was so great on that day, that had an army of sixty thousand Austrians presented itself against the city, we might have surpassed what had been done against the Spaniards under Masaniello, or against the French commanded by Championnet. At the two above-mentioned periods, the different classes of citizens were not agreed, as in 1820, when the number of traitors scarcely amounted to one in a thousand; and these on a general rising would have been far more likely to conceal themselves in a place of safety than to devise treachery. And on learning that the Parlia-

ment was determined to support the public cause at all hazards, an armed multitude would have poured in from the provinces without even being summoned.

The Carbonari, equally indignant at the conduct of the Court, the Ministers, and of several of the Generals, strove by threats and promises to induce the deputies to remain faithful to the public cause. The parliament, thinking themselves in danger, between the popular effervesence and the courtiers' conspiracy, wrote to me through the medium of their President, Ruggiero, to say that they desired to speak with me. On my arrival, the National Guard who was on duty there, began to beat their drums, to place themselves in order of battle, and regardless of discipline, shouted, "the Constitution of Spain, or death!" The patriots, collected thither from all parts of the city, re-echoed these cries; and the deputies, not aware that I had been called at their special instance by the President, and not used to see me there, supposed for a moment that my appearance had a hostile meaning.

The Parliamentary Commission asked me if the Congress might look upon itself as free, and not exposed to the conspiracy of the royalist party, and to the threats of the liberals; and what was my opinion upon the departure of the King. I replied, "The royalist party is nothing but an unpopular staff without soldiers; and, to the misfortune of the country, will not dare to do anything to constrain you, in spite of yourselves, not to persist in your false and fatal system of moderation. As to the patriots, or the higher Carbonari, you have nothing to fear; since their intentions are generally honest, I shall treat them as school-boys. As to the departure of the King, if you will authorize me so to do, I will this day conduct him

with the royal family to Caserta, and dissolve the royal guard, by draughting them among the other corps of the army." The Commission replied, that these measures could not be carried into effect without bloodshed; to which I replied that not even a drop would be spilt. The Commission however continued, "but if you are deceived; if what you propose should entail upon us a civil war?" I replied sternly, that they seemed to forget that they were speaking to a man who was not a novice in such matters, and whose opinion ought to have some weight with them, if they looked back to the past. The Commission did not dare authorize me to put my plan into execution; for on my part I hesitated some time as to what I ought to do in spite of the parliament: but on reflecting that any attempt of mine, made against the consent of the Congress, would have created a legal party in favour of the Court and of the Allied Princes, I withdrew; but I have ever looked upon that day as the first step to our ruin. In 1799, there was only a small fraction of the citizens devoted to the cause of liberty, and their representatives, elected by a foreign General, conducted themselves in a manner which proved that they preferred death to servitude. In 1820, a Congress selected by the nation, and unanimous in their desire to support the Constitution of Spain, had not the courage to adopt energetic means of proving themselves worthy of the trust confided to them. How hard to be learned is the knowledge of social combinations!

What my brother had foretold on the day he quitted the Provincial Governmental Junta happened with the parliament. The legal deputies became exclusive masters of the Tribune. Several young men, endowed with talent and patriotism were quite unaccustomed

to speak in public. The older deputies and the fathers of families studiously avoided all active measures, not to increase the displeasure of the Allied Princes as well as that of their own, whose royal anger had manifested itself so dreadfully in the year 1799. Few, indeed, had acquired the art of public speaking, except those who were lawyers. For instance, a deputy from the province of Bari, Nicolai, Marquis of Canneto, a learned man and a clever writer, composed a most eloquent discourse to excite the Congress to show a vigour worthy of the occasion; but as he read it, and read it badly, it produced no salutary effect.

In the midst of this general feeling of irritation, the message of the King was discussed by the Congress. Borrelli was the first person to speak and to enter into the question relative to the proposed change in the Constitution, and to the departure of the Prince. Although Borrelli was by no means deficient in talent and eloquence, faithful to his legal habits, he invoked St. Louis and Henry IV. as guarantees of the good faith of their descendant, King Ferdinand, just as if this Prince had not thrice been guilty of perjury, notwithstanding the virtues of his ancestors. Borrelli added, that as the nation could not possibly have a better or more efficacious advocate at Laybach than the King, it was by all means advisable to allow him to proceed there. As to the change in the Constitution, the wily Borrelli, pretty certain that *he* would not obtain any thing, opposed himself to it, so as not to lose the reputation for liberalism, which he unfortunately enjoyed in the estimation of the Carbonari. Several other deputies supported the same opinion, and it was therefore decided that His Majesty should be allowed to depart, on condition, however, that he renewed his

oath of fidelity to the Constitution, and promise to defend it in the Congress. The parliament could not have come to a worse conclusion, for on the one hand, this obstinate clinging to the Constitution of Spain, which they so much abhorred, irritated the Allied Princes, as well as our own King; and on the other, by allowing the King to depart, they placed him in a position to revenge himself without risk, which was a very great consideration to so timid a mind.

There was not, however, a single deputy of the Congress to exclaim: "In 1799, about six thousand of our countrymen were driven into exile, and three hundred of the best men in the country were barbarously put to death through the perjury of the present King. If those illustrious victims were to rise from their tomb and mock the blind faith which you lend to this same King, what argument could you make use of to justify your credulous simplicity?"

In the meanwhile, the timid King, frightened at this clamour, and before he was aware of the decision of the parliament, sent a second message, totally contradicting the first. He moreover promised to swear that he would support the Spanish Constitution in the presence of the Princes assembled at Laybach, adding, that should the Allies not prove favourable to the wishes of the people, he would himself return into the kingdom to support the rights of the nation. At the same time he renewed his request to be accompanied by four deputies to act as his counsellors, and to bear witness to his good faith. Being ready to commit fresh perjuries, his Majesty promised and swore every and any thing, so that they would but allow him to quit the country.

The feeble parliament made known the result of their

deliberations to the King in an address, thanking him for his proposal of consolidating the national freedom, at the same time expatiating upon the sanctity of an oath, and upon the terrible vengeance of God towards perjury. They refused the request that four deputies should accompany him to the Congress of Laybach, on the plea that the wisdom of his Majesty needed no council, or his noted good faith any witness. This address was presented to the King by twenty-four deputies of the Congress; and one of them, Borrelli, read its contents aloud, adding to it some of his own very liberal opinions. The Prince replied in the tone of a man whose heart is full of sincerity, declaring that, religiously regardful of his repeated oaths, he would fully justify the faith reposed in him by the representatives of his beloved people. I had gone to the palace to confer with the Duke of Calabria upon affairs pertaining to my office. He was no longer Vicar, but Regent of the United Kingdom, on account of the impending departure of the King, his father. Entering by chance the throne-room, I heard the discourse of Borrelli and the answer of the King; which being concluded, the deputation presented for his inspection the reform to be made in the Constitution of Spain, and the selection of the Counsellors of State. The King named the Counsellors the following day, but having no time to inspect the reform, he left that labour to his son, the Regent.

According to the Constitution of Spain, the State Counsellors were elected by the King from the *ternary* presented by the parliament; and it was almost indispensable to the interests of the army that one military man should be appointed amongst the Counsellors of State. I was selected to be one of the Counsellors; and as I was the only military man brought forward by

the Parliament, I accepted the charge for the welfare of my country. The office of Counsellor, moreover, was not in opposition to my promise of renouncing every advantage, for neither was it a question of increasing my emoluments, nor was the rank it offered by any means superior to what I already held. It seemed as if the King, like Ulysses, gloried in his dissimulation. After having promised and sworn so many things in order that they might allow him to depart; after his departure had been settled, and a few moments before his embarkation, he wrote the following letter to his son, the Regent, with the intention that it should be known:

" My dear Son,

" Although my sentiments are well known to you, I now write them that they may be the better impressed upon your memory. The pain which I experience at quitting the country is mitigated by the thought that I shall at Laybach promote the peace of my people and the rights of the throne. I am unacquainted with the intentions of the Allied Sovereigns, but I know my own, which I reveal to you, in order that you may at once have the commands of a King, and the precepts of a father. In the Congress I will defend the events of last July; I will firmly maintain for my kingdom the Constitution of Spain, and demand peace. My age requires rest, my dear son; and my mind, fatigued by many vicissitudes, recoils at the idea of external war, and of civil discord. May my people be at peace, and after thirty years of mutual tempests, may we finally reach a haven. Although I trust in the justice of the congregated sovereigns, and in our former friendship, it is necessary that you should know that in whatever

situation it may please God to place me, my will is that which I manifest in these pages, and it will ever remain unchangeable against the efforts which may be made against it. Let these words be engraved upon your heart, my dear son; make them the model of your regency, and the guide of your conduct. I bless and embrace you.

"FERDINAND."

Whoever reads this letter will be tempted to believe that part of its contents at least came from the heart of the King. But his subsequent conduct clearly proved that he thought exactly the contrary to what he wrote. The letter was shown to many persons, who revealed its contents, which thus became almost public, nor did the King write it for any other purpose. In the meanwhile, he embarked on board the British vessel, the Revenge, the same which received the Emperor Napoleon at Rochfort. King Ferdinand was obliged to proceed with the vessel to Baja, near Naples, that it might repair the damage it had sustained by coming into collision with a frigate of the same nation during the night. A deputation from the parliament proceeded thither to greet him; he received them, wearing on his breast the ribbon of the Carbonari sect, which they no longer displayed out of their Vendite. He repeated to the deputies what he had said and written. His intimate friend and the companion of his misfortunes in Sicily, the Duke of Ascoli went to see him and said, "Now that you are free and out of all danger, tell me how I am to conduct myself during your absence."

The King vexed at such a question, reproached the

Duke with seeming to doubt his real desire of consolidating at every risk the Constitutional throne, and of executing what he had sworn. The Duke, affected at this declaration, showed that he could be moved by noble sentiments. The admiration he expressed was rewarded on the return of the King by exile, notwithstanding the thirty years' friendship which had existed between them. Two days after the Revenge set sail for Tuscany, whence the King proceeded to Laybach. To wind up my account of the King's conduct, I must relate that when at Laybach, he was questioned as to the motives which had induced him to reiterate all his promises, when once he found himself safe on board the English vessel. He replied, that whilst at Baja he had remarked two pieces of artillery upon the fort which defends it. I was made acquainted with these particulars a year later in London by Lord Holland, who was on terms of intimate friendship with persons who had assisted at the Congress of the Allies.

The morning after the departure of the King, I was standing with Count Zurlo and various officers in the waiting-room of the Regent, when the Prince and his wife came out of the private apartments to accompany Prince Henry, brother of the King of Prussia, who being upon the point of quitting Naples had come to take leave of our Prince. On beholding me, contrary to the custom of the Court, Prince Henry quitted the Regent and his wife, and hastened to the spot where I stood. He twice took hold of my hands and embraced me warmly, whilst his tears fell so abundantly that he was obliged to take out his handkerchief. This scene did not at all please the Regent and the Princess, and

was observed with wonder by all the bystanders. Zurlo said to me, "This portends war:" and I replied, "if it be inevitable, let us meet it willingly."

I did not fail to pay a visit to Prince Henry on the same day, to wish him a good journey and to thank him for the kindness he had manifested to me. His aide-de-camp, Baron Lepell had our cause deeply at heart. I said to him, that if by giving myself up unconditionally to the Allies, I could avoid war, I would instantly start for Laybach. This gentleman replied, "We are all aware that you would sacrifice your life for your country; but the Allies wish to destroy your freedom, and upon this point they are decided." Could I only have obtained unlimited power to organize the people and the army for our independence, I should not have been so anxious for the maintenance of peace.

CHAPTER IV.

1820.

Change of Ministry—I hasten the organization of the National Guard—Guard of Security in the capital—I am made a member of the Commission formed to examine the modifications to be made in the Constitution of the kingdom—Letter written to me by the Regent—Arrival of officers from the different Italian provinces—The Duke of Calabria goes to the Parliament to take the oath as Regent. Constrained to decide between visiting the Abruzzi or Calabria, I select the Abruzzi.

THE ministers who had presented the message of the King to the Parliament were obliged to resign, and they were succeeded by others less opposed to the Constitution, but no less feeble in purpose. The Duke of Campo Chiaro and Count Zurlo, both of whom had affixed their signatures to a circular equivalent to the message from the King, were called upon by the national representatives to justify their conduct. The assembly, actuated by a sentiment of compassion, which is often extremely injurious in politics, pronounced their acquittal. The ministers who had fallen, in spite of the endeavours of the Duke of Calabria to support them, suggested to this Prince the choice of their successors. By these means the portfolio of the War Department was conferred upon General Parisi, a man of high

integrity and knowledge, but whose advanced age compelled him to abandon the ministry. Some said that he was averse to the secret intrigues carried on there, and that he felt he had been called to office too late to remedy the evils produced by the errors of his predecessor. To this misfortune must be added the aversion felt by the chief of the army, the Regent, for the new order of things, and the warm desire which was manifested by various Generals blindly to second his views. Under such circumstances the hope of saving our national independence by means of the army would have argued absolute fatuity. On turning my thoughts towards the militia, I could scarcely flatter myself that in so short a space of time, ill-supported by the Prince, and feebly by the Congress, I could organize them so as to make them available to an army weakened by the apathy of its commanders. If a hope was left me, it lay wholly in an insurrectionary war, which would have broken out on our first defeat, when the traitors would have been unmasked, and in which our national virtue would have shone forth even more brightly than in the days of Massena, when we were divided amongst ourselves. And as indecision of purpose, rather than a want of patriotism was manifested by the greater part of the deputies, it is to be presumed that the Congress would have followed the standard of the national insurgents.

In every event, as I was uncertain whether Austria would allow me three more months, I laboured day and night to organize the militia, the legions, and the Guard of Security of the capital. The measures I took for the organization of similar corps in Sicily were almost fruitless; for had the parliament been bribed by the Allies to sow discord between the people

of the two kingdoms, they could not have done so more efficaciously. If the threatened approach of the Allies had allowed me time to go over to the island, what with the excellent reputation Florestano left behind him and the facility of persuading to noble deeds the descendants of those people who had acquired such glory under their first Kings of Aragon, I could easily have derived great assistance from the warm-hearted Sicilians. Restricting myself to act with the greatest energy in the provinces on this side of the Straits, I found how injurious a Constitutional Princemay become in the exercise of public affairs. I was to have six Generals, as sub-inspectors, whose business was to execute my commands in the fifteen provinces of Terra Firma. The Regent chose to select them himself out of his own creatures, who gave me no manner of assistance. He was so obstinately bent upon this selection, that it was necessary to yield, or openly to revolt; neither would it have been easy to revolt, for the parliament would infalliably have declared the Regent, father of his country, and myself a rebel; because the Prince was supported by all the powers of Europe, and I by the Carbonari. We shall shortly see in the midst of so many difficulties, unsupported by the parliament, and detested by the Regent, whether I could have derived any advantage from the excellent disposition of the great mass of my countrymen. They were so devoted to the public cause, that they as implicitly conformed to all the orders I issued, as if I had been a dictator, all of which orders proceeded from myself, for there did not then exist, as I have before said, any laws either for the orginization or discipline of the different bodies I was to raise. It was a question of nothing less than the obliging about

two hundred thousand citizens to arm and equip themselves at their own private expense, whilst there existed no law to compel them to do so, and at a period when we were living under liberal institutions. I punished the slightest delinquencies by fifteen or thirty days' imprisonment, and never was I accused in a single paper of abuse of power. The two hundred thousand militia and legions were to hold themselves ready to move towards the frontier at a moment's notice. It is easy to know some of the labyrinths of the human heart, and the maxims whereby to guide mankind, but it is not given to every one to act up to such knowledge or by such maxims. Nobody is ignorant that a just and judicious severity gives satisfaction in the long run; but as its execution awakens temporary, and sometimes great discontent, few dare put it into practice. I exerted myself in my orders of the day to persuade the multitude that when the circuit, district, or province, elected a Captain, Major, or Colonel to assume their command, it ought to be looked upon by the latter as the greatest honour and satisfaction they could possibly attain. Having thus filled the officers with enthusiasm, I exacted great sacrifices from them, and in the legions in particular, the officers often provided the soldiers with clothes at their private expense.

The National Guard of the city and province of Naples, generally termed Guard of Security, existed in numerous cities, containing the names of all the principal proprietors of the city. These paid a trifling tax imposed on them, which furnished pay for about twelve hundred young vagabonds, arrayed in suitable uniforms. They mounted guard at several gates of the

city, and appeared at all the reviews. Being mostly idle, without any profession, and of bad habits, they tended far more to disturb than to maintain the peace of the city. When I said to the Council of Ministers, that as to the National Guard of Naples, I would, regardless of the past, organize one so useful and so well accoutred, as to be unequalled in any other capital of Europe, the Regent and his ministers were only restrained by their politeness from laughing in my face. I added, that I would so organize this guard, that in the event of war, Naples would not need a garrison of troops of the line. All the members of the Council said that I flattered myself, when I thought to organize in the capital a militia similar to that of the provinces, and that I should find myself mistaken. I replied that I was ready to turn hermit if I did not fully execute my promise. It would take too long to narrate minutely the system I pursued to execute my purpose. I was impartial and rigorous to the utmost possible extent. It is not true, as says Carascosa, that the castles were full of Guards of Security; not that I should have shrunk from imprisoning one half of the citizens of Naples, to accustom the whole population to sacrifice their own private interests and idleness to the public welfare; but on the one hand, the people were well inclined to second my object, and favourably disposed towards the cause of their country; and on the other, I was fully aware, that it was not by the number of punishments that I could set an example, but by severely chastising the delinquents of the highest social standing. In all, there were not, I believe, more than thirty punished by confinement within the castles, and amongst

these were several courtiers, who refused to mount guard on the plea that they were gentlemen of the bed-chamber on duty.

The Duke of Bovino, reporting himself ill, offered a thousand uniforms to be exempted from the service; I replied that the Guard of Security was clothed at their own expense. When this wealthy Duke, with his musket on his shoulder, and wearing the order of San Gennaro, stood sentry at the quarter of Santa Maria la Nuova, the multitude came to gaze at him, saying, "Thank heaven, at last we behold justice!" After such an example, how could any simple artisan or petty gentleman hope to be exempted or unpunished? Besides, they all liked to find themselves in good company, and with their superiors. I shall at a later period speak more of this Guard of Security; at present I must limit myself to recording some particulars relating to them. The province of Naples furnished a regiment of infantry; the capital itself gave six, two of cavalry and four of infantry; these formed twelve battalions, one for each quarter. The colonels were young men of the best families in the kingdom, such as Colonna, Prince Scigliano, and Prince Torella, brother of the Duke of Roccaromana. The Carbonari complained to me of the colonels of the above corps having been exclusively selected amongst the nobility. I replied, that the father of Torella had been condemned to death as a republican in 1799, and had been afterwards reprieved and sent to end his days in the Fossa di Santa Caterina, in the island of Favignana; that the uncle of Scigliano had been beheaded for the same cause; and that the brother of the Duke of Roccaromana had been driven into exile. That the circumstance of these gentlemen being of the very highest birth, and yet having proved

themselves favourable to the democratical party, was in itself a great merit. I added, that there was a post of colonel still vacant, and that they might propose to me any honest and active citizen who was not noble. The Carbonari of the high Vendita came and proposed the son of the Duke of Carignano for the vacant colonelcy. I told them, that the contradiction into which they had fallen fortunately proved that there existed no aristocracy amongst us, although we still possessed those vain titles.

I have already stated that, besides the inspection and organization of the National Guard, I had received the command of a division of the army which was stationed in the Abruzzi. It was indispensable that I should review the division confided to me, because I felt persuaded, that when once war should be decided, the Austrians would begin by attacking the Abruzzi before any other hostile operation. It was therefore extremely important that I should make myself acquainted with this important frontier, and ascertain the improvement made by the National Guard in the mountainous provinces, buried in snow during one-half of the year, where rises the Gran Sasso of Italy, and which would be the first exposed to invasion. Before quitting the capital, I had many things to arrange for the rest of the kingdom, and especially to obtain from the parliament and the Regent a decree, authorizing the purchase of a hundred thousand muskets. I had no slight difficulty in obtaining this decree, as well as that two active and intelligent artillery officers, should be sent over to England to effect the purchase.

In the meantime, the Regent ought to have occupied himself with the examination of the modifications proposed by the parliament to be effected in the

Constitution of Spain, with power either to approve or reject them. As he entertained hopes of again possessing absolute power, through the assistance of the Allied Sovereigns, he took little heed of these modifications; but to keep alive the public belief in the liberality and rectitude of his intentions, he established a Commission to make this examination, which was composed of three Ministers of State, three counsellors, and three deputies, two of whom were Borrelli and Pocrio. As all the Counsellors of State had been proposed by the Parliament, this Commission was calculated to satisfy both the Congress and the public. The Regent chose to give another proof of his tendency towards the most extensively liberal institutions, by selecting myself as one of the three State Counsellors who were to examine the already-mentioned modifications. When we came to discuss the subject, I said to the other members of the Commission, and particularly to Pocrio and Borrelli, that it would have been far wiser to have turned their attention to the general defence of the Constitution and the national independence against the Austrians than to so minute a discussion as the intended modifications. The advocate, Borrelli, who was never at a loss for an answer, good or bad, said in an ironical tone, "It is to be hoped that war will break out, else the first of our citizens, William Pépé, will die of grief." For the sake of peace I was obliged to listen quietly to the speeches of this man, whom, before the revolution. I would have sent a thousand times—to speak politely—to "the shades below."

To give some idea of my correspondence with the Regent towards the end of 1820, I will transcribe only two of the least prolix of his numerous letters. It will be clearly seen how deeply the Regent dissembled with the nation, and with all those who either by choice or

from necessity were about him. Listening to his conversation, or reading the letters written by him, one would have supposed him as eager as myself to promote the preparations for our defence, and to organize the National Guard of the kingdom; but in point of fact he did everything in his power to throw obstacles in the way of their execution. I was one day obliged to examine his portfolios, in search of certain important documents which he denied having received from me, but which I found at length in his cabinet.

"Naples, November 4, 1820.

"To Lieutenant-General, Don William Pépé.

"I learn with pleasure by your letter of yesterday, that last night the public tranquillity was not disturbed. As to the forage which you think ought to be given to the two regiments of hussars and national dragoons, it will be thought about. It would be necessary in the meanwhile to forward to the Minister of War some information as to the individuals who are to be admitted into these said corps, as it is essential that the War Office should be consulted upon the matter.

"I have solicited the decision of parliament upon several important points submitted to them respecting the infantry Guard of Security, but you had better, on your part beg them to hasten their decision. I find the reasons which you offer me, for not giving up the organization at this moment extremely conclusive, and I have no doubt that with your activity, it will be rapidly carried out. Orders have been already given respecting the dismissal of Captain Fannini, and you will do right to act in the same manner towards all the other officers whose conduct deserves the same treat-

ment. I have received a list of the Major-Generals and Colonels proposed by you to the Minister of War, to hold the office of sub-inspectors: my resolution will be communicated to you through the War Office, as well as my determination respecting Colonel Wispeare, whom you have requested to have as chief officer of your staff.

"FRANCIS."

Naples, November 11, 1820.

"To Lieutenant-General William Pépé.

"I have read your report of yesterday, and I find all that you have done for the proper organization of the provincial legions, extremely regular. It is very essential that they should be composed of capable men, fit for service, of good morals, in possession of a certain independence, and interested in the preservation of the public order. The choice of the officers who are to form part of the same corps, must be actuated by the same principles; indeed, more attention must be paid, as it would be irregular that they should wear the uniform of officers before they are provided with corresponding provisional brevets. These will be delivered as soon as you send the proposition rectified by yourself, according to the orders which I have given to the Minister of War, on the subject of the nominations proposed by you, and sent from the province of Terrano. The same course will be pursued when you send others. In order that all this be duly executed, it will be necessary for you to come to a proper understanding with the competent authorities, especially with the President of Public Security, as you justly observe, and I am certain that he will second you with

all possible activity and zeal in an operation so useful to the nation.

"I must warn you that the period fixed by you for the termination of the consolidation of the legion of Naples, purifying the same from such men as are pernicious, ought to be shortened as much as possible, by hastening the operations of all those who have aught to do with it. I therefore urge you to exert yourself to this effect with all the zeal and activity which characterize you, and which are exacted by a labour of such vast importance.

"Believe me with esteem and gratitude,

"Yours,

"FRANCIS."

I looked upon the formation of three camps of instruction in the Abruzzi, Monteforte and in Calabria, as indispensable. The object of these was to forward the instruction of the militia and legions, amounting to ten thousand in each camp.* By such means, they would become inured to the fatigue and customs of war. Besides this, I proposed that an intrenched camp should be opened in Calabria, exactly in the centre of the woods of Sila. I had expected that my projects would have been opposed by the Regent and his feeble ministry, but I found them ready to execute the decision of the parliament, which strange to say, offered the most decided opposition, on the plea that war was by no means probable, and that the expense of these camps would be too heavy for the exchequer. I replied that their first care should be to prevent the public treasury falling into the hands of the invaders; but the lawyers, with their mischievous jargon, led the Congress just as they pleased, and con-

tinued to affirm that war was become a fixed idea in my mind.

At this time, about a hundred and fifty French, Polish and Italian officers, from different parts of the Peninsula, arrived in Naples, with the purpose of fighting in favour of Italian liberty. Most of them had served under Napoleon. I requested the Regent to allow them to receive the salary awarded to those who were on active service; this was granted, and they accompanied me into Calabria, where they conducted themselves perfectly well. These officers all told me, that were I to pass the Tronto, all the people of the Papal States, the Lombards and the Piedmontese, would rise *en masse*. I replied that the day on which I learned that an insurrection had burst out in Lombardy, or in the States of the Church, would be a day of mourning to me, for such an insurrection could not be general, neither would it be supported by any strong fortress or troops of the line. On the contrary, a movement in Piedmont would have filled me with joy; for there it would be supported by a brave army, and excellent positions both in Alexandria and Genoa, whence it would have been easy to communicate with Naples by sea. I added, that if once the Italian flag were to float over the walls of Genoa, or in Alexandria, I would in spite of the Regent and the Parliament, endeavour to make my way into the province of Genoa, by Tuscany and Lucca, or else by sea: but neither myself nor the Carbonari ever received a single message from the Piedmontese provinces; and yet the liberals of those provinces knew full well to whom they ought to apply at Naples, whilst I was really ignorant to whom I could write in Piedmont. I should certainly not have thought of writing to the Prince of

Carignano, nor should I ever advise the friends of liberty to avail themselves of a Prince entitled to a throne, to assist them in overthrowing an absolute Government. I could not by any means reckon upon our own ministry to establish a secret correspondence with the Italian liberals, for they would infallibly have revealed such a circumstance to the Regent, who would in his turn have communicated it to the ministers of the Allied Princes, by whose means both himself and the King, his father, imparted their intentions to the Sovereigns met at Laybach.

On the 18th of December, the Duke of Calabria, accompanied by all his family, proceeded to the Congress to take the oath, in his new capacity of Regent. The President of the assembly spoke as follows:

"The oath just taken by your Royal Highness has filled our hearts with tenderness and joy. The attachment of your Highness to the public welfare has always been extremely manifest, but to-day you confirm it still more by the most solemn promises, which are guaranteed by a just God. The parliament congratulates itself upon having entrusted the Regency of the kingdom to your Royal Highness; to a Prince who loves the Constitution; who will consolidate its existence, and who alone could alleviate the grief we experience at the absence of the King, your august father. Under the auspices of your Highness we shall behold the power and splendour of our nation become more and more evident. We shall become more deserving of the esteem of just men, and more terrible to those who may dare to attack us. We will prove to the whole universe, that our liberty is the safeguard of the throne, the protection of the people, and that it is even closely

allied with public order. That finally an independent nation is capable of every thing, when it has at its head a magnanimous Prince."

The Regent replied: "I share in the truest manner the sorrow which you express for the absence of my august father. I have warmly at heart the noble object which has caused him to undertake this journey to Laybach, since it is to defend the cause of the nation so dear to his heart, and to spare you all the evils of war. The new title, which, conjointly with the King, my father, you have confided to me, is a fresh proof of the affection and confidence of the nation. It will urge me, more than ever, to become a vigilant guardian of our present Constitution, and to increase the glory and welfare of the nation. *Far—far be from us hoary mistrust, and dark intrigues!* Let us emulate each other in the paths of honour: you, with all the faculties given by legislative power; and I, with all the energy and freedom imparted by the same to the executive power. Whilst the King, my respected father, raises his voice in defence of our country before the Allied Sovereigns, let us, by the noble firmness of our demeanour, impose still stronger reasons in our favour."

These words were interrupted by the enthusiastic applause of every one present. The Prince, affected to tears, resumed: "The words I have just uttered come from my heart, which regards the Constitution as the foundation of the prosperity of our country. They convey, likewise, the sentiments of his Majesty, our King and father, which he expressed to me before his departure."

On looking closely into these speeches, which were

exchanged between the Regent and the parliament, it will be seen that it would have been vain for me to publish the reasons I had for not placing the slightest trust in the good faith either of the King or his son. As it is in the nature of man to believe what he wishes to be true, all the citizens who were esteemed as honest and right-minded re-echoed the opinion of the parliament. On the 26th of December, as Carascosa states in his history, the citizen, Attore, presented an act of accusation against that General, but the Congress paid little attention to it.

I have already stated the reasons which obliged me to go into the Abruzzi; and yet others, perhaps, more important, called me into Calabria, In the Abruzzi, it was a question of the first engagements which would have occurred with the invaders: in Calabria, the fate of our country would be decided. If once the Calabrese had been put into motion and engaged, either the cause of freedom would have triumphed, or we should have fallen with honour. But in the Abruzzi—the organization of the militia had been entirely neglected; and in one of the three provinces—that of Aquila, the populations contiguous to the Papal States, had been evidently operated upon by the suggestions of a superstitious and interested clergy. I would just remark that of all the districts in the kingdom, here alone did the fanatical priests succeed in exercising their evil influence upon the minds of the lower orders of the people. Called upon with equal enthusiasm by the patriots of the Abruzzi and of Calabria, I committed the great error of proceeding to the Abruzzi, uncertain whether the enemy would leave me time to visit Calabria, which I ought to have preferred for two

weighty reasons: the proof that the Calabrese had given of their courage in 1805, under Massena, and the intimate knowledge I had of this people, which I had acquired no less by having been born in the midst of them, than from having fought with them under Massena; and from having, at that period, organized about twenty-four thousand of them into militia, which was then denominated, Provincial Guard.

CHAPTER V.

1820.

My departure for the Abruzzi—State in which I find the means of defence, the Militia, and the Legions—I distribute colours which had been richly embroidered by the Princess Regent—Tour in the province of Aquila—Intrigues of the Papal Government with the population of the provinces adjacent to the Roman States—Letters from the Regent and the deputy Pocrio—Tour in the province of Trano—Letters from the Minister of Grace and Justice, and from the most noted liberals of the capital.

On the night of the 24th of December, when the Neapolitans cast aside their usual habits of abstemious sobriety, and collect together their parents and friends to feasting and revelry, I began my journey into the Abruzzi. Before I entered my travelling-carriage, accompanied by the chief of my staff, Del Carretto, and by my aide-de-camp, Staiti, I proceeded to the Regent, who was expecting me. He was surrounded by his wife and children, who, from their tender years, and the beauty of their appearance, naturally created a sentiment of interest. The Regent held by the hand his eldest son, a child of eleven years, attired in the uniform of a colonel: he said to me, pointing to the young Prince, "You must teach this boy the profession of arms, and if we are to have wars, he shall be

with you." The young Princes and Princesses were seated close by at supper, for on Christmas Eve at Naples, every one, from the royal family down to the lower classes, all sup joyously. Not only did the Regent renew his promise of faithfully, and at every cost, supporting the revolution, but he moreover desired me to inform the population of the Abruzzi, that before long he would visit those provinces. He then gave me the standards embroidered by his wife, the sister of Ferdinand of Spain; there was one for every battalion, and I was to distribute them myself.

On reaching the Abruzzi, I became only too conscious that when it is a question of warlike preparations, the legislative body have no remedy against the malicious negligence of the executive power. The Minister of War, and still more the inspector of the engineers, Colletta, had as wholly neglected the labours of fortification along the frontier of the Abruzzi, as if there had been no probability of war. The provisional fortifications in the passes of Tagliacozzo, Popoli, Antrodoco, Morano, and Leonessa, were truly ridiculous. I did not myself regard these labours as useful, but since they had been undertaken at all, they ought to have been properly executed, instead of uselessly expending money at a period of such financial distress. The artillery had not cartridges for a single engagement, and no measures had been taken to procure provisions. The regiments of the line were in want of cloaks and shoes in the midst of the snow; leathern knapsacks for the soldiers were likewise wanting. As far as regarded the organization of the militia, and of the legions, it was only begun after I was made Inspector-General; and in the three months which had preceded my nomination, what had been done by a ministry opposed to our

institutions? The commanders of the provinces, and the sub-inspectors, were mostly devoted to the Regent, and men of no capacity. Of what avail is the ardour of the people, their firm determination to defend their country, if they have chiefs who are opposed to the public welfare? Colonel del Carretto, the chief of my staff, used honestly to say to me, "General, you alone are fever-stricken, and this makes me foresee nothing but misfortune."

I began to write urgent letters of complaint to the Ministers, to the Generals, to the Intendants, to the Parliamentary Deputies, and to the Regent. I threatened to reveal to the public, through the medium of the press, all this fatal negligence. My letters produced some little effect; but I could not instil the love of country into the hearts of those who smiled at the very name, and who, if they did anything, did it out of fear, lest the revolution should consolidate itself in despite of so much treachery. There was no lack of good and honourable citizens to occupy the places given to the unworthy; but the latter alone found favour with the Prince. In the meanwhile, my soul found some consolation in the contrast which existed between the ardent desire of the people to act in behalf of their country, and the slothful indifference of the former. I began to organize the militia and legions of the Abruzzi, with my usual perseverance. As I was pressed for time, and the days were at the shortest at that season. I reviewed them at night by torch-light, by the flame of which I addressed myself to those warm-hearted people, and presented them with the colours embroidered by the Duchess of Calabria.

Of the three provinces of the Abruzzi, that of Aquila was the one which inspired most interest, from

its being the most extensive and populous, and the most exposed to the inroads of the enemy. If a hostile army were to cross the Tronto and enter the Abruzzi by Guilianuova, it would be placed between the sea, the Gran Sasso of Italy, having in front the Pescara, and the fort which takes its name from that river. Now, the province of Aquila, which was the first that would receive the shock of the enemy, was the only one in the kingdom in which the party opposed to our revolution had any weight. This arose from the circumstance of many of the families of the rich landholders and people being connected by blood with those of the States of the Church, where many of the peasantry of Aquila go to till the ground. The priests of these districts, instigated by their Papal brethren, not being able to entice the men away from Constitutional or Carbonari principles, worked upon the women and persuaded them that their husbands belonging to these sects would be damned, and enjoined them to live apart from them. I had entertained some idea of forming a column of these sorry priests, and sending them into Capitanata to pass the winter with the shepherds of the Abruzzi; but I did not carry it into effect, from the certainty that the parliament would have blamed such an act. The greatest evil I feared from the priests, was that they would act as spies to the Austrians as soon as the war should break out, and that, thanks to such warm friends, none of my movements and preparations would have been concealed from the enemy.

Whilst I was in Aquila, besides the letters written to me by the Regent, I received one from the Deputy, Pocrio. The latter informed me that the King had reached Florence, and that in that city, where he was at

full liberty to make known his real intentions, he showed himself decided upon maintaining his promises, and advocating the cause of liberty, and of the national independence. And yet Pocrio, who was a man of much capacity, and who in 1799 had been amongst the patriots who capitulated, when no heed was paid to the capitulation, was condemned to death, which sentence was commuted into imprisonment for life in the Fossa di Santa Caterina in Favignana. It is a sad truth that some men never seem to derive any profit from the examples offered by history; but it is still more disheartening to see that they reap no more profit from the misfortunes of their own lives. Before I quitted the province of Aquila I organized four battalions of militia, and four of the legions. As there was a great want of muskets, I ordered that all the rifles used in sporting which could be got together should be repaired and put in order. The people of Aquila honoured me with a grand ball given in the theatre. There I perceived that the love of our institutions, in that city, did not equal that of the towns of Chieti and Teramo.

From Aquila I determined to proceed to Teramo, by Tottea, in order to examine for myself that dangerous road, to observe the country around it, and to assure myself likewise whether it was impassable in the middle of winter. Having spoken upon the subject to all classes of persons, they had assured me that during that month at least, it was wholly impracticable on account of the great quantity of snow which had fallen, and which rendered it necessary to cross the Appennines near the Gran Sasso of Italy. I therefore turned on the left bank of the Pescara, and by Civita di Penna, entered the province of Teramo, where I found the whole population in the greatest enthusiasm. That

province likewise touches upon the States of the Church on the side of Ascoli. The people of Ascoli were more disposed to become Carbonari, however, than to lure those of Teramo from their patriotism. During the course of my tour, men and women, not only of the lower but of the wealthier classes came many miles on foot to meet me. What a contrast between these worthy mountaineers who had never read of the glories of the Romans, the Samnites, or the Greeks, and the learned men of the capital, and so many Generals and superior officers! Our learned men attracted the applause of all liberal Europe by the eloquence of their discourses; and the Generals, in less desperate circumstances, would have defended the national honour at the head of their troops; but both the one and the other, seeing the country threatened by such powerful enemies, rested their hopes more upon the promises of the King and Regent than upon the public spirit of the people, who had already on other occasions given proofs of vigour and perseverance against foreign invasion.

I was received in the city of Teramo with the greatest cordiality, and with a pompous display which I would willingly have dispensed with, but as it expressed their ardour for the public cause, I was obliged to content myself with it. Each district of the kingdom furnished two battalions, one of militia, and another of the legion; but the people of Teramo would give three battalions for each district, one of militia, and two of the legion. From Teramo, I proceeded to visit Civitella del Tronto; when half-way there, in the village of Campli, I found, in the midst of the snow, a beautiful temple, constructed of the branches of trees, and ornamented with baskets filled with a kind of sweetmeat

for which that part of the country is celebrated. With these and other demonstrations, the people rejoiced in honour of the public cause. Little had been done to improve the fortifications of Civitella del Tronto; but that fortress had been greatly favoured by nature, and there is not a question but that a government jealous of the honour and independence of the nation, might have rendered it an impregnable fortress.

A judge of the civil tribunal of Chienti, a native of Civitella del Tronto, being there on business, determined upon giving me a hearty dinner. He was a ready *improvisatore*, and a great patriot, and during the whole course of the dinner, he did nothing but improvise upon patriotic themes. He might have sang at length to flatter a Prince who had oppressed the nation, but he could not have done so with that energy, with that delirious fire which animated his black eyes, with that smile of joy which seemed to testify that his soul was possessed by the genius of Italy. In those days, I was continually placed between the poetry of pure minds and the selfish prose of the corrupt; although the latter were few in number, they prevailed greatly, as they had the ear of the fortunate Princes, the oppressors of the people. The worthy judge and his improvisations detained us so long that when I returned to Teramo, it was night, and I was obliged to review several battalions, staying for me in the city, by torch-light; which circumstance greatly amazed those good mountaineers of the Abruzzi. On the following evening, I visited the *baracca* of Carbonari in the Vendita which they held. The form of the *baracca*, the axe, the stove, the busts of the Virgin, and of Jesus the martyr of despotism, were all objects which spoke to the imagination of the multitude. Almost all the

respectable men were Carbonari, and there were mendicants in this society, and the most conspicuous citizens almost always held the higher grades of the sect. The plebeian and the gentleman were seated together side by side.

In the Carbonari of the provinces more morality existed than in those of the capital; the former were consequently far more useful to the public cause. During the months of the Constitution, the Carbonari acquired such extension, that their *baracche* might justly be styled patriotic halls, and were far better regulated than those which existed in France and Naples during the Republic. I was astonished, and struck with admiration at the conduct and principles professed by the Carbonari of the Abruzzi. This sect afforded me great assistance in organizing in the three provinces twenty new battalions of militia, and eleven of the legion. Not only did all the Carbonari enlist, but the more wealthy assisted the poorer with money to clothe themselves, so that the militia and the legions were clothed and armed with shooting rifles at their expense. It may be believed that after the events of the past twenty years, the exertions of the Carbonari, and the population of the kingdom inflamed with the love of liberty, organized into battalions and supported by an army of the line even less numerous than the one we possessed, might have so surrounded the Austrians and resisted them, that few would have quitted the kingdom, and Italy would have been free. But to bring about such a result, it was indispensable that our forces should be directed by a ministry and by Generals really devoted to their country. To have both the one and

the other, in spite of the King and the Regent, it would have been necessary, that by an extraordinary accumulation of political circumstances, the parliament should have been forced to compromise itself; that is to say, it would have been essential that with the fall of liberty, the deputies should have beheld for themselves the prospect of exile, the prison or the scaffold.

During the period of my stay in the Abruzzi, it happened that twelve soldiers of the 8th of the line, in garrison at Civita di Penne, deserted. They were pursued and attacked; although determined to defend themselves, after a pretty warm fire they surrendered to the Carbonari, who out of sheer patriotism had joined in the pursuit. One of the deserters was killed and three were wounded. These Carbonari, it will be understood, belonged to the militia and to the legion, the first duty of the sect being to defend the country with their arms.

A great number of patriots from various cities of Italy had come to the Abruzzi; they were principally, however, from those in the vicinity of the Papal States. They were constantly entreating the Carbonari of the Abruzzi to proclaim the independence of Italy, promising as usual the assistance of hundreds of thousands of armed men. They added that were I, without the consent of the parliament and of the Regent, to cross the Tronto, the whole of Italy, from the Alps, would immediately fly to arms. They said so much, that finally a deputation composed of sensible men of the sect came to speak to me upon the subject; I had not much difficulty in convincing them that such designs and expectations were but too ill-founded. I myself spoke to the patriots beyond the Tronto, and told them to be in

readiness to rise when the Austrians should enter the kingdom. And even in this case, I bade them be cautious, and only show themselves in places where neither the artillery nor the cavalry could act; so that they should never be obliged to fight otherwise than separately. These warm-hearted young men, out of civility, appeared to be convinced, but I could read upon their countenances that they were not, and that they thought they knew more of the matter than myself.

From the enthusiastic province of Teramo, I passed into that of Chieti which was no less so. The inhabitants of Pescara, both men and women, had contributed by the labour of their hands to restore the fortifications which had been destroyed there by the Austrians in 1805. This fortress, with the sea free, would have been of the utmost service in a national war.

As I approached Chieti, it was a moving scene to behold the inhabitants of this city and of the neighbouring communes, amounting to about thirty or forty thousand persons of both sexes and of every condition coming to meet me, preceded by young girls bearing olive branches. The intendant of the province, Liguori, who, accompanied by the principal authorities, had come in carriages to meet me, said that nothing I beheld had been prepared by him, and that in these demonstrations I might perceive the enthusiasm of the population under his administration. Not only am I ignorant of the art of embellishing the facts I relate, but I have not even that of setting them forth in the best colours, else the reader, on perusing this narrative of my tour in the Abruzzi would weep with emotion.

I was myself deeply affected to perceive that, after centuries of slavery, the name of liberty had power to elevate this people to rapture.

The Carbonari of Chieti were by no means inferior to those of Teramo in number, enthusiasm, or in the moral qualities of their leaders. It is true, however, that amongst the Carbonari of Chieti, there was one in high credit, a doctor born in the Marches, and long established in the Abruzzi, who was by no means famous for his morality; whilst in Teramo the oracle of the Carbonari was the worthy Delfico, brother of the author of the same name. But this circumstance however unpleasant to Chieti, was compensated by the good qualities of its Carbonari, for even the demagogues of corrupted morals acted like men of virtue, when by so doing they could acquire the desired popularity. I had been unable to prevent a public feast being offered me at Aquila, Civita di Penne, and at Teramo, nor could I avoid this honour at Chieti. From this city I went on to its rival, Lanciano, which if it does not vie with Chieti in its buildings, does so in the activity and energy of its population. Here even the Bishop showed himself a great liberal: he preached a most liberal sermon in the church to the two battalions of the district assembled there for the distribution of their colours. Not having time to extend my tour as far as Vasto, I called its battalion of militia to Lanciano, which was better organized, through the pains-taking of its commander, Major Cardone, than many of the line. Had we still remained a nation, he would have received the reward due to his services, for I had warmly recommended him to the ministers and the Regent.

Amongst other letters of the month of January, the Regent wrote me the following:—

Naples, January 16th, 1820.

"To Lieutenant-General Don William Pépé, Civita Ducale.

"I am infinitely grateful for the good wishes you offer up to heaven for my preservation, and that of my family, contained in your letter of the 3rd. Being fully convinced of your affectionate sentiments towards me, I am the more obliged to you, seeing that you do full justice to my feelings, which are ever directed to the welfare of the kingdom, and the preservation of the liberty given it by the King, my august father. I expect your promised observations upon the present state of these provinces, and upon the means which you regard as necessary to be used in their present condition. I flatter myself you have already received a letter which I wrote to you before this. I remain with esteem and affection.

"Yours, FRANCIS.

"P.S.—Your letter of the 12th instant, written from Civita di Penne, has just reached me: I inform you of it for your guidance."

In this manner did the Regent himself write to me; but at the same time he made the Minister of Grace and Justice, Troisi, write and desire me to return to Naples, unless I wished to see the capital in a state of anarchy. There the National Guard and a legion of the people, half completed, were in open war with the royal guard, and every day there were men killed or

wounded on both sides. The young students from the provinces had begun to excite the Carbonari to manifest their disapproval of the want of energy of the parliament, so that everything was in disorder, nor did the Generals commanding the troops of that vast city dare to employ force, being detested by the multitude. Besides the letter from this minister, I received others from my friends, many of whom were men of sagacity, who saw clearly the misery of our political condition, and were aware of the constant intercourse between the ministers of the Allied Princes and several of the Generals. They informed me that nothing had been done for the purchase of muskets, and that different brevets which I had demanded for several Colonels and Majors of the legion and militia, had not yet been forwarded, which greatly impeded the progress of the organization of those national corps. All these unsatisfactory tidings forced me to quit the good and loyal people of the Abruzzi; but before starting for the capital I received three letters which I had demanded of the Regent. They were addressed to three intendants of those provinces, and contained a strongly-expressed approbation of the zeal displayed by them in the public cause.

CHAPTER VI.

1821.

My arrival in Naples—The disorders excited there by the enemies of the revolution disappear—My conference with the War Commission of the Parliament—The French squadron is disposed to hoist the tri-coloured flag; reasons why this was not executed—Review of the National Guard of the capital—The Archbishop of Naples and his manifesto—First letter of the King to his son, the Regent—The Neapolitan Constitution is established and approved—The Regent is present at the last session of the Congress—Proclamation of the permanent Parliamentary Commission to the people of the Two Sicilies.

I entered Naples at midnight about the middle of January, and was astonished on reaching the Strada Toledo, on my way to the Chiaja where I lived, to hear the report of musketry. I immediately despatched one of my officers to ascertain the meaning of such an occurrence and its causes. I was informed that it proceeded from two patrols, one of the royal guard, and the other of the guard of security, and that this was one of the outrages daily repeated. The royal guard called the guard of security rebels, and the latter retorted by styling the others Fedeloni? The animosity was excited on one side by the officers devoted to the Court, and on the other by zealous Carbonari. It was publicly reported that the foreign ministers had some-

thing to do with it, being anxious to represent the kingdom as in a state of anarchy, in order to afford a pretext to the Allied Princes to march against us with their armies; as if even a state of utter anarchy could give them any right to interfere in our private affairs. In the meanwhile, as is usually the case, these disorders committed with impunity only served to cause the perpetration of others, and heaven only knows to what length they might have been carried had I not fortunately returned to Naples. The next morning I made the round of the twelve quarters of the city on horseback: in each quarter there was a post of the Guard of Security. My visit to these posts joined to an order of the day, immediately put an end to every disorder, and even to the fear of seeing them renewed. The whole population now said, that these commotions could not have been the effect of an exalted feeling of patriotism; but that they proceeded rather from the evil machinations of the enemies of our liberty.

Finding that several superior officers and colonels proposed by myself to hold such offices, and approved by the Regent, had not yet received their brevets from the Minister of War, I immediately waited upon the latter to inquire the cause of such delay; but he assured me that he had put the documents before the Regent to await his signature, and that his Royal Highness had not yet returned them. I then went to the Regent, to whom I said, that without colonels and majors to command the battalions, it was utterly impossible to organize the National Guard effectively, and he then assured me that the brevets had never been sent to him for his signature. The aged minister maintained that they had been presented some time back, and given into the hands of the Regent. To clear up the mystery, I

searched as I had been obliged to do once before, the papersof his Royal Highness, amongst which I found the brevets. They were immediately signed and forwarded; but it was a month after the time they ought to have been delivered, and this delay was of no small consequence. It would have been madness to have shut one's eyes to the evil intentions of the Regent. He had likewise neglected to send off the officers of artillery who were to have effected the purchase of a hundred thousand muskets to arm the militia and the legions, who were provided only with common rifles without bayonets, and even these were mostly in bad condition.

From the cabinet of the Regent I went to the House of Parliament, whither the war commission had assembled to hear my verbal account of the defensive state of the Abruzzi, and of the legions and militia of those provinces, as well as of those in the other parts of the kingdom. The infirm state of health of the Minister of War precluded his giving any exact intelligence upon the subject. The two eloquent advocates, Pocrio and Borrelli, formed part of this commission. I began by showing that the executive power had certainly not acted up to the national requirements; that if they reflected a moment, they would see that of the soldiers on leave, summoned to complete the army, the number had been far more considerable than was requisite; that, having decreed the formation of the militia and legions, in the course of scarcely three months, and in spite of numerous obstacles there now existed upwards of a hundred and twenty strong battalions. That money having been called for, even the taxes had been, contrary to custom, paid in advance. Finally, that although the troops had been withdrawn from the provinces, still there existed the greatest possible public order in them,

whilst the country and the public roads were safer even than before. On the other hand, if they examined into the conduct of the ministry, they would see that the fortifications formed in the Abruzzi were of no use; that the corps of the line were unprovided with cloaks, knapsacks, and shoes. That the militia and legions had no muskets; no cartridges, nor powder to make them with; that there were no magazines to contain the provisions for the troops and for the National Guard, if assembled on the frontier.

Finally, that notwithstanding his promises, the Regent had not yet despatched the officers to effect the purchase of muskets. I added that the neglect of this purchase was of such importance, that were I to make it known to the nation, both the Regent and the parliament would forfeit all claim to its confidence. That I did not make this circumstance public, not from any consideration for the Duke of Calabria or the Congress, but to avoid any disturbance, which is always the greatest of evils at a moment when there is any fear of a foreign invasion. That I did not publish the negligence of the Regent in keeping in his portfolio, for a period of thirty days, the nomination of the superior officers of the National Guard. I ended by telling them, that in spite of so many obstacles they would shortly behold the National Guard of Naples surpass their expectations by the manner in which it would be organized.

I read upon the countenance of these deputies no little displeasure at the boldness of my speech. The trust they held, instead of exciting them to make every effort for the public welfare, even in the defiance of the greatest dangers, only served to render them proud and vain, as but too often happens with men who for the

first time find themselves in possession of power. Nevertheless, as they were all attached to the new order of things, and as it would not have suited them to break with me, who was justly irritated at seeing the public interest thus grossly neglected, they summoned instantly the Ministers of War and of Finance. The latter was the Duke of Carignano, who proved himself more active in the exercise of his functions than could have been expected from his advanced years, and who was devoted to the Constitutional Government. He met with great difficuties in obtaining the money necessary to carry on the expenses of the war; and the deputies were little inclined to encourage him to resort to energetic expedients. I told them that, were the Austrians to enter the kingdom, they would be less particular as to the means by which they would raise the money of which they might be in want. I have not forgotten a particular circumstance which shows how injurious lawyers are in a National Congress. Having explained to the Commissioners the extreme fervour of the population of the Abruzzi in the defence of their province, and that by the month of March they would furnish twenty battalions clothed and armed at their own expense, I added, that as they were the poorest population of the country, it would be fitting to make over to the Intendants of the three Abruzzi, the trifling sum of fifty thousand ducats to purchase guns, shoes and cloaks, to be distributed amongst the poorest of the legions. By doing this, the Congress would evince its good feeling towards these poor populations. It seems scarcely credible, but Doctor Borrelli replied, "General, instead of twenty battalions, organize eighteen or even sixteen, and spare the treasury these fifty thousand ducats." I was indignant at this mean

advice; and having replied with considerable warmth, the Commission granted my request. The respectable General Parisi, Minister of War, had not long held that office; and his good intentions were unavailing against his infirm health and advanced years, which rendered him incapable of contending against the intrigues of the Court.

Two or three days after my return to the capital, I received a visit from a French naval captain, who, owing to his political opinions was not in active service. He came to tell me that the officers of the French fleet, which lay in the Bay of Naples, were upon the point of hoisting the tricolored flag, and of setting sail for Toulon, to proclaim the fall of the Bourbons, and that they had great hopes of being assisted by the liberal party in France; but that before they attempted to carry such a scheme into execution, they wished four of our most influential deputies to assure them, that in the event of their not succeeding in their attempt, they would exert all their influence to cause them to be permitted to enter the Neapolitan service. This project seemed to me extremely bold; but at that period France was in a state of great excitement, and public affairs in Naples were in so deplorable a condition, that I was determined to speak upon the subject to Borrelli and Pocrio, who were the most influential men in the Congress. They would not allow the matter even to be thought of. Five years afterwards, I mentioned this to the Duke of Bassano, at Brussels, and he said it was his opinion, that if the fleet had arrived at Toulon with the tricoloured flag, France would have been thrown into a state of insurrection on account of the hatred borne by the people to the Bourbons, who had been placed upon the throne by foreign armies.

I have in another chapter stated what the National Guard of Naples, generally termed Guard of Security, was under Joachim; it was composed of twelve hundred vagabonds, paid by the landholders, who thus, by means of a few carlini a month, were exempt from a service which every respectable citizen would have been ashamed to perform. I have likewise said that both the ministers and the Regent thought that it would be impossible to establish in Naples such a National Guard as had been formed in the provinces. Against the convictions of all, I had begun to organize it in the capital, according to my own ideas.

It was the end of January; I had spent a full month in the Abruzzi, so that only fifty days remained to me to complete my operations. The day of the general review arrived; the Regent was to distribute the colours embroidered by his wife, and the sun shone with that brilliancy which is common in the middle of winter in that heavenly climate. The province of Naples gave three battalions; the capital twelve, and two regiments of cavalry. Each battalion contained from twelve to fifteen hundred men, clad in green uniforms, faced with maroon, and elegant, both by their make and the quality of their materials. The smiling countenances, and the slight figures of the young men completed the beauty of these civic troops. Each regiment, whether infantry or cavalry, had its band; and as the musicians forming it were voluntarily attached to the different corps, the result was, that the music was such as might be expected from the city of harmony. Over and over again I asked for a national hymn in the style of the Marseillaise, but my endeavours on this score were in vain. Many attempts, both in verse and music, were brought to me, but they were

melodious conceptions, not bold inspirations. I used to say to the scientific composers and poets, "You ought to be able to touch the hearts of the lower orders, or of a barbarian like myself. How comes it, that you cannot find words and sounds to excite a people, who weep over the adventures of knight errants, and who will remain without food for a whole day for the pleasure of listening to such tales?" It was useless, and I only lost my labour. When I rode along the ranks of these magnificent troops I was myself amazed at their appearance. According to what was told me, these worthy citizens had spent more than two million ducats on their clothes and equipments, without reckoning the expense of those forming the regiments of cavalry, commanded, one by the Duke of Caroli, and the other by Prince Serignano. Amongst the cavalry were to be seen young men of the best families in Naples, and remarkable for their elegance. I used to term these regiments "the squadron of Rinaldo." The strangers who were in Naples were more struck with admiration than the Neapolitans themselves; and the Regent and family, as they drove in two carriages along the Chiaja, gazed on this National Guard with approbation. The Prince would cast his eyes from the regiments to me in token of his satisfaction at my perseverance and its success. He entered with the royal family into a church in the Riviera di Chiaja. There a priest pronounced a sermon full of the warmest patriotism, and then blessed the colours. These were handed to me by the Regent, and by me to the colonels, who distributed them to the national troops, to whom the benedicton had been made known by the discharge of the artillery of the castles. They then filed off, and the review ended. The utility derived from this militia was immense,

for the city could be left without any garrison, which was indeed done, and yet it enjoyed as much tranquillity as if ten thousand troops of the line had been stationed there.

Although this small service which I had been able to render the State had been generally applauded, even by Florestano, the same evening, a Member of Parliament, remarkable for his wit, named Galante, said at a large party of his colleagues, "This morning General Pépé showed us his Prætorians, who really presented an imposing appearance." The same morning, the majority of the deputies wished to suspend the sitting, that they might be able to see the review, but this proposal was opposed by some from a petty feeling of jealousy. This mean ingratitude towards me, whose whole heart was full of the desire of serving my country, did not greatly affect me. I regarded these vexations as the thorns inseparable from a beautiful rose; as the light clouds which confer increased lustre upon liberty.

It was the end of January when the Archbishop of Naples, to whom the Government had shown more indulgence than there was occasion for, growing bolder and bolder, began to set forth the most extraordinary pretensions. He published a pastoral charge, signed by himself and twenty bishops, in which he brought into play all the force of priestly hypocrisy to make the people believe, that whilst the nation was ruled according to Constitutional laws, it was not only in open revolt against Princes, but against God himself. Amongst other things, he protested that the parliament ought not to have anything to do with ecclesiastical punishments. He said also, that perverse men despised both the virtue and the religion of our fathers. So seditious a manifesto produced no effect; for even the

common people were no longer disposed to give heed to the cant of the clergy. The parliament, as weak on this occasion as it had been on many others, contented itself with requesting the Regent to put an end to the irregular conduct of the Archbishop by whatever means he pleased. The Regent and the ministry then caused the Minister of Grace and Justice to write to the Archbishop, informing him that the circular published by him was contrary to the rights of Princes, and that such an act was a delinquency prohibited by the code then in force; but that out of regard to the Cardinal-Archbishop, they would this once overlook the circumstance, upon condition that he should withdraw every copy of the manifesto and dismiss his Vicar-General, from whom the circular had emanated. I was of opinion, that two hundred thousand copies of this pastoral charge should be published, with a refutation taken from the maxims of the Gospel, to serve as a liberal catechism to the people; but the lawyers and such priests as were deputies in the parliament, thought that it was too much presumption in a General to interfere in religious and political matters which seemed to them very difficult to handle. At that period, as well as during the two preceding years, I had closely scanned the influence which the King might have exercised upon the people by means of the clergy. All my observations convinced me that it would be far better for the priests to excite the population to rise in favour of the King in any other portion of Italy, or even in some parts of France, such as La Vendée, for instance, than to do so in the Two Sicilies. Few will give credit to this assertion, of which I am profoundly convinced. I was in the heart of the insurrectionary war, which took place here in 1799 and 1805, and I

had every reason to feel, that a spirit of nationality and of loyalty, far more than any sense of devotedness towards the clergy, had incited the people to take up arms. And if in these wars several priests were at the head of bands, it arose from their own individual courage, and not from any other reason.

During the whole of January, the Regent never showed to the parliament more than one letter written by the King his father. This epistle was calculated to awaken the belief that the writer was an idiot, or that he regarded the nation and the Congress as being in a state of utter imbecility. In this letter the King did not even mention the object of his journey; he spoke of his health, of his pastimes, of the chace, and of the excellent qualities of his dogs compared with those of the Emperor Alexander.

Instead of opening its eyes, and deciding upon resorting to measures suited to the dangerous emergency in which we found ourselves, the parliament mightily engaged in works of pen and ink, and had it been possible to contend with these, they would have fought against all the Princes of the earth. Instead of taking measures worthy of a people who are bent upon the preservation of their liberties, the parliament had it in contemplation to send to the Regent the Neapolitan Constitution established upon the basis of that of Spain, which they did, and which was finally approved by the Duke of Calabria on the 29th January.

On the same day, a deputation from the Congress presented itself to the Regent, to inform him that the first session was about to expire, and to beg him to be present at the last sitting. The Regent replied, "I will be present at the close of the session, and I beg that the deputies will not quit Naples, but that they will

remain to prepare the business of the next meeting, as well as to afford me the means of availing myself of their wisdom and advice in all the circumstances which may present themselves."

The Regent went to the Parliament-house on the 31st, and spoke as follows: "I wish to manifest my satisfaction at the conduct of the parliament, and at the respect it has constantly paid to the throne. My heart is grateful for the proofs of affection which myself and my family have received on many occasions, and especially for the cordial and respectful manner with which the parliament and the nation which you represent have entrusted the defence of our independence to the King, my august father. I hope soon to be able to announce to you the happy results of his efforts. At the same time, I cannot refrain from applauding the enthusiasm of the nation, which however warm, has never made it forget the wise and moderate conduct which it ought to maintain towards foreign powers. Neither can I abstain from praising the zeal which you employ in every branch of the public administration, whilst you never infringe upon the rules of that Constitution to which we have both sworn fidelity. I hope that public prosperity will gain much in the next session, thanks to your wisdom and your active co-operation, which make you harmonize with the authority derived from the executive; for I have no warmer desire than the glory and happiness of our country."

When the permanent commission of the Congress established itself, it addressed a proclamation to the people of the Two Sicilies, which concluded with these words: "Fame will avouch to the monarchs of the north the certainty of our calm and noble bearing.

They will say, 'This is a nation worthy of its high destinies.' Our good King Ferdinand will listen, his heart thrilling with joy, to the well-merited applause of his people."

Was it possible that the nation could be saved with a parliament who thus reasoned, and was thus deluded? I have heard men of talent affirm that a Congress elected by the people whom it represents always reflects the national mind. Such reasoning has all the appearance of truth, but I believe it to be erroneous. The multitude ever confronts danger with greater promptitude than its representatives; the latter, indeed, finding themselves comparatively small in number, are more exposed to punishment in case of failure, and are little inclined in general to descend from a state of wealth to exile or imprisonment.

Whilst on this side of the Strait, the citizens vied with each other in proving themselves worthy of their acquired freedom, an atrocious crime, calculated, as much as a single action could do, to sully the proceedings of the Constitutional Government, was committed in the Capital. A man named Giampietro, who had been Director of the Police, who previous to the revolution had always shown much aversion to liberal principles, and who at a later period had imprudently manifested his joy at the approach of the Austrians, was murdered during the night by Carbonari. His murder had been decided upon, from all I could learn, in a small *Vendita*, not out of any feeling of private vengeance, but from an exalted but mistaken patriotic zeal. Had I not been obliged to quit the capital to proceed to the Abruzzi, I should, for the love of justice and for the honour of the revolution and the Carbonari, have arrested all the

delinquents. I would have requested that they should be speedily tried, and if condemned to death as the law demanded, I should have begged the Regent to show no mercy on this occasion. But as I had started for the frontier, nothing of what I had determined in my mind was executed. I must likewise admit that the conduct of the Government had rendered it so unpopular, that without me they would have found much difficulty in effecting the arrest of the culprits.

CHAPTER VII.

1821.

The Austrian army is ready to move—Blindness of the Neapolitan Congress—Proposal made to me by several deputies and Carbonari—The Austrian army crosses the Po—Proclamation of General Frimont, Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian army—Letter from King Ferdinand to his son, the Regent—Opening of Parliament and speech of the Regent—The Parliament is obliged to pronounce in favour of war—Speeches made in the Congress—First expedients of the Regent approved by the Congress—The possibility of maintaining the national independence.

EVERYTHING the Regent said inspired the Congress with a fatal confidence, and in consequence of the eloquent speeches of its members, excited in its turn the same feeling in the nation. Whilst our legislative and executive powers frittered away, in vain discourses, a time which was so precious, the Austrian army continued to advance towards us in a manner which left no doubt as to their intentions, even to the least clear-sighted. Its right rested upon Piacenza, Cremona, and Castelmaggiore, from which three places it could cross the Po in a few hours, and in twelve days reach the Tronto. But the lawyers in parliament persisted in believing that the Allied Princes would not dare to

push on their armies before they had combated their learned and subtle arguments. One of the most eloquent of these deputies, the day before he pronounced his speech, said to me, "My discourse to-morrow will produce a revolution in Europe." Let it not be supposed that this blindness extended to all the men of mind in the kingdom; even in the parliament, many deputies whose hearts were better than their tongues, blamed the weakness of the majority of their colleagues, who would not adopt expedients worthy of a people that had shown themselves ready in a thousand ways to make sacrifices to preserve their liberty, which had never been dreamt of in past times. These deputies and many conspicuous patriots came to ask me what I thought best to be done for the public safety, which was but too truly in danger; I replied I would do everything in my power that could tend to the preservation of our liberty. When we discussed the means to be employed, it was clear that all those who could have saved us were opposed by the Regent, or rather by the Congress, which, fearful of every vigorous act that might compromise themselves, rather than oblige the Duke of Calabria to proceed straight forward, preferred to support his Jesuitical conduct. Some persons said to me, "you have the Carbonari, the militia, and the legions with you, why not send the parliament to the devil, and call another?" I replied that if the evil consequences of such a step were to fall upon myself alone, I should not hesitate a moment to execute such an enterprise, but that these consequences must inevitably fall upon our country, because the parliament was not yet sufficiently unpopular not to have numerous defenders, amongst whom the Regent himself, under the cloak of patriotism, was one; thus we should fall

into a state of anarchy, which would to a certain extent justify the invasion threatened by the powers of Europe, and which we could not have resisted a single day with a civil war at home.

It was early in February, when we not only received intelligence that the Austrians had crossed the Po, but we were made acquainted with the proclamation that General Frimont had addressed to his troops. It is necessary that this document should be read with attention, especially by Italians.

" Du quartier-général de Padoue, le 4 Février, 1821.

" L'armée que sa Majesté l'Empereur a confié à mon commandement franchit les limites de la patrie dans des intentions pacifiques. Les événemens qui ont troublés la tranquillité de l'Italie, ont uniquement déterminé notre marche. Nous n'allons pas comme en 1815 au-devant d'un ennemi audacieux. Tous les habitans fidèles et bien intentionnés du royaume de Naples seront nos amis.

" Il est du devoir des officiers, et des soldats d'observer l'ordre le plus rigoureux, soit que l'armée traverse les états pacifiques d'Italie, soit qu'elle mette le pied sur le territoire Néapolitain ; tous mes soins tiendront constamment à ce qu'elle conserve cette réputation de discipline et d'amour de l'ordre qu'elle s'est acquise dans les années 1815 et 1817, dans les mêmes pays où nous entrons maintenant.

" Les ennemis seuls de la tranquillité de leurs concitoyens, les rebelles seuls qui méconnaissent les sentimens de leur roi peuvent s'opposer à nous. Cependant, dûssent-ils même réussir à en entraîner d'autres à la résistance, ils ne nous empêcheront pas pour cela d'atteindre le but que nous nous sommes proposés.

"S'il est glorieux pour un guerrier d'accomplir ses devoirs sur le champ de bataille contre un ennemi régulier, il n'acquérit pas moins de gloire lorsqu'il assure la tranquillité générale contre les attaques des malveillans.

"Notre Empereur compte sur nous, et nous saurons justifier encore cette fois la confiance qu'il a placé dans son armée; la réputation de ses troupes, aussi bien que les sentimens qui se joint à l'obligation de remplir nos devoirs en sont garants.

"(Signé) JEAN, BARON DE FRIMONT.

"Général de Cavalerie."

We likewise received, bearing date the 8th February, a declaration from the Papal Government, signed by Cardinal Gonsalvi, which was well understood to be favourable to the Austrians, who were to enter the kingdom with the consent of the King of Naples. On the 9th of February, the Duke of Galli arrived from Laybach, bearing to the Regent a letter from the King his father. It was as follows:

"My dearest Son,

"You are well aware of the sentiments which animate me for the happiness of my people, as well as the motives which alone have caused me to undertake at my advanced age, and in spite of the season, so long and painful a journey. I saw that our country was threatened by new misfortunes, and I thought that no consideration should prevent my making an attempt dictated by the most sacred duty.

"From my earliest interviews with the Sovereigns, followed by the communications made to me respecting the deliberations which had taken place amongst the

assembled cabinets at Troppau, I could not have a doubt as to the light in which the powers regard the events that have occurred in Naples from the 2nd of July to the present day.

"I found them firmly determined not to admit the state of things which has resulted from those events, and which might still result from them; and they regard it as incompatible with the tranquillity of my kingdom, and with the security of the neighbouring States, and they are determined to put an end to such a state of things by force of arms, if means of persuasion do not immediately cause them to cease.

"Such is the declaration made to me both by the Sovereigns and their respective plenipotentiaries, which nothing will induce them to alter.

"It is wholly beyond my own, and I believe every other human power to obtain a different result. There is no uncertainty whatever upon the alternative in which we are placed, nor upon the only means left to save my kingdom from the curse of war.

"Should the conditions, upon which the Sovereigns insist, be accepted, the necessary measures in consequence will only be settled through my intervention. I must, however, warn you that the monarchs exact some guarantees, which they judge for the moment to be necessary to assure the tranquillity of the neighbouring States.

"As to the system, which is to succeed to the actual state of things, the Sovereigns have given me an insight as to the general aspect in which they view the question.

"They consider the measures I shall adopt to give my Government the stability it stands in need of, without at all restricting my liberty as to the choice of

these measures, to be an object of the highest importance for the security of the neighbouring States, and consequently of the whole of Europe. They sincerely desire, that surrounded by the most honourable and wise of my subjects, I should consult the real and permanent interest of my people, without, however, losing sight of what is exacted for the maintenance of general peace, and that the result of my solicitude and my efforts may be a system of government calculated to guarantee for ever the repose and prosperity of my kingdom; and such, as at the same time, may give security to the other States of Italy, by removing all the motives of uneasiness to which the late events in our country have given rise.

" It is my earnest desire, my dearest son, that you give this letter all the publicity which it ought to have, so that none may deceive themselves as to the dangerous situation in which we may find ourselves. If this letter produce the effect, which I have a right to look for from the consciousness of my paternal intentions, as well as from my confidence in your enlightened mind, and in the excellent judgment and loyalty of my people, you will have to maintain public order, until such time as I shall have made known my will to you in a more explicit manner regarding the reorganization of the administration.

" With my whole heart I embrace and bless you,

" Your affectionate father,

" FERDINAND."

On the same day, the 9th, the Ministers of Russia, Prussia and Austria, waited upon the Regent and communicated to him the determination of their Sovereigns. These ministers added, that the Austrian army in Italy

had received orders to advance and occupy the kingdom, either by fair means or by force. That in case of war the Russians would advance to the assistance of the Austrians, should the latter be repulsed. That even should the Parliament and the nation consent to subscribe to the will of the Allied Powers, the occupation of the kingdom would still be regarded as indispensable.

The Regent replied, that he could not see without pain that they desired to make him the instrument of the destruction of the Constitutional system established in the kingdom. That, true to his oath, he was determined not to desert the nation; and that, although fully aware of the dangers to which it was advancing, he was nevertheless determined to share them. That as a son, a father, and chief of the nation, he had three duties to fulfil, and that were he to deviate from the path he proposed to follow, he should lose all claim to the esteem of the nation, and even of the Allied Powers. The ministers answered, that they regretted to see that the executive power had not sufficient force to place itself upon a level with the circumstances in which it was placed. At this speech the Duke resumed, that did he possess the force, he would never employ it against the nation; on the contrary, that he would exert it in its behalf, as it had acted with the greatest moderation towards the King and the Royal Family.

After this audience, the ministry called by the Regent, decided that the parliament should be made acquainted with every thing, and that the letters of the Allied Princes should be laid before it.

The reader will have fully understood, that the answer of the Regent to the Ministers of the Allied Princes, which was so full of patriotism had been

concerted before hand; so that if the parliament had consented to execute what the allies demanded through the medium of their ministers and of King Ferdinand, every thing would have been concluded according to the pleasure of the King and the Regent. In case the nation should have resisted, the Duke of Calabria would have enjoyed great popularity in the kingdom. Had there remained even a shadow of doubt as to the duplicity of the Regent, he would have entirely dissipated it by the conduct he adopted on mounting the throne.

On the following day, the Duke of Calabria sent a message to the permanent deputation, to announce that the resolution adopted by the Allies at Laybach was of such importance that he deemed it necessary, according to the Article 155 of the Constitution, to call the National Parliament to deliberate upon the measures to be adopted. The Regent ended his message by saying; "Faithful to my oath, I will not separate my interests from those of the nation."

The opening of the parliament took place on the 13th of February with great solemnity. The Regent made known the decision of the Allied Sovereigns at Laybach, and constant to his dissimulation, he promised always to act conjointly with the parliament, and he recommended the deputies to show their usual wisdom in their deliberations upon matters of such great importance. He left the assembly in the midst of the most unanimous applause, having charged the Duke of Gallo to report to the parliament all that he had seen and heard at the Congress of Laybach, as well as what the foreign ministers had said to the Regent. Gallo, who during all the vicissitudes of our Constitution, had constantly, and against the expectations of every one,

conducted himself like an honourable citizen and minister, related with frank simplicity every thing that had come to his knowledge. He read the letters written to the Regent by his father the King, and by the Allied Sôvereigns. He then proceeded to state how ill he had been received by the latter, and made known the hostile intentions of the Courts of Italy, which were ready to abet the foreign armies. The parliament decided that matters of such importance should be brought under discussion the following day.

I was fully certain that the parliament would never subscribe to the inadmissable conditions addressed to us from Laybach, for had it accepted them, the members would have run a very great risk of being burnt alive in the place of assembly. I therefore felt convinced that this same timid parliament would declare war. The sitting was opened by the best orators, Pocrio and Borrelli, but they were ever lawyers. They did not say, that the King was a traitor for following the Austrian army, and that the war we were about to undertake could not be conducted by the Regent, because it was not possible for the son to fight against his father, and that the defence of the nation ought therefore to be entrusted to a General whose fidelity could not be brought in question. They did not say, that every people has a right to withdraw itself from a power abhorrent to it, especially if it be an absolute one, and supported by a foreign force. Instead of this, they made every effort to show that the King had never been obliged to grant the Constitution, but that he had freely given it from an excess of goodness; that ours had not been a revolution but merely an *allegrezza*, and that it had even lacked the appearance of a political commotion. After a long and tiresome reiteration

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of such absurdities, and after having demonstrated that the people of the Two Sicilies were innocent—as if despotism had never declared war upon any but guilty people—they concluded that the virtuous King Ferdinand was a prisoner of the Allies, that his liberty had been violated in a strange land, that therefore the letter written by him to his son had been extorted from him; that we should accordingly go to war, and that our armies ought to be led by the son of Ferdinand, the Regent of the kingdom.

To make the public tolerate this strange conclusion, which entrusted the safety of the whole kingdom to the Regent; his brother, the Prince of Salerno; and the Duke of Ascoli, the friend of the King and son of his wife, the Prince Partanna, requested to serve in the war.

Before we relate the events which follow—for every thing depended upon the resistance to be offered—we will examine what were at that moment our means of defence, and what was the moral state of the nation. The plain declaration of the Allied Sovereigns, and the presence of two English and French fleets in the Bay of Naples had so little depressed the multitude, that they exclaimed that they would march against the enemy, and they called upon the most populous cities to show a sympathy with their ardour, by giving public feasts in the theatres. Such ardent feelings of patriotism did not exist in the hearts of the majority of the deputies, or in those of various Generals and superior officers. Both, whether from a recollection of the vindictive ferocity shown by King Ferdinand in 1799, or that they did not regard the enthusiasm of our people as sufficient to oppose the force of the very powerful Allies, I know not, but they did not show the same fervour in

behalf of the national cause as was expressed by the multitude. The Regent who was at the head of the executive, and of all the military forces of the State, was adverse to the new order of things, not from fear, but from inclination. Nevertheless, if some fortunate accident had more clearly revealed what the Prince, the deputies, and generals were made of; perhaps, the nation conducted by commanders, and directed by legislators of greater virtue, determined to sacrifice every thing for the public cause, would have maintained its independence, or at all events, have fallen with honour.

The Regent, who according to the Constitution of Spain was Generalissimo of the army, had not a single aide-de-camp, nor a chief officer on his staff. He had not selected the generals for the principal corps. The fourth part of the troops of the line was left in Sicily without the least necessity; and finally, the Regent who had hitherto been so full of dissimulation, now careless of appearances, openly showed his utter negligence of all that regarded the war department. Various generals began to visit and pay their court to the foreign ministers whom they regarded as their future protectors, and by way of expiation of the fault they had committed, they requested the highest appointments in the army. Before the revolution, these appointments had been held by generals called *Fedeloni*, who had followed the Court to Sicily, where during ten years they had enjoyed uninterrupted peace. The royal guard, of about six thousand men, took no trouble to conceal their devotedness to the King, although he was returning in the rear of the army of the enemy. But as the Carbonari penetrated every where, it happened that the evil intentions of the superior officers and generals,

were not unknown even to the soldiers, so that there no longer existed either confidence or sympathy between the leaders and their subordinates. Finally, the militia and legions, in which the chiefs and the subordinates were equally attached to the cause of liberty, were mostly in an indifferent condition. I had not had time to re-establish their proper organization, or to correct the irregularities into which they had fallen, and which were tolerated by the sub-inspectors, who were generally devoted to the Regent. Moreover, both the legions and the militia were armed with sporting rifles, without bayonets, nor was there now any chance of their being provided with muskets.

I must now relate the expedients resorted to by the Regent and the parliament, when they found that war was inevitable. The former designed to do the only thing that could keep the nation at bay, until himself and his family found themselves with the King in the midst of the Austrians. The Regent nominated General Carascosa to the chief command of the first corps. As this act proved, to a certain degree, the evil intentions of the Prince, to mitigate the bad effects it might produce upon the people, he made me Commander-in-chief of the second corps, entrusting to me, as a mark of his good will, the Abruzzi frontier which would be the most exposed to the attacks of the enemy. Thinking that the having bestowed upon me such a command was not enough to destroy the mistrust created by the appointment of Carascosa, the Duke of Calabria thought of making Florestano chief of his staff. As my brother, disgusted by the affairs of Sicily, had declared that he should ever be ready to fight for his country, but only as a private soldier, the Regent had no small difficulty in persuading him to accept the office. To accomplish

it, he was obliged to call in the assistance of several of the principal deputies of the parliament. They told Florestano that he would be responsible for the evil consequences of his refusal; and to induce him to forget the past, they promised him that they would propose to the chamber to grant to the Sicilians what he had promised them in accordance with the instructions of the Government, whilst he commanded that island. Actuated by his anxiety for the public welfare, my brother at length accepted the appointment offered him, and the deputies well satisfied, said to me, "All that belongs to the war department is well arranged. You command the corps which is the most exposed to the enemy; and your brother, in the name of the Regent, as chief of the staff will direct all the military operations, so that the Generals who are least disposed to favour the revolution will be obliged to do their duty." So spoke these deputies, and their views of the case would have been correct if the Duke of Calabria had acted with good faith, if his words had really interpreted his feelings. But what could the chief of the staff do, while a Prince Generalissimo was favourable to the enemy, and did not lack generals ready to second his evil designs? And what could I do with my corps, while all the means necessary to carry on the war were neglected? Many other generals had very different feelings from mine. I have already said, that to avoid the risk of losing their employments, or being imprisoned or exiled, they had chosen to follow the fortunes of a Court protected by the arms of all Europe. I shall not expose the conduct of these officers even when the time should come for such a revelation; but I will quote the facts published by Carascosa and Colletta, and leave the reader to form his own conclusion. I am convinced

that the nation had both, inclination and energy to defend itself against the invader. I likewise think that it is of great future importance to the destiny of my country, that this truth should be impressed upon the minds of my countrymen, and this conviction causes me to study means of throwing as much light as possible upon the real causes of our misfortunes.

Before I continue this subject, it will not be inopportune if I resolve to the best of my ability the following question. When once the Austrians had crossed the Po, and left no doubt as to their intentions, was it possible for the parliament to save the national independence, notwithstanding all the errors committed by the Government down to that moment? I am convinced that it could have been saved had the deputies cast aside all fear of compromising themselves; and it might have been effected, in my opinion, in the following manner.

1. It would have been necessary to remove from the army all the generals and superior officers who were opposed to our Constitutional Government: there would still have remained superior officers enough, who were really disposed to serve their country. In every case, it would have been better to have caused a division to be commanded by a colonel who was willing to make every sacrifice for his country and his honour, than by a lieutenant-general, however able, more attached to his interest than to that of his native land. At the beginning of the American war, Washington was only a colonel.

2. Florestano ought to have been sent to Sicily with such extensive powers as would have enabled him to create a sympathy in the inhabitants of the island in favour of the Neapolitans. His popularity was so

great in that part of the kingdom that he would soon have caused a cordial fusion between the two populations; and then with the ten thousand men who garrisoned the island, and fifteen thousand more furnished by the energetic islanders, he might have landed at the first summons on this side of the Straits, and his corps of twenty-five thousand men would have proved a most important reserve. For instance, had he landed at Gaeta, whilst the Austrians were advancing towards the South, of what great importance would it not have been to the State?

3. The parliament ought to have withdrawn either to Palermo or to Calabria with the royal family.

4. The garrisons of the different strongholds ought to have been composed, two thirds of militia and one third of regular troops.

5. Thirty thousand militia and legions, and the whole army should have withdrawn to the strong positions in Calabria; where an intrenched camp, well provided with water and provisions should have been formed; for as the cavalry could not act in such a situation, it would have been of no use there. From this camp, columns should have been sent off as far as the Abruzzi to harrass the Austrians in flank and in rear; this might have been done by sending them across the Apennines, by crossing the woods which form the whole length of the kingdom, or else by way of the Adriatic in transports. These large and small detachments would have acted in concert with the troops led by my brother, and landed upon the shores opposite to Sicily. By such means the fifty thousand Austrians, even had they been twice that number, could never have kept their footing in the kingdom especially in the months of June, July, and

August. The French themselves would never have been able to remain in the kingdom, had they not been assisted by the landholders formed into provincial militia, and yet the French possess far more activity than the Austrians, and Massena was greatly superior to the Austrian General. Having myself fought against the Austrians, at the age of seventeen; having borne a part in all the insurrectionary wars in Calabria and in Spain; having organized the people of the kingdom into militia; and finally, my own disaster at Rieti, gave me a right to state my opinion with confidence. My countrymen will risk little in availing themselves of my long experience, should similar circumstances present themselves.

To conclude, I will add that I have been often asked if I thought that in 1821 the people of the kingdom would have maintained the national cause with the same vigour with which they had resisted Massena? I have always replied that they would have shown even more vigour in favour of the Constitution, if supported by the landholders. And how could it have been otherwise, when we remember that they willingly sent back the dismissed troops to complete the army, although most of them were husbands and fathers—as also did the landholders—and that they cheerfully paid by anticipation the taxes to carry on the expenses of the war? Further, as we shall see hereafter, obeying a mere telegraphic order, they sent off to the frontier no less than eighty national battalions, the greater number of which were composed of the common people. If such demonstrations would be extraordinary in any country, they were more so in ours, where formerly the levy of troops and the collection of taxes had been both slow and uncertain. The dispersion of

my followers, as I will show, after they had tolerably well fought, arose from their want of confidence, which resulted from our internal dissensions from the continual errors committed by the Government during eight months, and finally from the fact of their being unused to war, and not trained to military habits. But had they even abandoned me without such weighty reasons, did not the Americans forsake Washington several times, and did not the French republicans at first do the same? If the latter, by their numerous victories, have erased the recollection of their first defeat, it is because they possessed a parliament and a Government which were compromised and therefore firm, and they were not betrayed by their own rulers.

All, or at least part of these facts were well known to Austria; so well, that a year after our misfortunes, I was informed in London that Medici, the minister devoted to the Austrian cabinet, had been assured that in the event of an insurrectionary war breaking out in the kingdom, the Emperor of Austria would have proposed an arrangement and have granted a Constitution with two chambers. However, even this would most likely have proved only a new deception.

CHAPTER VIII.

1821.

The greatest error of the Constitution of Spain of 1812—Letter written to me by the Regent—To what extent the Parliament feared to compromise itself—Council of Generals; discussion and decision come to by them—I order eighty battalions of the legion and militia to assemble—Grand dinner given by the general assembly of the Carbonari to the General-in-chief of the two corps into which the army is divided—I take leave of the Regent—His solemn promises.

Amongst the numerous defects of the Constitution, published at Cadiz in 1812, the greatest in my opinion is the clause which gives the King the entire command of all the national forces both by sea and land. The same absurdity exists in the Constitutions of France and England. They who defend this clause, say that the Minister of War always follows the King to the camp, and becomes responsible for all the acts committed by him. According to such reasoning, it would seem that none of the orders of the King are executed, unless such as are written and signed by the minister. But every one knows that in camps, orders are more generally given verbally and in person than in writing. And if the minister does not approve of the orders of the King, the generals cannot obey their Sovereign

without the consent of the minister, or the minister without permission from the King; consequently the army falls into a state of anarchy. The more one examines the consequences of a chief command bestowed upon a King who is not responsible, the more one feels that it is wholly incompatible with a Constitutional Government. Now, according to the Constitution of Naples, copied almost entirely from that of Spain, the Regent in the absence of the King became more than generalissimo, controlling the movements of the army and conferring commands and promotions. Thus it happened, as I have already stated in the preceding chapter, that Carascosa was appointed Commander-in-chief of one or two corps, and this, notwithstanding he was generally supposed to be adverse to the new order of things, and that he had but recently been obliged to quit the War Office. There existed another difficulty, which was, that the Prince was very ignorant in matters of war, how then could he hold such a command? If the Regent, by naming Florestano as chief of his staff had intended to permit him to act, he would have been approved of by all, because my brother had more experience of war than any other of our Generals; but as will be hereafter seen, far from being guided by my brother, the Regent concealed his intentions from him that he might effect his own guilty designs.

Ever sedulous to make it appear that he was attached to the cause of the country, and moreover to shield his own responsibility, he wrote me the following letter with his own hand:

"Naples, February 15, 1821.

"I have just been informed that several strangers who arrived this morning, state that yesterday the

14th instant, the head of the Austrian column, which is crossing the Marches, must have reached Rimini. I think it right to inform you of this circumstance, knowing your zeal for the defence of your country.

"FRANCIS."

Such was the mighty intelligence given by a Prince Generalissimo, to a General holding a chief command. Whilst the Austrian column was advancing with such rapidity, neither the militia nor the legions had yet received orders to assemble and begin their march. The battalions of these corps, of the provinces of Calabria and Apulia, were further from our frontier than the column of the enemy.

The parliament promulgated many decrees favourable to the public cause, and therefore the multitude forgave their not having prevented the Regent from bestowing a command of such importance upon Carascosa. I again affirm that the parliament was devoted to the public welfare, that the majority of the deputies desired the triumph of liberty; but that they constantly avoided whatever was likely to compromise themselves, and thought effectually to avoid doing so by being extremely indulgent towards the Regent. This idea was so firmly fixed in the minds of the deputies, that one of the warmest and most eloquent of them, said to me at Paris, twelve years afterwards, in the presence of Mammiani, the philosopher of Pesaro, that on being solicited by a fervent patriot to make some resolute demonstration in favour of liberty, he had replied: "You are a good man enough, but thank God we have succeeded in not compromising ourselves; and you would have us all at once lose the fruit of our prudence."

Not to leave anything untried, I begged the Regent to assemble a council of Lieutenant-Generals to settle with them the basis of the operations for the approaching campaign. He granted my request, and having assembled the council, he begun by renewing his promises of fidelity to the national cause, and by stating his intention of fighting for it in person with his brother the Prince of Salerno. What famous champions, even had they been willing ones! It was in vain that I warmly supported my opinion that the royal family, the parliament and the army, should lose no time in reaching Calabria. I offered with a single division of troops, and twelve battalions of militia chosen by myself, to oppose the enemy in detail on this side of the frontier, sometimes retreating, and sometimes resisting in the strong positions to be found from the Tronto to the confines of Calabria, in which provinces, without at all losing any of the advantages offered by a mountain war, our fate would have been ultimately decided. It was determined in the Council of Generals that about half of the troops in Sicily should be recalled; that the war should be a defensive one, and should open with the defence of the frontier. That the second corps under my command was to keep upon the first line and defend the Abruzzi; the first was to keep on the second, as a reserve, with twenty-five thousand men of the line, and forty battalions of militia and legions. My corps was to have contained eight thousand of the line, and forty battalions of militia and legions; and in case of a reverse the Volturno was to become the first line of defence.

It was likewise decided that at Naples an intrenched camp should be formed around the castle of St. Elmo, and that all the apparatus of war and objects of impor-

tance should be removed from the capital to the island of Capri and to Messina. The Regent and his family, as well as the Parliament, were to follow the army in its retreat. It was my opinion, that the retirement from Naples of the parliament and the royal family should be immediately effected, for I foresaw that after a check sustained by our army, they would be too much inclined to come to an arrangement with the conqueror, instead of offering an obstinate resistance. As to the numerical force of the two corps, I demonstrated the irregularity of giving me, upon the first line, so small a number. They opposed to my argument the scarcity of food in the Abruzzi, on the snowy hills of which the health of the soldiers would be greatly hazarded, and they promised me assistance of troops, and of manœuvres from the corps of Carascosa, as soon as the enemy should be directed against me. I explained to them that they placed me in an awkward situation by deciding that I was not in any case to cross the frontier, for thus the enemy might with impunity manœuvre as they liked about the Abruzzi. Colletta warmly defended the opinion of not advancing a step beyond the frontier, I was obliged to tell him, that such might be the opinion of a man wholly inexperienced in war. He never forgot this remark of mine. I supported my opinion with tenacity, and the Minister of War, Parisi, received orders from the Regent to give me instructions according to my desire, which I will produce a little later. Colletta writes in his history, that in that council, "It was judged impossible from the great age of General Parisi that he could withstand so much fatigue, and that he was succeeded as Minister of War by General Colletta." Not even in this case does the historian speak the truth; in that council nothing was

said respecting a change of minister, and still less of electing himself; he was created minister later, when I was in Aquila, and by means of an intrigue which was to prove fatal to our freedom. It is true that General Pàrisi was far advanced in years, but he surpassed Colletta in knowledge, experience, and above all in faith and truth.

This Council of Generals was dissolved, and seeing that we were rushing on our ruin, I determined upon giving up the command of the second corps, and asking for that of Calabria, where with the militia, the local legions, and the battalions and squadrons I could recal from Sicily, I might have organized a reserve. At the same time, I should have realized my favourite project of forming a strong intrenched camp, which would have served as a point of union for the National Guard, and the troops who might then show most perseverance in the patriotic cause in the probable event of a defeat. When I spoke of this plan to the Regent, he seemed greatly astonished, and said that the General in whom he placed the greatest confidence ought to remain upon the first line. However, had I carried this plan into effect, abandoned as I should have been by the Duke of Calabria and by the Parliament, I might have struggled for the honour of our army, but I could never have saved our country. Colletta in speaking of this opinion, says, " One of the Generals, William Pépé, chose to see in our militia, both old and new, a degree of zeal and valour which rendered them invincible; but the others who were more experienced in the nature of the Neapolitans, and less inebriated by temerarious grandeur, knowing the army to be fresh, and the discipline weak, thought that the soldiers would be daunted by the unusual appearance and noise of arms." None

of these generals could know the character of my countrymen better than myself. I had learned to know them at the age of sixteen, when I fought in 1799 for the cause of liberty. Driven into exile the same year, I studied them individually in the campaign of Marengo, and in those which succeeded. Under Massena in Calabria I had full occasion to become acquainted with the Neapolitans of every class, having been charged to organize them into militia. In Spain, where I had the command of a Neapolitan brigade, I could scrutinize their nature; and I was enabled to become intimately acquainted with the capacity of our young soldiers, when under Murat I commanded the vanguard in the last Italian campaigns. On the return of the Bourbons, my having formed that militia which overthrew the absolute power, shows I believe that I must have possessed full practical knowledge of the nature of my countrymen and of their conduct in war. I maintained, that although the troops might be deficient in discipline from the want of proper commanders, that the legions newly and badly armed, without any of the habits of war, and unable to fight in any other way than that of detail, still, if properly directed, might have preserved our liberty. Several generals in this Council, and especially Colletta, affected to feel so little confidence in the disposition to fight of the militia and the legions as to suppose that they would not even obey my orders to march. I replied: "Thanks to the authorization which I have just received from the Regent, I will send a telegraphic order for eighty battalions of militia and of legions to join and march towards the frontier. The Regent will see, and you too, Generals, will see, that not one battalion will fail to obey; and if, instead of eighty, a hundred and twenty

were wanting, a hundred and twenty battalions would march." To these words of mine, the Regent replied: "The promises of Pépé never fail;" the other Generals added, "If it be so, all will go well." I resumed, "It shall be so; and if I were entirely free to act you would see, that with the militia and the legions, that is to say, the nation organized in arms, we should do more than was done in 1806 against the French; and the French are very different soldiers from the Austrians, who moreover are not commanded by a Massena." To this they returned no answer.

On quitting the council, I immediately, by means of the telegraph and the post, despatched orders to all parts of the kingdom on this side of the Straits, for the assembling and marching of eighty battalions. The forty which were to form part of my corps, were from the provinces of Avellino, Foggia, Molise, the Abruzzi, and one from Calabria. But neither this nor the other Calabrian battalions arrived in time, on account of the great number of marches they had to make. Colletta, perhaps from ignorance states, that all the militia of Calabria was to have followed me. The active battalions, according to the law, were to be composed of only six hundred men; now, as they were almost all three times or at least twice that number, the consequence was, that the impartiality of the choice might have had a great influence upon the moral disposition of those battalions. I had sent clear instructions upon the mode of selecting with impartiality the militia and legions of the active battalions but as my sub-inspectors spread through the provinces; had been selected by the Regent, from those Colonels and Generals most devoted to himself, they availed themselves of this crisis to execute with the greatest partiality the choice

of the legions and militia who were to march. This guilty partiality, awakened a general feeling of discontent.

The Minister of War expressed himself in the following terms, in the instructions which I demanded of him, in order that the passage of the frontier with hostile intentions might be left entirely to my free will.

"War Office, Naples, February 15, 1821.

"As the instructions relative to the plan of the campaign about to open are not yet settled, I hasten to inform your Excellency that I will communicate them to you as soon as I receive them from the Regent.

"In the meanwhile, as you are on the point of departing, I inform you that his Royal Highness, by a rescript dated to-day, authorizes your Excellency not to mind the frontier, but nevertheless to keep upon the defensive, according to the agreement come to at the meeting of Generals presided over by H.R.H. The Regent likewise authorizes you to hasten the battalions of the National Guard from the Abruzzi.

"The Secretary of State, Minister of War,

"PARISI."

The high Carbonari Vendita of the kingdom, whose president often conferred with me, augured nothing but evil to the progress of our affairs, owing to the little confidence they placed in Carascosa, commander of one of the two corps. The Carbonari, nevertheless, entertained some hope that as it was a question of resisting a foreign invasion, both himself and the generals who had shown themselves opposed to the revolution, would do their duty. As it had been decided for the sake of the public welfare, that the sect should

not quarrel either with the parliament or the Regent, the high Vendita thought it right to show themselves well disposed even towards an enemy to whom such high military charges had been confided. It was therefore decided by the Vendita that a grand banquet should be given to the Generals who were in the capital, and who held appointments in either of the two corps, hoping that such a demonstration would tend to reconcile the two parties. The invitation was accepted by all, even by Carascosa and Colletta, who showed themselves extremely cordial towards a sect, afterwards violently attacked by them in their histories. I must for the sake of truth state that the Carbonari were far from appearing anxious to obtain lucrative employment, as is generally the case with citizens belonging to the successful party. On the contrary, they evinced the greatest disinterestedness, and not only did they not seek to benefit themselves, but the rich spent largely, and the poor contracted debts to arm and equip the poorer legions. Amongst the poets who recited their extempore effusions, Gabriel Rossetti was distinguished. He was a fervid patriot and Carbonaro, born in the Vasto of the Abruzzi, and who afterwards paid for his noble sentiments by eternal exile. In a happy moment he exclaimed: "And which of our leaders will be Miltiades?" He paused at these words, and his numerous audience remained in suspense, when the poet with an unexpected hyperbole resumed, "all will be Miltiades." It is but too true, that if all had been united and willing, we should have been the admiration and not the contempt of Europe, and out of the energy of the Neapolitans would have arisen the freedom of the whole of Italy.

There are some who say, had the Royal Family been

sent away, the parliament dissolved, and a Republic proclaimed, nothing more could have resulted than what did occur. Such reasoning is more erroneous than it appears at first sight. They who interfere in public matters should not only think of the present, but likewise of the future. We lost our liberty because the nation was betrayed; but whatever may be the cause which prevented our resisting the enemy, the fact has left behind it such sad recollections, as to dishearten our country for a long time. Nevertheless, if such humiliation had been followed by the horrors of anarchy and civil war, fomented by a foreign power, the recollection of such horrors would have been impressed upon many generations. If the days of the Constitution of 1820 and 1821 are now regretted and form an epoch in our history, they would in the other case have been remembered with dread and horror.

After all these events which rapidly succeeded each other in the course of a few days, I went to take leave of the Regent before my departure. He recommended me warmly to write often to him, and promised that my corps should not stand in need of provisions, shoes and cloaks, which were of the utmost necessity at that season, and in the snows of the Abruzzi. He promised to send me reinforcements to be detached from the first corps, as soon as the circumstances of war should render it necessary; and ended with these words: "Let us do honour to ourselves; I recommend to you, dear William, our country which is dear to you, as well as the independence of the throne. Recollect, that I will share with you the fortunes or the misfortunes of the nation." I replied, "that in case of misfortune my situation would differ greatly from his." I then

kissed his hand according to custom, and quitted Naples.

I took with me, as chief of the staff of my corps, Colonel del Carretto, and as chief of the staff of the National Guard, Colonel Wispeare. I left in the capital, as chief of the staff of the Guard of Security, Nicholas Caracciolo di Roccaromana. These three officers assisted me well, and behaved in an honourable manner. If when in command of the second corps, and in front of the enemy, I still continued to discharge the duties of Inspector-General of the militia, and to regulate their movements, it arose from sheer necessity. There existed at that time few laws for the organization and discipline of the National Guard, so that most things were arranged by me, and I was obeyed as if my order had been backed by the laws.

CHAPTER IX.

1821.

I enter the Abruzzi—I stop in Salmone and Chieti and then visit Pescara, Giulianuovo and Teramo—I proceed next to Tottea and from thence to Aquila, not without some danger of perishing in the snow—The eighty battalions of militia and legions begin their march—The enemy reaches the frontier—My troops take possession of the most important points—I cannot succeed in getting any certain intelligence respecting the number and movements of the enemy who surround the Abruzzi.

On entering the Abruzzi by Castel di Sangro, I found them more than usually covered with snow. This circumstance was by no means favourable, for the National Guard were mostly unprovided with cloaks, and must have suffered considerably during the bivouacs, which inconvenienced even the troops of the line inured to such hardships. Night overtook me in a plain five miles in extent, and the snow lay so thick, that the two carriages containing myself and suite, could not have got on, had not many young men of the militia and legions, who were there by chance, assisted the post horses by pushing at the wheels of the carriages, and so urging them across the plain. I asked these obliging young men, how they happened to be at this spot at so late an hour of the night. They

replied that they had been bear shooting, but this did not prevent their being anxious to follow the enemy, and they manifested great confidence in themselves. I was aware of what little weight is to be given to the talk of inexperienced youths, nevertheless, I liked to see them bold on the approach of danger. On reaching Salmone, I began to inspect the artillery and the fortifications, and although they were in a bad state, I should not have afflicted myself much upon that point, had there been a sufficient supply of cartridges. What likewise tormented me, was the want of magazines of provisions, and of mules, so indispensable in those snow-clad mountains. On crossing the valley of Popoli, I remarked that the works which had been executed by the engineers were of no importance. I reached Chieti in the night. The Intendant of that city, an honourable man, named De Lignon, and a warm patriot, told me that the citizens of that province were surprised by a war, which a few days back, the ministers and parliament had regarded as improbable, and which was now not only certain, but imminent. These patriots wished to know from me how many battalions of the line would be sent to defend the Abruzzi, and how far the militia and legions, which were not in existence two months before, were to be trusted. I replied that it was not the time either to blame or to approve the executive power and the Parliament; but that now every thought and energy must be turned to the defence of our liberty, and of our national honour.

On reviewing the militia and the legions in Chieti, I found that they had done miracles, for in the brief period of fifty days they were capable of being under arms, and of executing the elementary military movements. They were in complete uniform, but many

wanted cloaks; the tailors and shoemakers were working as quickly as possible, and at the expense of each citizen. The only defect which could not be remedied by individual zeal was the absence of muskets; indeed not only those were wanting, but even the sporting rifles required repairing before they could be used. A patriot Regent and ministry would have immediately purchased fifty thousand muskets. Such were the men to whom the sacred interests of the country were intrusted! I shall always preserve a tender recollection of the patriotism of the young landholders of Chieti, who composed the main part of the corps of three hundred mounted rifles of the Abruzzi. These young men purchased, with their own money, horses, arms, and complete uniforms, and several of them, not having money for such unexpected expenses, contracted debts.

This corps of mounted riflemen served to carry on the communication between the different columns, and to do what is generally done by the light cavalry. The young men of the Abruzzi were incomparable for such a service, their horses being accustomed to the snow, and to climb and descend the hills without difficulty. Such zeal and patriotism did not prevent General Carascosa from writing, in page 276 of his work: "on finit par désirer généralement l'arrivée des Autrichiens."

From Chieti I descended to Pescara, where I found that, thanks to the active labours of the Carbonari and of their wives, the fortifications were so much improved as to be able to sustain a regular siege. I inquired about the gun-boats, which the Minister of the Marine had promised me, and I found that nothing had as yet been heard of them. Following the carriage-road which coasts the Adriatic, I reached Giulianuovo. Here my present situation vividly recalled to my mind, that of

poor Joachim Murat, when he was there in 1815. As I was lodged in the apartment he had inhabited, and in which he had had a strange scene with General Aquino, I could not prevent the memory of those fatal disasters from casting a shade upon my future prospects, and these reminiscences saddened me greatly. From Giulianuovo I went on to Teramo, where in proportion to its population, I found the militia more numerous than in the rest of the kingdom. There the different artizans worked night and day to finish the uniforms, arms, shoes, and knapsacks of the troops; but the intelligent men of that population were as much astonished as those of Chieti, at the small means granted me for conducting the war, and the officers of my staff heard it rumoured on all sides that I should be forsaken by the Regent and by the first corps. As Teramo touched upon the frontier, and as many inhabitants had friends and relations in the Marches of Ancona, they received intelligence of the number and condition of the enemy's column, and that no doubt could be entertained but that the Abruzzi would be the first province attacked by Austria. Whilst such a belief existed, it became known that the main forces of the army, forming part of the first corps, remained at Terra di Lavoro, and this naturally confirmed the suspicion that the Regent, and several Generals devoted to him, had come to an understanding with the enemy.

I was impatient to reach Aquila, as the enemy directed itself with the principal portion of its forces towards the frontier of that province. I could reach that city either by crossing the Apennines through Tottea, close to the Grand Sasso of Italy, or else by turning towards the river Pescara, near Civita di Penne. This last route required three marches, the former only one;

but this was so dangerous during the winter, that those who attempted it were often lost. Besides the great advantage of saving two marches, I was anxious to become acquainted with the route leading from Teramo to Aquila, through Tottea, as well as to see with my own eyes how far it might be practicable for a column of infantry. A little before sunset, I started for Tottea, which I reached after having crossed mountain after mountain. I passed the night here, and as I was harassed less from fatigue than by the gloominess of my own thoughts, I hastened, by way of saving time, to write a proclamation to the corps under my command, which I published at Aquila, and which will be found at the end of the chapter. Night was far advanced, and I often inquired the state of the weather, as the difficult part of the road only began after Tottea, when the French Captain of cavalry, Persan, arrived. He had served under the command of Bolivar in Columbia, and later under that of Ypsilanti. Persan joined my staff; he was always at the advanced post, and approved himself brave at all times. Dawn broke, with a fall of snow, and I had to decide between risking the passage, in order to reach Aquila that night, or to reach that city in three days by Civita di Penne. I assembled the most experienced citizens of the town, to hear their opinion respecting the road I ought to take on that snowy day. The snow storm was not very heavy; some were of opinion that I ought to wait till twelve o'clock to see if the weather changed, adding that if the snow were to increase, I should find myself blocked up at Tottea. I was sorry to lose three days by taking the longer road, and I therefore started by the shorter and more dangerous route, accompanied by many experienced countrymen, who were well acquainted with the

passes. The wives of these poor men were weeping at their windows, as they saw us proceed, for they regarded the loss of their husbands as almost inevitable. The threatened danger lasted for a space of about six miles, along a table-land, on the summit of the mountains; if the wind termed *murderous* had blown there with any violence, we should have perished. We proceeded in perfect silence and with difficulty, as we fell at every moment; the wind fortunately diminished, instead of increasing; the danger lasted about an hour, until we reached the descent, which has the appearance of a steep staircase, and leads to the pass of Marano. Here I had expected to find great temporary fortifications, as I had been led to believe at Naples, instead of which I found nothing but trifling labours of no avail. I established my head-quarters at Aquila, and then examining all the forces which composed my corps, I found them reduced to nine battalions of the line, two squadrons, two companies of pioneers, and not more than ten battalions of militia and legions from the Abruzzi, having sent orders to the others from the same provinces to suspend their march until they had been provided with various articles they stood in need of. Twenty more battalions of the National Guard could not arrive before several days, because they were first to assemble, and when assembled, those nearest to the frontier of the Abruzzi had twelve long marches to make, and the more distant ones had even twenty-four, therefore, several could not arrive in time. As for the artillery, the mountain and field guns I had with me were sufficient; for I have never thought that artillery could be of much use in the Abruzzi; and in my opinion, there is little occasion to use it even in other

parts of the kingdom, if one of the combatants avoid the few plains which are found there.

In relation to the eighty battalions of militia and legions, including those of the Abruzzi, I received official notice, that they had begun their march. It was not a small thing to behold so many young men, clothed and armed at their own expense, quit their families, and march towards the frontier at the first telegraphic notice, after the same population on this side of the Straits had only furnished an army of fifty thousand men.

Men of Italy, who have a long and arduous struggle to endure before ye can again become great and free, if you call the people to the defence of the country, and see them rush to arms, as did those from the Tronto to Calabria in 1821, and behold this national ardour produce no good result, then say that the fault rests with the leaders, not with so many thousands ready to do their duty. It is only inexperienced commanders who are alarmed by the circumstance of their troops turning from the enemy at the first onset. Without again citing the instances of the Americans, and of the French, I may remind the readers that Charles XII. was defeated by the same Russians who had been so often defeated by him when he opposed them with greatly inferior numbers, and the Russians were soldiers, and not hastily-organized militia. And if a more recent example be needed, I will recall to mind that the Prussians of Jena, stimulated by their persevering national patriotism were enabled to enter Paris twice.

And now, Italians, behold the dark shadow cast over this prompt and unanimous meeting by the historian Colletta. He says: "At the same time, several

battalions of the civil militia had moved from the provinces, and it appeared as though they required to be restrained rather than stimulated, and that the militia exceeded the number required. Many young men, for whom the weight of ordinary arms was too great, assumed others, more suited to their tender age, with which they cheerfully marched. Several women, mothers and sisters, several fathers and uncles, unfitted by their age or sex to bear arms, carried the luggage to save the militia this burthen. But all this, which looks like patriotism, was in point of fact fear of the Carbonari. These, that they might spare themselves the fatigues of war, threatened the people of the different villages, and forced even the most peaceful citizens to march towards the frontier."

Even when you want to calumniate, it is necessary to advance credible circumstances. And who will believe that forty-eight thousand militia and legions took up arms out of fear of the Carbonari, who, according to Colletta, boasted of their patriotism, whilst they remained quietly at home? There did not exist an officer, or a subaltern, who was not a Carbonaro. The first to march were the Carbonari, and foremost of all, their chiefs. I will hereafter furnish unquestionable proofs of patriotism, given by the most conspicuous and wealthy citizens belonging to this sect. And yet Colletta is much read in Italy, because there is no better historian of the time of which he treated, and because the Italians, careless of acquiring better information, and seduced, like women, by the elegance of his style, give faith to his calumnies against his countrymen and nation.

The following is the proclamation which I addressed to my troops to encourage them, and which I caused

to be printed, that the soldiers might read it more easily.

"To the Militia, Legions, and Soldiers of the Second Corps of the army in the Abruzzi.

"His Highness, the Prince Regent has conferred upon me the honour of commanding the second corps of the army of the kingdom, along the whole line of the Abruzzi. I will be your true brother-in-arms, but I shall exact from you the most scrupulous observance of military discipline, without which no good result is to be obtained. If every failure and every delinquency will be severely punished, every honourable and remarkable action shall have a speedy reward. My orders of the day will be inserted in the Constitutional papers, and will announce to your fellow-citizens, to your relations, to your wives, the names of those who have merited the gratitude of the nation on the field of honour.

"Militia, legions, and soldiers, the day of glory will soon dawn for us: the second corps will be the first to face the enemy. Eight millions of our compatriots are impatiently expecting to hear that we approve ourselves the worthy defenders of our national independence, and of the freedom which we have gained for ourselves. We die in old age, after having exhausted the art of medicines; we die young in a thousand ways, oppressed by acute pain, and surrounded by the selfishness of our successors, who often have not the decency to conceal their ingratitude. It is, perhaps, our fate to die for our country's glory, and for the support of our freedom, and of the Constitutional throne. Some few days less of life are nobly compensated by a glorious death amidst the blessings

of the present generation, and of the most distant posterity.

"The enemy advances, and why? Are we the first people who have given themselves liberal institutions? Why do they not turn their steps towards Spain or Portugal? Shall we be the Helots of Europe, we who have resumed the classical names of our ancestors, who once held, as in a balance, the power of the rulers of the world? Austria says to us, 'Forget the oaths of your King, and your own; return under the yoke of absolute power; imagine that you have been dreaming during the last seven months, and that the applause and admiration of the world were a dream. Do as actors do, who after having represented great men, return to their nothingness: if you consent to all this abjection, we will perhaps leave you an existence divided between hunger and taxation. In the past year, you paid to us Austrians the last rates of an enormous contribution: this year you will return to pour into our treasury new taxes. To be certain that you will not again be enabled to emancipate yourselves from our yoke, we will, with an army of fifty thousand men, despoil you, for the second time, of every means of defence: we will declare your army and your National Guard dissolved, and they shall commit to the flames the uniforms which cost them more than three millions of ducats. Finally, the land-taxes, and every other tax, shall be fixed by our judgment, and for our advantage.' People of the Abruzzi, militia, and legions of the second corps, the day approaches on which, in the name of eight millions of our countrymen of the United Kingdom, we shall answer these injuries, out of which shall arise our greatness and our glory."

The national battalions which did not belong to the Abruzzi, and one or two more of the line, as well as the Holy Squadron, recalled from Sicily, had not joined my corps; but the enemy had already reached the frontier. One of my brigades, commanded by General Russo, occupied Rieti. As I had given him orders to abandon that city as soon as the Austrians should appear, he retired to Civita Ducale, and the enemy took possession of Rieti. Thus their advanced posts and mine were in sight of each other. I had sent forward General Verdenois with two battalions of the line, and two of militia as far as Ascoli, on the side of the Tronto. Another battalion of the line was at Tagliacozzo, and another towards Leonessa. My forces being so small, I was sorry to have four battalions of the line thus dispersed; but had I not done so, I should never have been able to ascertain with any accuracy, the numerical force of the enemy's column, which might have penetrated into the Abruzzi from any of these points. If I had placed battalions of National Guards in their stead, they might have taken every Austrian detachment for a column, and thus my movements would have been erroneous. It was the duty of the Regent to inform me of the force of the columns the Austrians intended to oppose us, and the direction taken by each of them. It is true that my brother was at the head of the general staff, but he had only exercised that office for a few days, and to establish an efficacious system of *espionage*, is a work of time. Had the Regent, by means of the diplomatic functionaries, obtained intelligence respecting the movements and intentions of the enemy, he would unquestionably have kept them secret. I turned to the Car-

bonari to procure the information I could not obtain from the Duke of Calabria; but they complained of the Carbonari of Romagna, who, being most likely intimidated, did not dare to send a circumstantial account of the force and movements of the enemy which they had promised us. Neither the Carbonari of Lombardy nor Piedmont, showed any symptoms of their existence; and the few who had joined us for the love of Italian freedom, and who shared in the dangers of this struggle, complained bitterly of the silence of their fellow sectaries. I next endeavoured to make use of several priests of the province of Aquila, who were regarded as liberals, to procure information respecting the number of Austrians in the neighbourhood of Rieti. They quitted our frontier, passed two days in the States of the Church, but although they belonged to the Carbonari, were not able to bring me any useful and positive information.

From the daily reports I received from General Verdenois in Ascoli, Colonel Delignoro in Leonessa, from General Russo at Civita Ducale, and Colonel Manthoni at Tagliacozzo, I judged that the Austrians had surrounded the Abruzzi, where I was abandoned with small means of defence, and it will be seen later what were the machinations carried on behind my back to injure me and my country.

CHAPTER X.

1821.

Colletta is named Minister of War—The battalions of the legions and militia of Molise and Avellino begin to join my corps—The Archduke Charles and the Prince of Salerno sectaries—I am disappointed of the provisions, shoes and cloaks promised me—Letter which I receive from the Spanish Ambassador, and what he causes to be written to me—Treaty endeavoured to be made with Austria, without my knowledge—Proclamation of King Ferdinand—Proclamation of the General-in-chief of the Austrian army.

I was in the situation I have described, when I received intelligence from Naples that Colletta had been made Minister of War at the instance of Carascosa, as he relates in his history. This appointment would not have been effected had I been in the capital, and it seemed to me the augury of black intrigues against my country. In my opinion, no man who is not upright in his private dealings can be honest in his public ones; neither can any one without political probity conduct himself well in private life. Now, as the reputation of Colletta had been very bad, even when he held a subaltern rank, I could not expect that on his having reached the high position of minister, under such difficult circumstances, and with a Court so opposed to our national interest that he would prove himself a good citizen. Hitherto his life had been

spoken of in several pamphlets. I will shortly point out a few words of his own, and of his friend Carascosa, published in their own histories, wherein they mutually sing the praises of each other. I could never understand how Carascosa, who was brave in the field, could form so intimate a friendship with Colletta.

The single battalion of the Calabrese Militia, which was to serve in my corps could only arrive after the lapse of several days, on account of the length of the marches it had to make, and it did not reach me in time. But the militia and legions of Sannio, and those of the province of Foggia and of Avellino had already entered the Abruzzi. Amongst these were the battalions of militia which I had organized with so much care, and with two years of difficulty prior to the revolution, and which were called by the historian Colletta, my accomplices. These accomplices of mine, were in truth, the only battalion of the National Guard, who had military forms, if not habits; for the others had partly been ill-composed, and for so short a time, that they might possess enthusiasm, but it was not possible for them to possess military steadiness. To this must be added, that the sub-inspectors, who were creatures of the Regent, and to whom had been entrusted the selection of six hundred militia and legionaries, in each battalion of twelve or fifteen hundred men, had either through negligence or partiality made such a choice as to discontent all those who were designed to serve. I informed the Duke of Calabria of these disorders; but I did so formally only, for I felt certain that it was joy to him to behold our means of defence ill-organized. I reviewed the newly-arrived battalions, and did everything in my power to provide what was necessary for their wants, as well

as to cheer the hearts of young men, unused to such long marches, such suffering, and such discipline.

The enemies of the new state of things, and consequently mine, said, that I manifested great satisfaction at the manner in which the National Guards and troops were organized. And yet in the days of Joachim Murat they had regarded me as the most exacting of all the Generals in the observance of discipline, and of all the other conditions which contribute to the perfection of military corps. How then could all the unfavourable circumstances attendant upon the troops and National Guard escape my eye? How could I look with indifference upon the effects produced on the minds of the multitude, by the certainty that the first Powers of Europe were operating against us by means of troops, threats, and seductions combined? How could I help feeling that the same would happen with the National Guard so recently organized, as with a newly-bound book which falls to pieces if opened too soon? Nevertheless, I was convinced that if the Parliament had retired to Calabria or Sicily, the national cause would have triumphed by carrying on a war of detail. They who without having acquired my experience are of a different opinion, will at least believe that we should only have fallen after a prolonged, exemplary, and honourable opposition.

It is a fit time to speak of the effects produced by the Carbonari upon the regiments of the line, of which effect such bitter complaints were made by the Generals and officers adverse to the Constitutional Government. That every sect introduced into an army destroys its discipline, is one of those truths which cannot be contested by an experienced officer; but since this sect had long existed among us, and had

recently contributed to overthrow the absolute power, it became necessary to direct it well; to draw every advantage from it in difficult situations, and then to contrive that it should fall of itself after a few years. In Germany during the years 1814 and 1815, the Princes who styled themselves legitimate, made use of a certain sect to animate the citizens, and the military corps to resist Napoleon: as Princes, Generals, officers, and soldiers belonged to the sect, wonderful effects were produced during the two above-mentioned years.

There can be no doubt respecting the existence of this sect, for besides what is read and said upon the subject, I recollect hearing the Prince of Salerno mention it, during the first days of our revolution. I had gone to beg that he would accept the command of two fine regiments of hussars and of dragoons of the National Guard of Naples. He consented with much grace, and then leading me into his study, he said, when we found ourselves alone, that he would reveal a secret to me, if I would promise to keep it, as he was desirous that the circumstance should not come to the knowledge of the King his father. As that monarch is no more, I am no longer bound to silence. He proceeded, after receiving my promise, to tell me that he had been a Carbonaro for seven years, and that he had been affiliated to that sect by the Archduke Charles of Austria. I said that this fact gave me the more pleasure, that as a sectary he was older than myself.

Leopold, Prince of Salermo, was a true gentleman, and incapable of uttering a falsehood, so that I concluded that the Carbonari of which he spoke, was the famous German sect established under the auspices of him who destroyed the legions of Varo. Napoleon in his proclamations accused the German Princes of having

made use, to oppose him, of means destructive of the monarchical principle. But setting aside all reasoning upon the advantages to be derived from the Carbonari by our army, I will merely state that in the corps of Carascosa, Colonel Palma, who was himself a Carbonaro, always conducted his regiment in the most admirable manner. Added to this, my own military corps, which was full of Carbonari, was for several days in presence of the Austrians and opposed them to the best of their power. During this time not a single act of misconduct or insubordination was committed by the privates against their officers, not even at the moment of their dispersion.

Before the battle of Rieti my men had never deserted; nevertheless, I not only tolerated but stimulated the Carbonari in the exercise of their rites. In the corps of Carascosa, which never saw the enemy, and where the Carbonari were unfavourably regarded, the troops deserted by hundreds, and the lives of the officers were threatened by the deserters, according to the statement of Carascosa himself; and this was before I had encountered the Austrians.

This is what occurred in the corps of Carascosa, at the time when I maintained the most strict discipline in my own. Carascosa, in page 308 of his work writes thus: "Je trouvai encore un autre rapport à Pontecorvo sur la désertion d'autres miliciens, qui avait eu lieu le 26 Février, et le Général d'Ambrosio m'avait aussi informé que durant la nuit du vingt sept au vingt-huit, un bataillon de ligne de chasseurs de sa division, composé entièrement de congédiés, avait renouvelé les symptômes de révolte et de désertion totale qu'ils avaient manifestés à Sessa dès le dix-neuf du même mois." The pages of Carascosa are full of these reports of desertion, which took place before my affair at Rieti.

He relates what happened on the 16th of March, as follows, in page 393. " J'appris le débandement presque total des troupes de Torricelli, qui avait été commencé au signe accoutumé d'un coup de fusil, et qui s'était terminé également en faisant feu sur les officiers et sur le Général Filangieri lui-même, parce qu'ils avaient cherché à s'y opposer." Page 401: "Le Général Ambrosio et moi nous étions dans la même voiture, et le Général Filangieri nous suivait à cheval à peu de distance; nous étions tous les trois en uniforme complet, ce qui rendait impossible qu'on se méprit à notre égard. Cependant, qu'on juge de l'infamie des desseins qu'on nourrissait contre nous; quelques soldats, égarés sans doute par des conseils perfides, osèrent exciter leurs camarades à faire feu sur nous en prétendant que nous étions des généraux Autrichiens."

I ask, how comes it that neither myself nor any of the Generals of my corps, were ever threatened; neither during the combat of the 7th of March in Rieti, nor during the dissolution, nor after, whilst the Generals of the corps of Carascosa who had never even beheld the enemy through their glasses, were exposed to excesses which he styles infamous? Why previous to the 7th March, when my troops were in the midst of snow-clad mountains, most of them without either cloaks or shoes, did they not desert, whilst those of Carascosa, in a mild climate and in the midst of abundance, quitted their standard by hundreds? The answer is plain and is this: that the aversion of those Generals to the cause they were to support was still known, and naturally enough produced all these misfortunes.

Carascosa says in page 400: Ainsi le dix-huit Mars à six heures du matin, nous nous trouvâmes trois Lieutenants-Généraux à Casa Lanza sans un seul soldat,

et presque dans le même état que Marius sur les ruines de Carthage." Had he read Plutarch with attention, he would have recollected that the life of Marius was never threatened by his soldiers, and that a General should never place himself in a condition to say "My troops attempted to kill me."

After this digression, which I have thought necessary to enable the reader properly to judge of the character of the multitude with whom we had to deal, and also to judge whether the Carbonari proved injurious to the army, I will resume the thread of my narrative. The administrative authority of the Abruzzi declared that there was an absolute want of provisions: the chest of the Paymaster-general was empty; neither the shoes nor cloaks which were promised me arrived, neither did the mules which were indispensable to effect the removal of the wounded, and to transport the provisions. These calamities so vexed my soul, that I made the chief of my staff, Colonel De Canetto, write to the ministers, that, rather than be obliged to behold such villanous and wilful negligence I would shoot myself; but that I would previously let the nation know the names of the perfidious citizens whose treachery had betrayed it.

In the midst of this wretched state of things I obtained from the Regent an assurance that he would send off the Councillor of State, Bozzelli, as chief of the administration of my corps, with a paymaster and a sum of money. Ah! why had not the majority of our Generals the frank virtue of the excellent Bozzelli! The parliament, in one of its *ternaries* for the election of Counsellors of State, had proposed Bozzelli, who without his own knowledge was selected by the King. It was in the Council of State that I knew this excellent man, who is an honour to Italy. This truly good

citizen manifested great activity, and adopted efficient expedients to furnish my corps with provisions, which was no easy task in the middle of winter, and in the Abruzzi. Having conquered this first difficulty, another arose, which was the means by which to transport the provisions. A few mules were, however, obtained; but it was impossible to procure corn sufficient for the quantity of biscuits necessary to enable me to carry into execution a design I had meditated, and of which I shall speak hereafter.

But if the arrival of Bozzelli cheered my soul, it was again saddened by the following letter which he brought me from the Spanish Ambassador, Onis :—

" Naples, le 27 Février, 1821.

" Mon Général,

" J'ai reçu la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date du 24. Je vois par elle avec plaisir le bon état de l'armée que votre Excellence se propose de guider à la victoire, et qu'elle est sûre d'obtenir par les bonnes dispositions que vous avez prises pour recevoir l'ennemi. Je dois cependant prévenir votre Excellence, que d'après des lettres de Rome que je viens de recevoir, il est à craindre que votre Excellence sera attaquée dans les Abruzzes par sa droite avec toutes les forces Autrichiennes. La position du Général Carascosa n'étant pas sur la Sabine, comme j'ai toujours cru qu'elle devait être, pour maintenir une communication immédiate avec votre Excellence, mais sur Saint-Germain, ce qui le laisse entièrement détaché et isolé, il est presque hors de doute que l'objet de l'ennemi sera de détruire votre Excellence, comme le seul, où le principal obstacle pour l'anéantissement de la liberté. Je crois propre de mon amitié de vous le faire connaître, pour que vous preniez vos mesures en

conséquence, tandis que je m'emploie auprès de Monsieur votre frère, afin qu'il vous fasse passer tous les renforts possibles.

Je vous prie d'agréer les assurances de ma plus haute considération.

"LE CHEVALIER ONIS."

This letter from the Spanish Ambassador left me no doubt respecting the intentions of the enemy, or of those of the Regent, and of the Generals of the first corps, evidently concerted with Colletta, now Minister of War. The movements of the Austrians tended to surround and destroy me alone, with the whole force of their army: Carascosa, by keeping his corps as far as possible from me, gave the enemy full time to effect my destruction. It had been decided in the Council of Generals, that in the event of the Austrians directing the main part of their army against me, I should immediately receive from the first corps the assistance of troops and of manœuvres. Now the Austrians did not advance against me with the main part of their army, but they surrounded me with the whole, in the Abruzzi; why then did not the first corps send off at least one of its divisions to my assistance? The Ambassador Onis, not thinking what he had written to me sufficient, charged a Calabrese friend of mine, Michele Procida, Major of the Guard of Security, to inform me that Colletta and several other generals were entering into a treaty with Austria; that Austria had announced that she would at all hazards invade the kingdom; and that this treaty most likely regarded private interests, not the interests of the nation, as had been the case at Casa Lanza, in 1805.

Several generals and officers, their adherents, endeavoured to dispose the minds of many other officers who

were against their projects, not to oppose their treating with the enemy. As men easily believe what they wish, these Generals revealed their intentions in an assembly of officers, and when they became known the troops deserted and threatened to kill their officers, as I have before stated. That the information given me by the Spanish Ambassador, and the above-mentioned assembly of officers may not appear doubtful, I will quote what Carascosa and Colletta say upon the subject. Carascosa, in page 330, says: "Je convoquai des généraux et des officiers d'état-major pour conférer sur cet état de choses. Un de ces derniers proposa d'envoyer comme parlementaire aux Autrichiens quelque officier intelligent pour découvrir leurs intentions, pour observer leur attitude, et pour savoir si l'on pouvait conserver l'espoir d'une honorable transaction, dans le cas où le secret de notre faiblesse ou le mauvais esprit de notre armée ne seraient pas encore connus." It is necessary to remember that the Allied Princes had declared, that the kingdom should be invaded at every cost, and that Carascosa had received no official charge to treat with the enemy. The following is a most unheard-of conversation between two Generals, who ought to have defended the national independence. Carascosa says in page 331: "Je demandai au Général Filangieri si l'on pouvait compter sur la garde pour la défense de Mugnano; mais il répondit que non; qu'au contraire, ce corps avait décidé d'envoyer une députation aux Autrichiens, dès qu'ils se présenteraient, pour leur déclarer que leur intention n'était pas de se battre contre eux, puisqu'ils les regardaient comme les alliés du Roi." It is essential to remark, that this conversation, and assembly of officers presided over by Carascosa, in which he proposed to treat with the enemy, took place

when my army was intact in the Abruzzi, and when I sent off hopeful, and even exaggerated accounts of its willingness to take the field, so as to prevent the enemies of my country from daring to betray it. I have not yet, I believe, said that two Generals spoke of the determination of their troops not to fight, which is synonymous to betraying their country, and yet their commanders had taken no measures to prevent such treachery, or at least to report it to the Government. The circumstance of Carascosa having written things of little importance to the Government, and having concealed what he knew respecting the intentions of the royal guard, would have been looked upon as a capital crime, if our affairs had taken another turn.

Now let us see what the historian Colletta says in page 280 of his work: "The King of Naples was at Florence, and was expected at Foligno, which was filled with Austrians, who surrounded the kingdom, hoping less from the war than from expected tumults. In the meanwhile, the inaction of these troops facilitated overtures of peace, and it was only necessary to consult the parliament, for the Regent did not dare to exercise in secret the royal power, as he was fearful in such sad times of exciting the suspicions and the indignation of the people. But as the vote of the Minister of War was, that every day the appearance of force should be augmented, as well as negociations for peace, the conditions, the manner, and the ambassadors were decided upon accordingly."

According to Colletta, the negociations for peace were to be concealed from the people, from the parliament, and from me who had the command of one of the two corps, and of the one which was upon the first line. On reflecting upon the designs of Colletta, Carascosa,

and the Regent, of opening secret negociations for peace, and upon the declarations of the Sovereigns at Laybach that the Austrian army should invade the kingdom were the Neapolitans even to give up the liberty they had acquired, every one will see that these secret negociations could have no other object than the enslaving of the nation and the ensuring of favour and pardon to those who had proposed them. From what Colletta says, the Regent feared the indignation of the people; consequently the people loved liberty; yes, they did love it, and had they been supported by worthy commanders, they would have preserved it. As minister, Colletta, by his secret machinations, prevented the army from performing its duty, and afterwards as a writer he tried to cover it with shame.

I transcribe two proclamations, one of King Ferdinand, and the other of the Austrian Commander-in-Chief. Both of these clearly show that the negotiations for peace by no means tended to prevent the invasion of the country.

PROCLAMATIONS OF THE 23rd OF FEBRUARY, 1821.

"Ferdinand I., by the grace of God, King of the Two Sicilies.

"The solicitude of our heart, expressed in a letter of the 28th of January, and directed to our beloved son, the Duke of Calabria, joined to a similar declaration made at the same period by the representatives of the Allied Sovereigns, can have left no doubt upon the minds of our people as to the effects of the diplomatic events of last July, or upon the after-consequences to which they expose our kingdom.

"Our paternal heart had nourished the firm hope,

that our warning would have caused the counsels of moderation and of prudence to have prevailed, and that a blind fanaticism would not have drawn down upon our kingdom those evils which we have constantly laboured to avoid.

"Relying upon this hope, we have prolonged our stay in the place where our allies are assembled to be enabled until the last moment to second by our warmest efforts the decisions which might be come to in Naples. To attain such a consummation, to which all our efforts tend; to become the conciliator and pacificator of these dissensions, is the only consolation which could in our old age compensate us for our grief, the rigour of the season and the fatigues of a long journey. But the men who exercise for the moment the power in Naples, oppressed by the perfidy of a small number, have remained deaf to our voice, and wishing to alienate the affections of our people, they have attempted to deceive them by an erroneous supposition, injurious to the great monarchs, which is, that I am in a state of arrest.

"It is necessary for me to reply to so false and guilty an imputation. Now that though the effect of the most perfiduous suggestions, our stay amidst our Allies can no longer have for its object the realization of our first hopes, we will immediately begin our journey to return to our States. Thus situated, it is no less our duty towards our people than towards ourself to make known to them our royal and paternal sentiments.

"A long experience of sixty years has taught us to know the inclinations and real wants of our subjects. Trusting in the rectitude of their intentions, we shall, with the help of God, be able to satisfy their wants in the most just and durable manner. We recommend

to our army by land and by sea, to consider and receive that of our august ally as a force acting solely for the real interest of our kingdom, and which, far from being sent to subject it, is authorized to join with it, to re-assure the public tranquility and to protect the real friends of their country's welfare, who are the faithful subjects of their King.

"FERDINAND."

PROCLAMATION OF GENERAL FRIMONT TO THE NEAPOLITANS.

"At the moment when the army under my command sets foot upon the frontier of the kingdom, I feel that it is my duty to declare frankly and openly the object of my operations. A detestable revolution which burst forth in the course of July disturbed your tranquillity, and shook those feelings of friendship which can only exist between neighbouring States when grounded upon reciprocal confidence. Your King had made his people hear his royal and paternal voice; he has revealed to you all the horrors of an useless war, which no one wishes to bring upon you, unless constrained so to do by your own actions. The old and faithful Allies of the kingdom have likewise raised their voice to you; they also have a duty to fulfil towards their people, but yet your real and enduring felicity is not a stranger to their minds, and that felicity will never be yours in the path of revolt, and while treading under your feet your sacred duties. Abandon voluntarily a revolution to which you are strangers, and put your trust in your King. Your interests are inseparable from his. On touching the frontier of the kingdom, no hostile feeling guides our steps. The army which is under my com-

mand will consider and treat as friends all the faithful subjects of the King. and the Neapolitans who love tranquillity. They will every where preserve the strictest discipline, and only regard as enemies those who oppose themselves to it.

"Neapolitans, listen to the voice of your King, and of his friends, who are likewise yours. Reflect upon all the misfortunes a vain resistance will draw down upon you: be persuaded that the passing idea with which your enemies and those of public order endeavour to mislead you, can never tend to your happiness.

"JOHN, BARON FRIMONT.

"General of Cavalry.

"From the head-quarters of Foglino.
"February 27, 1821."

These two proclamations of the King, and of the General-in-Chief, Frimont; the disorder and desertion which had taken place in the first corps, and which never happened in mine; the not finding myself supported with the requisite energy at the approach of the Austrians, nor assisted with troops; the letter from the Spanish Ambassador, and what he caused Procida to write to me, all tended to make me think that the Regent, Colletta, and the Generals of the first corps were treating with the enemy, and that they concealed their conduct from the parliament and from myself, because the basis of the treaty must of necessity be the fall of our liberty. Besides the letters which I received from Naples, and which confirmed the intelligence of Onis, others even more ominous were sent me by Carbonari, who were greatly compromised. They warned me that the partisans of Austria sought, and with some success, to find accomplices even in my own corps: they

exhorted me in the name of my country's welfare to lose no time in taking bold measures, such as marching with my troops and militia upon the capital, declaring that the country was betrayed and in danger, and assuming a military dictatorship. They were not aware that when a General stands opposed to an enemy, he does not save his country by turning his back upon it; on the contrary, his duty is to face it with determination and energy.

CHAPTER XI.

1821.

My military and political situation—I form the plan of crossing the Austrian lines and entering Piedmont — Reasons which induce me to resolve upon attacking the enemy occupying Rieti—The Regent fails in his promise of sending me assistance —Instructions which I receive through Major Cianciulli, and strange advice given me through this officer by the Commander of the first corps—My determination of marching upon Rieti the following day, the 7th of March.

FROM what I have related in the last chapter, it will be seen that my political and military situation was indeed desperate. The Regent, who was at the head of the Government and Generalissimo of the army, aimed at my ruin, The Minister of War and the Generals of the first corps were animated by the same desire, regarding me as an insurmountable obstacle to their secret treaty of peace—and what a peace! The great majority of the Congress favourable at heart to the public welfare were actuated by timidity rather to support the executive power than myself. On the other hand, the Austrians with fifty-two thousand men, mostly veterans, and commanded by their best Generals, surrounded the Abruzzi. They were abundantly provided with every thing necessary to carry on

the war. They styled themselves the vanguard of the Prussians and of the Russians, and said that they were encouraged by the Italian Princes, and that they attached great importance to having King Ferdinand with their army. What had I to oppose to my enemies both abroad and at home? The weak forces of my corps, the good will of the nation! But what means, what chance of safety was there for an unfortunate people who had trusted their arms, their treasures, and nearly a hundred thousand citizens to faithless hands? The force at my disposal was reduced to eleven battalions of the line, two hundred cavalry, two companies of pioneers, and about thirty battalions of National Guard, who for the first time in their lives quitted their homes. They were without muskets, and performed long marches through the snow, in which they passed the sleepless and miserable nights, most of them unprovided with cloaks, and not always well fed. More than two thousand of these militia arrived at my quarters without guns of any kind. Not to bid them fight with their fists or scandalize the province by sending them home, I wrote and asked the Regent for several thousand pikes, by way of saving appearances, having decided that I would employ them in some interior service. That my real and yet almost incredible misfortunes may not be taxed with exaggeration in the telling, I will refer to the tardy answer I received from that exalted patriot, the Regent.

"Naples, March 7, 1821.

"In answer to your letter in which you ask me for two thousand pikes, I inform you that I gave immediate orders upon the subject to Pedrinelli, who assures me that they are being made with the greatest haste, and

that they shall be immediately forwarded to you. I have just received another letter from you, dated the 4th instant. I have already given orders for what you have demanded, as your brother will more explicitly detail to you. I hope that success will attend your military operations, and I let you know that it is my intention to proceed to-morrow to Capua, from thence to go and visit the army. With my usual sentiments of perfect esteem, "I remain yours,

"FRANCIS."

The above letter will show that at the very time I was so closely threatened by the Austrians, the Regent had not yet moved from Naples; still less had he kept his promise of sending me assistance, should the enemy's column be directed against me.

It was not possible for me to defend the extensive frontier of the Abruzzi with the few troops and National Guard I had at my disposal, for the Austrians might have marched over it at any moment, forcing the pass of Tagliacozzo. By their advancing towards Salmona, my retreat would have become extremely difficult, for during winter many of those mountainous parts, covered with snow, are impracticable. After mature reflection, I determined upon executing a plan which, however strange at first, was the best that my circumstances admitted of effecting. I intended to form a column of six thousand troops, and six thousand National Guards —these latter selected from the eighteen thousand who were with me—to proceed with them along the edge of the Appennines by Novica, Viso, Camerino, Fabbriano, and then to enter the territory of Bologna, and to advance between the provinces of Modena and Tuscany, and so penetrate into Piedmont. Although I was

wholly unconscious of the revolution which shortly after broke out in Piedmont, I was certain that on seeing me there, followed by the youth of Italy, whom could have enlisted on the way, the Piedmontese would have joined their army to mine, and the affairs of Italy would have assumed another aspect. A few days after, when the brave army of Piedmont advanced to oppose the Austrians, their defeat arose solely from the circumstance that several Generals, and the Prince of Carignano, together with several corps of the royal guard, deserted the banner of liberty. Had I but appeared with my twelve thousand men, followed by many of the Italian youth of several provinces, neither the Generals of Piedmont, nor perhaps even the Prince of Carignano, would have betrayed the good cause. Perhaps the French, who were then in a state of great fermentation on beholding the two most important portions of our Peninsula in arms would have commenced the revolution which they effected nine years later. At the worst, the Italian armies of the north and south; united together for the first time after so many centuries, would have mutually encouraged each other, and Genoa, Alexandria, and many other strong military positions upon the Alps and the Appennines, would have served as a *point d'appui* for twenty-four millions of Italians. What would the Austrian army have done in the midst of the people of the south, whose eyes were fixed upon their brethren at the foot of the Alps? Then, perhaps, the royal Neapolitan guard would not have boasted of fraternizing with the enemy, and Carascosa and Colletta would not have had any idea of making secret treaties, whilst the parliament would have shown itself equal to the great event that had occurred. At the worst, the

Neapolitans and the Piedmontese would have been conquered but not humbled; for men who are always ready to blame those who are not successful in their enterprises, would have exclaimed: "The Italians would have remained victors in the conflict but for the hot head of William Pépé:" all the blame would have fallen upon me.

To carry such a design into effect, it was essential that I should have a good number of mules to transport the cartridges, and at least two hundred and fifty thousand biscuits, so that the absolute want of food might not oblige me to quit the Appennines and so retard my march. Besides, I wanted half a million of franks to pay ready money for such things as were of the first necessity. But above all, it was indispensable that I should learn how the divisions of the army were distributed, and whether one of them had not been placed in reserve upon the territory of Bologna. In the latter case, and if this division fulfilled its duty, it would not have been possible for me to penetrate into Piedmont, or if I did, I should have arrived in such a condition as to inspire no confidence in the Sardinian army. As to gaining five or six marches upon the Austrians who surrounded the Abruzzi, the thing would have been easy enough. I would have concealed my movements from the enemy by displaying the twelve thousand National Guards, who were not to accompany me, upon the heights of Tagliacozza, Civita Ducale, Leonessa and Ascoli. Thus, before the tardy Austrians could understand my audacious movement and prepare to attack me, I should have been with my column at a considerable distance from the Tronto. But the want of biscuits, mules and money, and still more of an exact notion of the manner in which the enemy had divided

its army between our frontier and Bologna, were circumstances which obliged me, to my infinite grief, to give up a project over which I had been meditating night and day for a week.

A young Frenchman, who had resided in the Abruzzi for several years, and was minutely acquainted with the topography of those provinces, had given me much useful information to enable me to execute my projected plan through paths which were little known, and concealed from the Austrians. From the many questions I had put to him, he might suspect the scheme I had in my mind, on which account the chief of my staff, Colonel del Canetto, never allowed him to be out of his sight, lest he should communicate with the enemy. Those who find themselves placed in such uncomfortable circumstances, are compelled in self-defence to suspect treachery on every side. The young Frenchman, as I afterwards found out, was entirely honest.

Having given up my favourite plan of marching into Piedmont, for the reasons I have already stated, and from fearing that it might have proved injurious to my country, I had to choose one out of three methods of conducting myself. The first was to remain inactive with my forces scattered over an extensive frontier; the second was to turn my back upon the enemy without even having made any demonstration, and the third was to meet the Austrians in a place favourable to myself, and thus accustom my troops to war, without exposing them to any great danger. I adopted this last plan. General Russo in his reports, constantly told me that having from his advanced post at Civita Ducale observed the enemy during two or three days from morning till night, he was convinced that they did not occupy Rieti with more than six thousand men. Upon this, I

determined to attack them in that city, because their number there was by no means considerable, and because that neighbourhood was extremely familiar and suited to me on every account. On the side of Velino, the base of the Appennines touches Rieti; on the opposite side, a large plain lies between the town from the mountains; but this plain is so uneven, and so covered with vineyards as to be totally unfitted for the action of cavalry or artillery, with the exception of that part which is on the high road. In such fields I should have been free either to advance, or to retreat towards my own position, without running any risk of being overtaken by the enemy, whilst, if they received assistance and attacked me, I could easily retreat to the pass of the Antrodoco. Rieti in this manner offered us an advantageous opportunity of accustoming my young soldiers to warfare.

I have already explained in what manner the enemy, without heeding the first corps of Carascosa, had surrounded me with fifty-two thousand men, so that in a few hours my small column might have been attacked by the large and well-trained Austrian divisions in Tagliacozzo, Civita Ducale, Leonessa, and even Giulianuovo, if they had crossed the Tronto and turned upon my right to show themselves in the Pescara. They who do not understand warfare, fancy it is easy for small bodies of troops to defend passes and hills against a considerable host. A small number of troops can only sustain the attack of a larger force, not by defending the positions which they occupy, but by retreating and turning with repeated evolutions.

On the 5th of March I disposed my small forces in the following manner. The brigade of General Verdenois, composed of two battalions of the 8th of the line,

and of those of the National Guard was stationed at Ascoli. Lieutenant-Colonel Pisa, with two national battalions, occupied several passes between Arquarte and Viso. Colonel Liguoso with one battalion of the 6th of the line and two of the National Guard, was stationed between Leonessa, and Piedilago; Colonel Manthoné, with two battalions of the National Guard, was stationed at Tagliacozzo; he was brother of the intrepid General-in-Chief of the Neapolitan Republic, who in 1799 was put to death by King Ferdinand. Eight battalions of the line, two hundred horsemen, two companies of pioneers, and fourteen national battalions, had been divided by me into three brigades commanded by Generals Montemajor and Russo, and by Colonel Casella. These brigades were under my own immediate orders along the road of Civita Ducale. The fourteen battalions of the National Guard were from the provinces of Abruzzi, Avellino, and Foggia. Several national battalions from Campobasso, and one from Calabria, were not yet arrived, neither was the squadron termed Holy, nor the hundred horsemen commanded by Colonel Scilla. Florestano wrote me word that the Regent had refused to send me any more troops, although in his instructions of the 2nd of February, signed by himself and not by the Minister of War, he said: "If the Abruzzi should form the main object of the war, you shall receive assistance of troops from the first corps of the army." The Abruzzi was not only the main, but the sole, object of the war, for the Austrians had surrounded them with their divisions, and did not, even for the sake of appearances, send off a single squadron towards the corps of Carascosa. They were certain that the first corps would not advance towards them; and, therefore, as the

Spanish Ambassador had warned me, they turned all their forces against myself. My instructions to General Verdenois and to the Colonels Pisa, Liguosi, and Manthoné were to the effect, that they were to keep me informed of the movements of the enemy towards the part of the country they occupied, and that if they found themselves attacked by a superior number, they were to retreat as slowly as possible, without exposing themselves to a contest in which they would have been very inferior in numbers. I left in the provinces of Chieti two Major-Generals who had followed King Ferdinand to Sicily, charging them to complete the organization of various battalions of the National Guard, who were in want of arms and uniforms.

On the morning of the 6th of March, I found myself with my head-quarters at Civita Ducale, where I received two reports, one from Colonel Manthone, the other from Colonel Pisa. The latter informed me that a considerable number of the men of his legions had quitted their standards to return to their homes, which were but at a short distance. Pisa did not mention any symptom of insubordination, and attributed this desertion merely to the want of food and of cloaks. Colonel Manthoné likewise complained of the desertion of three hundred men belonging to the National Guard of Molise, who, having no cloaks to protect them from the cold, were unable to support the rigour of the bivouac; the more so indeed, because even their rations were not regularly distributed to them. In all the other battalions, especially in those under my own eye, the discipline was perfectly maintained, and there was not one instance of desertion. Nevertheless, I concealed these two reports from the officers around me, and even from the Chief of my Staff del Canetto;

for it was necessary that I should encourage, and not dishearten them.

On the same morning Major Cianciulli arrived at my head-quarters. This officer had been sent to me by the Regent: he had served as aide-de-camp to Florestano in the campaign of Russia during all the siege of Dantzic, and lastly in the short campaign of Sicily. Cianciulli was entirely ignorant of the movements of the enemy. The Regent, the Minister of War, and the General commanding the first corps were interested in concealing from all, even from my brother, who was chief of the Prince's staff, that the whole Austrian army surrounded the Abruzzi. Had this circumstance been known, how could they have accounted for the inaction of the corps of Carascosa, who instead of assisting me by his manœuvres and with his troops, kept them at a distance of eighty miles from mine? Cianciulli, who was brave, intelligent, and full of national honour, brought me advice from Carascosa, which advice he mentions himself in page 332; and which consisted in counselling me to assemble all the forces of my corps in Aquila, and to make an intrenched camp of that city. The Regent advised the same course. To put such a camp in a proper state of defence required a period of two or three months, with money, artillery, and provisions, none of which means had I at my command. But let us suppose the camp in Aquila, and that I had been abundantly provided with provisions and artillery; I should have engaged the Austrians to besiege me in that city, which stands in an extensive plain, instead of fighting me in the Abruzzi mountains. Such a plan would have been most satisfactory to the enemy, and still more so to King Ferdinand, who would thus have taught me that no faith should be

placed in the oath of a King, nor in tears shed for his tears, when I had once been condemned by him to terminate my days in a cistern. Truly, if this order from the Regent, and this advice from Carascosa did not proceed from the Austrians, it had at least all the appearance of doing so, for had they besieged me in that city for a few days, they would have taken me prisoner with all my forces.

Thus abandoned by those who ought to have hastened to my support; in no way encouraged by the National Congress; uncertain of being able to provide even for the next day the necessary subsistence for my men; with militia new to the service, inexperienced troops and officers, who, although warm patriots feared the axe, or if not true patriots open to temptation; thus deserted in the midst of snow which chilled the natural cheerfulness of Neapolitans, what could I do? If there existed a possibility of my gaining some advantage over the enemy, and of accustoming my men to attack them without running the risk of being defeated, Rieti by its position which I have already described, presented the greatest chance of accomplishing my intention. At Rieti, therefore, I decided to attack the enemy. Had I succeeded, I should have gained a great deal in the estimation of my troops, and under this moral Ægis, I should have been able without damping their courage to retreat as far as Calabria. If, instead of driving the Austrians from Rieti, I had been defeated by them, I should have withdrawn to the mountains, with the advantage of having given a first lesson in war to my corps. I had anticipated that they would have encountered the first engagement with less vigour than they did on the following day; but I never expected that soldiers, militia, and legions would have been

completely dispersed; for I trusted to the great ascendency I had acquired over the multitude. Had they remained a year or even six months under my hands, this belief would not have proved vain; but the greater part of the soldiers and militia now beheld me for the first time. However, could I have foreseen what was to happen, I should have acted in exactly the same manner, for it was much better that such a misfortune should befall me on the frontier than in the heart of the kingdom. History affords many examples of soldiers, who, unused to warfare, have shrunk on their first encounter with the enemy; yet, who have afterwards fought with the greatest bravery.

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CHAPTER XII.

1821.

I reach Civita Ducale on the evening of the 6th of March—In what manner I disposed my troops—On the morning of the 7th, I march towards Rieti—Battle of Rieti—I order the retreat—Dispersion of my troops—The Neapolitans are unjustly blamed—Noble conduct of the officers of the National Guard.

On the evening of the 6th of March, I had removed my head-quarters to Civita Ducale. The brigades of Russo and Casella were with me, and I was in momentary expectation of two battalions of the line from Aquila. The brigade of Montemajor was near Rieti, upon the left of the river Velino. It was composed of four battalions of militia, and one of well-trained riflemen, commanded by Major la Porta, an excellent officer, who had served as Captain of Grenadiers in my regiment in Spain. Montemajor was naturally of a weak character, and this is a defect of which men never correct themselves. He was ambitious of the rank of lieutenant-general, and I assured him he would have it if he signalized himself in the first encounter with the enemy. By way of remedying his weakness, I sent off to him my energetic chief of the staff, Del Carretta, Colonel Novara, and Captain Cobianchi, a Milanese,

new in the service, but a devoted Italian. Novara was a native of Lombardy, and had served under Murat with honour in the horse-guards. The written instructions I gave to Montemajor were most particular, and indicated even the hour when he was to quit his bivouac, so as to reach Rieti at dawn on the morning of the 7th, at about the distance of a musket-shot on the side of the stone bridge upon the Velino. His directions were not to attack the enemy, but only to threaten them, and attract their forces to that point, and then inform me of the number to which they amounted. In the event of the enemy retreating, General Montemajor was to have followed them with great caution. None knew better than myself the evil effect of a defeat upon the minds of fresh troops and of very fresh militia, especially in the political situation in which we found ourselves. On the evening of the 6th, Colonel Lignani, without however exposing his column, was to make a demonstration at Piedilago, so as to attract the attention of the Austrians towards that spot.

Before dawn on the 7th of March, I was at my advanced post, half-way between Civita Ducale and Rieti. I drove away an Austrian piquet from the hill facing Cappucini, and caused my troops to occupy it. The ten battalions of the National Guard, with five of the line and two hundred horsemen were ready to execute my orders. I had brandy and provisions distributed to them abundantly, and in an order of the day I touched upon all those topics which are calculated to excite men to contemn danger. It was broad day, and I was waiting with impatience for Montemajor, who was placed on the left of the Velino, to draw near Rieti by the way of Casetta, and for his troops to

engage with the Austrians. From the degree of resistance made by them to this General, I should have been able to judge if, without any great degree of rashness, it would be prudent to attack the city and attempt to drive thence the Austrians, and to occupy it myself. But the column of Montemajor did not make its appearance before ten in the morning; and the enemy availing themselves of the time that the tardiness on the part of General Montemajor had obliged me to give them, sought and received assistance from the corps stationed in the neighbourhood of Rieti. This unpardonable delay of Montemajor proved most injurious to me; for it made me lose the advantage of forcing the enemy to evacuate Rieti, by giving them time to increase their forces and prepare for their defence. This circumstance obliged me to modify my operations. I limited myself to a reconnoitre of the Austrians; and this served as a most useful lesson of war, for my troops fought from advantageous positions where the enemy could not make use of their cavalry, and where their infantry, instead of advancing in a compact form, were obliged to fight separately. These lessons were likewise formed in the field where the brigade of Montemajor had begun the attack. With four battalions of the militia of Capitanata and Avellino, and another battalion of the line, I occupied an elevated hill opposite the Cappucini of Rieti. From this position I could discern all my forces, as well as those of the enemy, not one of whose movements could escape me. General Russo and Colonel Caselli with their brigades kept upon my right, in a plain which was so cut and interspersed with vineyards as to appear made on purpose for the advantage of inexperienced over experienced combatants. The two battalions of the line, com-

manded by the brave Majors Cirillo and Beaumont, likewise arrived. The former had been my aide-de-camp, and had signalized himself greatly in Russia; the latter had likewise served under me in Spain, and as adjutant-major had acquired an honourable reputation.

The enemy occupied Cappucini di Rieti opposite to me, and more than once sent forward a band of Tyrolese, who on being driven back confined themselves to a brisk discharge from their striped carbines against the militia, whom I kept together in a close mass. The latter remained motionless during this time; only every now and then, as the bullets whizzed through the air, they lowered their heads to avoid being touched. I smiled upon them as I pointed out the cool demeanour of their companions of the line. During this time, the bands of the militia played patriotic airs. The light troops of the enemy who were sent forward upon my right were not more fortunate; in the hope of intimidating my forces, they had pushed forward their fine cavalry, who made several vain charges, being always driven back. From the hill, I could see the Austrians towards the bridge upon the Velino opposed to Montemajor, but without any advantage; I could see the Tyrolese opposite to me merely defending themselves, whilst the brigades of Russo and of Casella upon my right, drove back the infantry and cavalry of the enemy. There was in the brigade of Russo a battalion of the militia of Foggia commanded by Major de Lucca, which behaved like a battalion of experienced soldiers.

Things had been in this state for about four hours, when the apathy of the enemy induced me to make dispositions for the occupation of several hills upon my extreme right by two battalions of the 8th of the

line, commanded by Colonel Casella; and I prepared to assemble all my troops in one column, flanked by light companies, and proceed upon the high road with several pieces of cannon with the intention of throwing myself upon Rieti. I was induced to adopt this resolution from having perceived that the baggage of the enemy was being removed from the city. Casella in the meanwhile boldly supported several charges of the adversary's cavalry, who vainly attempted to prevent him from occupying the hills. What must have been the indignation of the officers who fought on that day in the brigade of Russo and Casella, when they read in Colletta, that "on the appearance of a superb regiment of Austrian hussars, the civil militia unused to war, and terror-stricken, turned round and fled." Anger and jealousy are so deeply rooted in some human hearts, as to induce men to calumniate even their own countrymen. My observation that the troops and militia constantly repelled the cavalry of the enemy animated me more and more to attack Rieti, when I perceived that eight battalions, and perhaps the same number of Austrian squadrons were rapidly advancing towards the hill occupied by Casella. This officer could not derive any assistance from General Russo, who had in front of him a hostile force far more considerable than his own. The support received by the enemy arrived from Vienti, not far from Rieti. The five battalions I had with me were scarcely sufficient to stand against the enemy who occupied the Cappucini, and the two battalions of the line in reserve were but few to support my right, towards which the Austrians were sending considerable columns of infantry and cavalry. I shrank from the idea of retreating in the open day. The same thing happened to me now, as had occurred

to me six years before at Carpi, when these same Austrians obliged me to effect a retreat in full day which I meant to effect at sunset. Major Cianciulli has often repeated to me, that had the daring of the Austrians equalled their superiority in numbers, they would have been able to break our lines, and gain Civita Ducale, thus cutting off our retreat. From my earliest youth I had been intimately acquainted with the nature of the Austrian troops, and although they had made great progress between the period of the battle of Marengo, and the year 1821, the execution of bold daring movements was not, and never perhaps will be, suited to them. I did not therefore suppose that they could all at once have designed to put any audacious manœuvre into execution. Already my troops were so hotly pressed on my right, that having no time to lose I was obliged to yield. I sent off Colonel Wispeare to Casella to bid him retreat. Cianciulli was charged to carry orders to General Russo to begin a retrograde movement. I likewise ordered the retreat of the battalions which were upon the hill. As to the column of General Montemajor, he had sent Captain Cobianchi to me; this officer lost his horse amidst those woody mountains, and arrived on foot. I furnished him with one of my horses, and sent him back to his General with verbal directions to retreat. On his return, Cobianchi was made prisoner by the Austrians; but General Montemajor had nothing to fear, both from the fine position he occupied, and because the enemy made no kind of attempt upon my left. Poor Cobianchi was made a prisoner of war and incarcerated in Naples, where he bravely bore up against the hardest usage.

I made my artillery act upon the high road, and the militia were so new to war, that they were more

frightened by the noise of our own guns, than by the shot of the enemy. Until the moment of the retreat every thing went on well, and even better than I had hoped; for the men who had abandoned their ranks did not exceed two hundred, and the Austrian cavalry in their repeated charges were always repulsed by inexperienced soldiers and National Guards armed with sporting guns. As soon as the retreat began, it almost seemed as if an evil genius had changed the general state of feeling, for the men suddenly started from their ranks, and at least two thirds of them began to rush up the high and snowy mountains without being pursued by the enemy, and without heeding the voices of their officers. I myself, when I endeavoured to make them turn back and join their companions, a few of whom had still remained in their ranks, was only obeyed by those to whom I spoke; but the uneven state of the soil upon the sides of the mountain prevented my voice being heard by many. I thought that Civita Ducale was too near to see them all assembled there, and I sent several officers to Antrodoco, to stop the fugitives. These, instead of threatening their officers (as had happened in the first corps, which had never seen the enemy), cast down their eyes at the reproaches of their superiors. There was so little fear of a revolt, that the officers ill-treated the soldiers by roughly abusing them, so much so, that I had great difficulty in preventing them from employing coarse epithets, which tend to humiliate those to whom they are addressed, and prove great ignorance of the human heart.

Major Cianciulli who had his horse wounded, remained with General Russo, who with two hundred horse, part of the second light regiment, and the militia still true

to their flag, so ably closed our retreat, that on reaching our first positions, from which we started in the morning, the enemy gave over pursuing us, and did not cross the frontier. Having encountered more than a common degree of resistance from us during the whole day, they could not credit the entire dispersion of our forces. I remained with a few horse between Civita Ducale, and the convent which stands beyond the walls of the town. The enemy did not make a single prisoner, nor get possession of a single piece of cannon, and my troops after having supported the attacks of the enemy in a manner highly creditable to inexperienced troops, abandoned me without being pursued. At this moment I received from the capital the assistance of only one squadron, commanded by Colonel Ruffo Scilla, which I ordered to the rear-guard of General Russo. Thus ended this unfortunate day, which if of little importance in itself was immensely so in its results. It disheartened the friends of liberty, and gave scope to its enemies to crown our misfortunes, whilst it destroyed the little courage which still remained in the hearts of the deputies to enable them to support the holy cause of the people they represented.

I am not ignorant that the merit of nations is judged by results, and that the people of the United States of America, who so often abandoned the field of battle without fighting, when they finally acquired their freedom, were applauded by all Europe, who forgot that they owed it in a great measure to the ocean, which divided them from the mother country, and to the assistance which they received from France and Spain.

Latterly, the Belgians, as I have already stated, having the clergy and their King in favour of their

independence, at the first appearance of the Dutch, turned their backs upon them, and forsook their King, without offering even a shadow of resistance. But as they are become free and independent, the world forgets that they owe it to the intervention of France. And even the glory of the French nation was preceded by the flights of Sedan and of Lille, which were buried in oblivion by the brilliant glory of their celebrated conquests. To the Neapolitans, who were deprived by fortune of the advantage of a second battle, the shame alone has remained. From what I have related respecting the beginning of the first movement of the revolution, I have no doubt every candid reader will allow, it is to be presumed that if the National Congress had declared those Generals who were opposed to liberty, the enemies of the country, and had then retired either into Calabria, or into Sicily, the nation would have justified the firmness of their representatives. The energy with which they opposed the republicans of the kingdom in 1799, and afterwards in 1805 and 1806, tend to confirm such a belief. And yet in those days the invaders were assisted by the wealthy class of citizens in their attempts against the people.

But how can we complain of the injustice of strangers, who infer that our misfortunes result from our incapacity, when the only two Neapolitans who have hitherto written upon the events of 1820 and 1821, seem to have made it their study to vilify the country to which they belong? Colletta, not satisfied with falsifying the facts, makes Major Cianciulli an accomplice in his own assertions: an officer noted for his honour and bravery, and who said to me, that not one word that Colletta makes him relate was true. Colletta writes: "Major Cianciulli, who witnessed

these events, states, "On the 6th, General Pépé had sent two legions off towards Antrodoco upon the left side of the Velino; one more started upon the right of the river in the same direction, but as the two roads were not parallel, the columns were separated by a considerable space, and by the river. On the morning of the 7th, with the most powerful portion of his forces, without waiting for assistance, or for the arrival of the other, he descended the mountains near Antrodoco, and attacked Rieti. Here the Austrians were prepared for their defence, and on beholding the slowness and uncertainty of the proceedings of their assailants, they rushed out of the town in three columns. With one legion they made for the front of our line, the second took us on our flank, whilst the third remained in reserve in case of misfortune. Our young bands were shaken: the first retreated, the second did not proceed, and everything was soon in confusion. A superb regiment of Hungarian cavalry now advanced, at first slowly, then a little quicker, and finally at full speed. In the midst of the increasing peril, the civil militia, unaccustomed to war, began to fly, drawing after them, by the impulse of example, several companies of the old soldiers, who broke their ranks. Murmurs of 'Treachery!' and 'Let those who can, save themselves!' were heard throughout the whole camp."

After what I have already related of the battle of Rieti, it is needless for me to add anything to prove that Colletta, after having invented more like a romance writer than a military man, has kept back the honourable circumstances of this fact, which were, that our young bands resisted valiantly for six hours against an experienced and well-commanded enemy, whose cavalry was several times driven back. The report of treachery,

about which Colletta speaks, was never once mentioned. Carascosa only states that my militia were put to flight by the report of the artillery of the enemy. Those who had done so much towards plunging their countrymen into misery, afterwards heaped contempt upon their heads.

Although the battalions of the line had followed the example of the National Guard, and only the three hundred horse who were with me, had remained entire, I entertained a faint hope of being able to reorganize my forces between Antrodoco and Aquila. But when I reached Antrodoco I soon became aware that the troops and militia had been less shaken by fear, than by dark and mischievous rumours, spread by several subaltern officers, attached to those generals who did not cease to say that the whole of Europe was up in arms against us, and that every resistance would be nothing but an act of madness of General Pépé, and his most exalted Carbonari. During that night, several thousand soldiers and militia were compelled by cold and fatigue, to establish their bivouac in the neighbourhood of Antrodoco. Major Beaumont came and told me that he had assembled the troops of his battalion, and that they might be depended upon, as they would remain faithful to their flag. I replied, that he was indeed worthy of not being forsaken, but that in my heart, I was certain that before long his soldiers would follow the example of the others, because the contagion of moral maladies spreads far more rapidly than that of physical ones. My prediction was fulfilled a few hours later.

The dawn of the 8th March overwhelmed my soul with inexpressible gloom. The three hundred horse and two companies of pioneers alone remained entire,

all the other battalions of the line and militia amounted to scarcely two thousand men, comprising the column of Montemajor, which was still true to our banner. I gave orders to the officers who were without soldiers to proceed to Aquila, and await further orders. The superior and subaltern officers of the militia and legions surrounded me, armed with guns, and said: "General, we will obey you, and we will serve our country to the last as private soldiers." They were all landholders, and amongst the most considerable in the kingdom, and the greater number were husbands and fathers. Amongst them were Colonel Marquis de Rosa, Major de Luca, and Del Sordo, of the province of Foggia. Touched by the noble conduct of these officers, I said to them: "A country which possesses citizens endowed with such generous sentiments can never be destined to a life of servitude. Go to your respective provinces, where you will assemble your militia and legions, who will blush at having quitted you. I will call upon you again, and we will fight the enemies of our country with better success."

The Canon Cappucci, a distinguished Carbonaro, had chosen to follow me as the chaplain of my staff. When near Rieti, he had taken up a gun and fought bravely, to encourage the militia. On this occasion, he killed a Tyrolese, whom he stripped of his arms, which he presented, in Naples, to a Mantuan lady, of true Italian heart. The officers of the National Guard who offered to serve as soldiers were all Carbonari, and mostly grand masters of the sect. And yet both Colletta and Carascosa write that the militia and the legions had been forced to quit their homes by the Carbonari, who had chosen to keep themselves safely in their towns.

On separating from the officers of the National Guard, who had manifested such noble patriotism, I

recommended them to make their subordinates acquainted with the fault they had committed, but to do so without humiliating them, exhorting them at the same time to prepare to wash out the stain which was upon them on the first opportunity. I likewise gave these officers a proclamation I had written, and which they were to have printed in the chief town of each district, and then distribute through the country. It concluded as follows:—"You National Guards, who have defied the rigour of the season, and many privations, who have accomplished forced marches; who have clothed and armed yourselves at your own expense, and at first, although unused to arms, fearlessly encountered the troops of the enemy; your country, grateful for such noble conduct, will forget the passing error, common to inexperienced soldiers. But your women of the Abruzzi, Sanniti, Irquini, and Dauni, will be less indulgent than your country. They will not press you in their arms; they will make you blush for your weakness, and they will bid you hasten again to surround that General whose confidence in your patriotism you should have justified better than you did on the 7th of March, when you fought at Rieti."

I left General Russo at Antrodoco with the three hundred horse and about a thousand troops, collected from the remains of the dispersed corps of the line. I charged him to assemble together, if possible, the soldiers who were scattered about the neighbouring mountains, and twice a day to send me notice of the movements of the enemy. My instructions were that he should immediately retreat at the appearance of a superior Austrian force. I sent orders to the Colonels Liguosi and Pisa, the first near Leonessa and the second near Arquato, to retreat to Aquila, and I myself proceeded to that city.

CHAPTER XIII.

1821.

I return to Aquila—Other battalions of the National Guard arrive there, and likewise disperse — Precautions which I take—I receive orders from the Regent not to attack the enemy first—Reasons why I should not obey such an order, had I even received it in time—The Austrians draw near Aquila—Remaining strength in my corps—Retreat from the Abruzzi—Another desertion takes place at Castel de Sangro—Project to arrest me and to give me up to the Austrians—My arrival in Naples—Conversation with my brother—Girolamo Arcovito, President of the Parliament, comes to see me—I receive a visit from General Colletta—I go with him to the Regent, who grants every thing I ask—Duplicity of the Regent and of Colletta—Intelligence of the Piedmontese revolution is brought by a vessel, and is carefully concealed—Borrelli, the deputy—Conversation with various other deputies—My departure for Salerno.

On reaching Aquila, on the 8th of March, I found there a battalion of militia from the district of St. Angiolo in the province of Avellino. It was commanded by Major Alvini, an officer well known for his bravery and patriotism. He placed the greatest confidence in his men, and assured me that they would not disperse. I felt convinced, however, that the moral contagion which had broken out would not spare a single corps; nevertheless, I sent off Alvino and his

battalion to Antrodoco to strengthen the rear-guard of General Russo; but after a march of a few miles, his battalion dispersed. Colonel Valiante likewise came to me. This officer had been greatly compromised prior to the revolution, and now commanded the legion of Molise, his native province. He had preceded his legion by a day, and, like Alvino, he assured me that they would remain under his banners. Labouring under this illusion, Valiante returned to Popoli, to place himself at the head of his legion; but on his arrival he found it reduced to the officers and a few sergeants. I consoled these militia officers by pointing out to them that in the time of Massena, although the Calabrese had always fled at the first encounter, they afterwards invariably fought with the greatest valour and perseverance.

Whilst I was trying to afford consolation to others, I stood in great need of it myself; and alas! I knew not where to look for it. The general dispersion of my corps had converted the enthusiasm, manifested a few days previous by the population of the Abruzzi, into a sad and ominous silence. They anticipated that their provinces would soon be invaded by the Austrians; and the Carbonari who had shown themselves most warm in the cause of patriotism, now shrank back under the fear of King Ferdinand's punishment. The inhabitants of Aquila, of both sexes, were eager to know what General Pépé had said when he beheld the dispersion of his corps. On learning that I had neither uttered a complaint nor a reproach against the troops who had forsaken me, before they had been exposed to any great danger, they deplored my misfortune which they termed unmerited. From the earliest period of infancy my life had been a continuation of uninterrupted misfor-

tunes; but never until now had I felt what real sorrow was.

Had the Regent and the Parliament possessed any real feelings of patriotism, there would have existed a remedy for every evil; but what was to be hoped from such a Regent and from such a parliament, so weak even in better times, and from generals who hated the very name of patriot? These reflections plunged me into inexpressible grief. I who had hitherto enjoyed the strongest health now experienced such a degree of weakness, that while I was in need of rest, sleep forsook my eyes; I felt in want of nourishment, but I was not able to eat. If the thought of my country, and some faint glimmering of hope had abandoned me, I should have ceased to live. I was fully convinced, that had the Congress, without calculating the danger which might have resulted to individuals, boldly espoused the national cause, we should have triumphed in the same way as other nations had done, who had been as weak as ourselves at the outset. My grief, great as it was, did not however prevent my issuing the necessary orders for the retreat of Verdenois, Pisa, Liguosi, and Manthoné, with the remains of their columns. I caused two companies of troops to remain at Civitella del Tronto, and one battalion at Pescara. I ordered that the rest of the column of Montemajor should join that of General Russo; and having so done, I sent an exact account of my disasters to the Regent. At the same time I wrote to several deputies of the parliament, who were my friends, and exerted myself to instil into their minds the deep conviction which filled my own,—that by a recourse to several prompt and energetic measures, we might still be enabled to preserve our freedom. It was my opinion that we should begin the defensive war

upon the right side of the Volturno, so as to afford time for the dispersed troops and militia to re-assemble; likewise, because in the approaching month of April, the Abruzzi mountains would no longer be covered with snow. We could then have carried on there an insurgent war against the Austrians, who must soon have appeared in sight of Capua. I further thought that the Regent and the parliament ought to retire to Calabria, and that those Generals who had sought to acquire the favour of King Ferdinand, should be immediately dismissed the service. The deputies, ready to carry these measures into effect, were few in number; the majority of the members considered my proposal as tending to compromise their future prospects, and refused even to discuss the subject.

I had written to the above effect, when I received a letter from the Regent, dated March 8th, which was the day after that of the combat of Rieti. In this missive, he ordered me to restrict myself to a system of defence, but on no account to be the first to commence hostilities. Had such an order reached me in time, either on the 6th of March, or at day-break on the 7th, I should most certainly not have acted otherwise than I had done. If I had stood merely on the defensive, I should have met with exactly the same fate without having had the advantage of a six hours' contest, which enabled me to say to my troops, "You have experienced the attacks of the enemy, against which you opposed great resistance, why then afterwards did you quit the field of battle in disorder, and without being pursued; why did you forsake your ranks?" If, on the other hand, the enemy had penetrated into those provinces on all sides, without any opposition on my part, I should not have been enabled to recal to the minds of my soldiers

the laudable manner in which they had begun the battle. Besides, where should I have found another situation which admitted of my surprising the enemy from two different points, as I had done at Rieti, which town I should most certainly have taken, had Montemajor executed my instructions in proper time. Had I gained such an advantage, I might have returned at my pleasure, without my corps deriving any cause of fear or doubt from such a circumstance.

On the morning of the 10th, General Russo wrote to inform me that he had been attacked at Antrodoco by a considerable Austrian force, and that after having defended these passes as long as he could with his few hundred men, he had retreated, after some loss, to an advantageous position between Antrodoco and Aquila. Persons ignorant of the art of war, suppose that it is easy to defend these difficult passes with a small number of men. They forget that the assailant, at the head of a numerous force, can, by making a circuit, get possession of the summits of the mountains, and then have the inferior number at their mercy, and oblige them to abandon the pass.

I made the civil authorities of the provinces of Teramo and Aquila retreat to Salmone. I placed a garrison in the Castle of Aquila, and then advanced towards Popoli. From the report I received on my arrival there, it appeared that General Russo had still five hundred infantry and two hundred cavalry remaining. General Verdenois had from four to eight hundred infantry, and at my head-quarters I had a hundred horse and two companies of pioneers. It was impossible to me to hold the Abruzzi with so small a force. I therefore gave orders for our retreat, which was to be performed with the same degree of slowness as

marked the advance of the Austrians. I might have assembled my few forces to keep in front of the advanced column of the enemy, in order to give time to the Government to adopt another system of defence, had I not been obliged to go to the capital to raise the depressed spirits of my countrymen throughout the kingdom. But unfortunately I was the only General who was compromised, and the only one who could raise the courage of the multitude, had I only been seconded by the parliament. Instead, therefore, of losing time which was so valuable, in doing what could be quite as well executed by General Russo, I ordered him to unite the remains of the dispersed columns, who were scattered about the province of Aquila, and to retreat with them through Salmone and Isernia. To General Verdenois, I gave directions to effect his retreat by the road of Chieti and Lanciano.

Having thus disposed things for the evacuation of the Abruzzi, I passed the night in Salmone. On the following day, with the two hundred horse and the two companies of pioneers, I endeavoured to effect the passage of the plain of five miles with the artillery. Six years before, I had crossed this same plain with a heavy heart, forming part of the vanguard of the army of Joachim, which although defeated, was led by Generals more faithful to that King, than they now proved to their country. Our misfortunes had been great at that period, and the blow given to our national honour had been considerable, but we did not then as now, pass immediately from a state of freedom to one of complete servitude. Another affliction was in store for me at Castel di Sangro: a battalion of the Calabrese Militia, which had hitherto resisted the pernicious example of the others, reached that place and

immediately after dispersed itself. A few hours later, the two companies of the pioneers, who had seemed to glory in showing themselves an exception to the general disorder, likewise dispersed, and I remained alone with only a hundred horse.

I recalled to mind James II. of England, who when forsaken by all but his nephew, exclaimed each time some new instance of desertion occurred: "Is it possible!" But at last, abandoned even by his nephew, James uttered, "Can it be, that he has followed the example of the others!" What had happened to a King might have served to console a poor general. But if James lost a kingdom, we all lost a country for whose sake my whole life had been one long series of struggles.

I reached Isernia on the 13th of March. From thence I wrote to ask permission of the Regent to proceed to Naples, to confer with him upon matters touching the war. Then only did Carascosa decide upon coming to my aid. He sent to my assistance the King's regiment of infantry—a great assistance indeed against the whole Austrian army! I wrote to Carascosa, telling him, that he would do well to recal this regiment, as it was of little or no avail against the entire and powerful army of the enemy. The wishes of the Regent, and of those Generals who looked upon me as an obstacle to the treaty they aimed at concluding, were now gratified. They were simple enough to suppose that, although the legions and militia would not, the troops of the line would support to the last, the stipulation with Austria of conditions useful to themselves, although not to the country whose slavery was thereby irrevocably decided. After mature deliberation, however, the Regent and his adherents perceived that although I

now stood alone, I had still enough influence with the nation as mar their designs. This caused them to propose to the Council of Ministers that I should be put under arrest, and tried for having attacked the Austrians in Rieti, in opposition to the orders of the Regent. I have already stated that such orders only reached me after the fight; but they might have made use of this pretext to arrest and give me up to the Austrians, who would soon have settled the rest. It was, however, far easier to form such a plan than to execute it; therefore those who proposed it were careful not to allow the public to become acquainted with their project. I received permission from the Regent to proceed to Naples, and I accordingly quitted Isernia on the morning of the 15th of March. I reached a place, of which I do not recollect the name, but where the head-quarters of the first corps were established, and here a certain Colonel Santaniello presented himself to me. Some months before, this officer had held the command of the province of Chieti, but he had so disgusted the inhabitants and the authorities by his conduct, that I had been obliged to replace him in this command by another officer. Santaniello was notorious for his incapacity, but having now become my enemy, that was more than sufficient reason why he should be placed in active employment. This colonel approached me, I know not exactly with what intentions, but they were certainly of an evil nature. Perceiving that in opposition to the rules of discipline, instead of taking off his hat, he advanced towards me with an air of insolence, my aide-de-camp, Major Staiti, was about to spring from the carriage to bring him to a sense of propriety, had I not prevented him, saying, "Let him be punished in another manner." The Chief of the Staff, Colonel

Brochetti soon made his appearance, and ordered Santaniello under arrest. It happened in this instance, as in many others, this incident was exaggerated until it grew into a report, that an attempt had been made to take my life. I myself never gave any credit to such a rumour.

It was late at night, on the 15th of March, when I reached Naples. A numerous body of young men, forming the Guard of Security, were in the Strada Toledo. This guard alone protected the capital, where there were no military forces of the line: and succeeded perfectly in maintaining public order. They all evinced so much love for the public welfare that I was affected by it. Several times they stopped the postillion to ask after me and my corps, of that of Carascosa, and of the march of the enemy. They were not aware of my being in the carriage, and my aide-de-camp, Major Staiti, gave them such answers as were calculated to quiet their just alarm. I cannot express how miserable I felt at this moment on seeing all that could have been done with this poor nation, had it only been well directed; and yet it was doomed to fall again into a state of servitude. On reaching my residence, I found my brother surrounded by a small number of excellent friends. The deep affliction he experienced for our country and for me, was expressed upon his countenance, which he vainly endeavoured to conceal under an appearance of cold stoicism. Those around him assured me that for several nights, constant sighs and continual restlessness belied his affected indifference. My brother did not like to interfere with the internal affairs of the kingdom, but the humiliation of his country wrung his heart. From the conversation which took place between us, whilst I was taking some refreshment, I

could perceive he had no hope left. My duty was not only to hope, but to exert myself by every means in my power to save my falling country. Florestano had perceived the duplicity of the Regent, and had in fact abandoned him, without intimating whether or not he meant to return, defying all the injury the Regent could do him on the desired arrival of the invader. A hypocritical Regent whose feelings were opposed to our institutions; a timid congress; self-seeking generals, a French and English fleet in the bay to abet treachery; these circumstances even more than the Austrian army already in the country, rendered our case desperate. One of two deputies of the Congress, remarkable for their eloquence as I have already said, was Borrelli. I had caused him to be named President of the Committee of Public Security soon after the revolution, because the Carbonari of the high Vendite had warmly recommended him to me as an ardent patriot. Now, although my faith in his devotion to the public cause, and his disinterestedness was shaken, I determined to address myself to him. The intense pain I experienced at our misfortunes induced me to hope that he would second me in persuading the parliament to withdraw with the Regent and his family into Calabria. With this gleam of hope in my breast I sought to obtain a few hours' rest, but I sought in vain.

On the morning of the 16th, the President of the Parliament, Girolamo Arcovito, who had heard of my arrival in the capital, came to see me as much from affection as from a desire to talk with me upon our common misfortunes. He was that Arcovito of Reggio in Calabria, who had received me into his house in 1803, when I was a mere youth, endeavouring to revolutionize three provinces, for which indeed I was sent to the Fossa del Maritimo. At the period to which I allude,

Arcovito had nearly been thrown into prison on account of this visit, and now that he was President of the Congress, he had preserved the warmest love of liberty, and all his former friendship for me. He related to me the address which the parliament had decreed and sent to the King by means of General Fardella. The first words of this address studiously demonstrated that the members of the Congress had not been guilty of the revolution that had taken place; the rest contained humble expressions dictated by the most abject sentiments. The excellent President, Arcovito, appeared much grieved at this, and told me, that although President, he had been unable to prevent this despatch from being sent, which was the result of fear awakened in the hearts of his colleagues, by the recollection of the scaffold and axe employed by King Ferdinand in 1799. He then said: "I see that various generals out of jealousy of you, and the fear of losing their rank, have permitted our liberty to perish; nevertheless, they can never deprive you of the merit of having braved every thing for the love of the public welfare. But they will perhaps lose the rank they so much value, having done too much for the ruin of their country, and not enough to satisfy the King. If the parliament were to listen to me, the President, we should immediately depart with the Regent for Calabria, and entrust you with a military dictatorship." Arcovito promised me that he would support my project as to what ought to be done. We were both deeply affected when we parted; although I did not suppose we parted for ever. Arcovito was scarcely gone before General Colletta arrived. He embraced me in the presence of my brother; wept with emotion, and dried his tears. How, seeing such

emotion, could I help opening my heart to hope—to the belief—that he had returned to the national cause? I recollected that men are never altogether bad, or entirely good; I exposed to him my plan of re-organizing the second corps in Salerno, whilst the first should defend the right bank of the Volturno. Colletta, who was then Minister of War, not only approved, and promised to support my projects, but he proposed that we should lose no time in proceeding together to the Regent, that he might immediately decree the execution of what I meant to do. We went to the Regent. Colletta entered his closet before me to announce my arrival; I was admitted after a few minutes, and the Prince appeared painfully affected by the misfortunes which had befallen the troops under my command, and then, without making the slightest scruple, he decreed everything that the minister and I had demanded.

I perceived, and knew later, that the Regent and Colletta had agreed together that the Prince should apparently satisfy all my requests; for they were fearful that I might be otherwise induced to adopt some extreme measure, which might have put the lives of the traitors in danger. The real intentions of these two men were, to keep me occupied with the organization of my troops between Salerno and Avellino, whilst the commander of the first corps made a convention with Austria, who granting individual favours, should invade the kingdom, establish an absolute Government, and declare outlaws all who might refuse to lay down their arms. The following is the decree, signed by the Regent and transcribed by Colletta, relative to the corps I was to organize:

"War Office, No. 2743.
"Naples, March 16, 1821.

"General,

"His Royal Highness, the Prince Regent, has ordered that your Excellency should organize a second corps between the two principalities. This corps is to be composed: 1st. Of the *Quadri* of the battalions which have already belonged to the second corps, *Quadri* which shall be sent to Monteforte by the Commander-in-chief of the first corps. The soldiers who are to complete this *Quadri* are to be taken from the dismissed soldiers who are in the battalions of the militia or legions, according to the decree of the current day; and of the recruits that your Excellency can draw from the different recruiting depôts in the kingdom. These have been advised accordingly. 2ndly. Of a battalion of gensd'arme. 3rdly. Of the Holy squadron, which is to amount to one hundred and sixty horse. 4thly. Of battalions of militia and legions now in Naples, or on the road hither; and about which corresponding orders have been given to the Governor of Naples. 5thly. Of the battalions, corps, and companies which are being organized in Naples and elsewhere. 6thly. Of other battalions of militia and legions that your Excellency may think fit to organize in the two principalities or in Capitanata. As soon as the force and march of the 2nd riflemen are known, I shall hasten to send them to join the corps under your command. The above corps is to be composed of four brigades, commanded by the Generals Verdenois, Montemajor, Mari, and Aquino. The first three are to direct themselves towards Monteforte, as soon as they are made acquainted with the position they are to hold, and that they can quit the troops they now command. As soon as General Russo

shall have joined the first corps, dispositions will be made for him to join you.

"I have given orders that all the detached officers who have been placed at the disposal of your Excellency shall go on to Monteforte, to be placed under your orders as soon as they return from the Abruzzi. The Counsellor of State, Bozzelli, will stay with the second corps. I have likewise given orders that the Paymaster-General, Signor Gascara, and the Commissary, Signor Tolva, shall, until the arrival of their colleague, Morales, lend your Excellency their respective services in the corps you command. It is necessary you should know, that I have given directions that the battalions of Calabrese militia should stop at Salerno, and there await your orders respecting their new destination. The same orders have been issued to those from Apulia, who will await your commands in Avellino. I shall immediately give directions that the corps you are about to organize shall be provided with a field-hospital, as well as means of military transport and of subsistence. I shall wait until the artillery belonging to the late second corps shall have effected its retreat from Volturno, before I decide whether all, or part of it, shall form part of the new second corps.

"The Minister of War,

"COLLETTA."

The reader will hesitate ere he believe that out of all these things he had indicated, Colletta did not put one into execution: the promises made by him, in concert with the Regent, had no other object than to mask their designs to the last, and to justify themselves if I had denounced them to the nation, and had exhorted it to take up arms *en masse*. Carascosa, in his history,

states, that he received a letter from Colletta, likewise dated the 16th of March, in which, amongst other things, there are the following lines (page 392): "Le ministre avait ajouté, que je ne devais pas non plus compter sur la co-opération du second corps imaginaire que devait organiser le Général Pépé." These were the men with whom I had to deal. The Regent and Colletta had another motive for granting me in writing every thing I could desire, and that was, the intelligence which had been received by sea of the revolution which had burst forth in Piedmont on the 16th of March, in which they had proclaimed the Constitution of Spain. This important intelligence, which would have reanimated the whole population against the Austrians, was kept a profound secret between the Regent, Colletta, and Borrelli. The latter person, as I was informed afterwards at Paris, caused the crew of the ship which had brought this intelligence to be strictly guarded. The news of the Piedmontese revolution was not even made known to the parliament, and still less to me, from whom all three had great interest in concealing it more than from any one else. Had this political change in Piedmont been known to the Congress, they would most likely have gone to Calabria, and I might perhaps then have succeeded in arousing the public spirit, which was so much depressed, the more so indeed, that we had not sustained any severe loss. It is certain that Colletta related in Florence, and explained in his own way, how he had kept this event concealed. I was made acquainted with this circumstance by the learned William Libri.

The movement in Piedmont was inspired by Italian feelings, and undertaken with the greatest generosity; for there the patriots did not wait to learn the first

military results between ourselves and the Austrians, but decided immediately upon flying to arms to come to our assistance, exposing themselves thereby to the same misfortunes as ourselves in the event of our failure. If the Piedmontese had risen on the 1st instead of the 10th of March, or had they given me positive notice of their intentions, the affairs of Italy would have taken a more favourable turn than has been imagined, and history would have spoken with admiration of the conduct of the Piedmontese. But the fate of our Peninsula was destined to be disastrous.

As the affairs of Peidmont were entirely unknown, many superior officers who were greatly compromised, and who thought it likely that Carascosa would be in high favour with Austria, began to flock around him to make him their friend. The only two of my followers who were true to the last, were the Counsellor of State, Bozzelli, who held the administration of my army, and my aide-de-camp, Major Staiti. Both were made to pay dearly for their fidelity to their country and to their General. Staiti was condemned to death, and then was reprieved and sent to pass several years loaded with chains in a dungeon, and afterwards was removed to the island of Farignana. When the Regent ascended the throne, he granted him the favour of commuting this punishment into exile for life. Bozzelli for having followed me to Salerno, in obedience to the orders of the Regent, was punished by two years' imprisonment and fifteen of exile.

My horses and servants were arrested for some hours as they were about to pass through Capua by several officers of the first corps, who thought thereby to curry favour with the Generals, supposed to be on good terms with the Government about to be re-established by the

Austrians. The Holy squadron of which the Minister of War spoke, in his letter written to me in the name of the Regent, was the same which under the orders of Major Morelli had first raised the standard of liberty, and marched to my head-quarters. This same squadron had been to Sicily under the command of my brother. Having returned from that island, it was intended to form part of my corps in the Abruzzi; but from the want of saddles and other small articles, which might easily have been procured in ten days, it was scarcely ready to march on the 16th of March, when it proceeded to Avellino to await my orders. On the same day, the 16th, as I came out of the palace, I met the deputy Borrelli, who appeared to me but little affected by our common misfortunes, while I pressed him to join his efforts to those of the President Arcovito, and of the deputies who were warmest in the cause of the national interest, to induce the parliament to retreat to Calabria or Messina. But Borrelli in whom so much confidence was placed by the Carbonari, answered: "Would you have us imitate the flight of the militia?" And yet he made so much parade of his patriotism, that I was willing to attribute this reply to his want of experience in public affairs, and not to his being an adherent of the Duke of Calabria. On the same day, Pocrio, accompanied by other deputies came to me. He endeavoured to defend the message sent by the parliament to the King through the medium of General Fardella; but all his ingenuity and eloquence could not make black appear white. Until the last, however, he showed himself attached to the cause of the nation and of liberty, and conducted himself in the most honourable manner, as may be seen by his courageous and energetic protest, which entailed upon him a long exile and much

injury to his family affairs. Amongst other things and persons, we spoke of Carascosa, and all the deputies agreed upon his aversion to the new order of things. Nevertheless, several of them added: "Now that the destiny of our country is in his hands, he will be obliged for his own interest to act honourably, and to make every effort for its salvation." Thus weak men, rather than look danger in the face, try to delude themselves. The deputies quitted me, leaving me to hope, that in the event of the Austrians beating the first corps of the army, the parliament would retire to Calabria, after having given me a thousand frivolous reasons why this movement should not be made at once. On the same night I departed for Salerno, with the certainty that the parliament would support whatever demand I might address to the Regent; and yet I could foresee that the whole force of the State being directed by himself and his accomplices, our liberty could not sustain itself.

CHAPTER XIV.

1821.

My arrival in Salerno and transient hopes—Intelligence of the total dispersion of the first corps—I return to Naples—What attempts still remained to be made—Circumstances which opposed their accomplishment—I start for Castellamare with the intention of embarking for Barcelona—The vessel delays sailing—Letter from my brother; he sends me an ostensible appointment as Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States of America—Whether the maintenance of Neapolitan liberty would have been possible.

On arriving at Salerno at dawn, on the 17th of March, I immediately began to write to the civil and military authorities of Calabria, of Apulia, of Basilicata, Avellino, and even of Salerno. I then reviewed the few military corps, each small in number, which I found there. From Naples I had already written to the Intendant of Avellino, and to the General commanding that province, and had received favourable answers from both. The Intendant Marini assured me that all the officers of the militia had declared that they would not forsake me, and that they were certain of being followed by their subordinates, who had abandoned me at Rieti. The Carbonari of Salerno, as well as all the militia officers to be found in the province, made the same

declaration as those of Avellino. The message sent by the parliament to the King was generally blamed, on account of its want of dignity; and every one said that had the Congress quitted the capital, calling upon the people to take up arms at the same time, the whole population would most undoubtedly have risen *en masse*. During this time the Counsellor of State, Bozzelli, a man remarkable for his wisdom, energy and honour, came and joined me. This was the last time that fortune, as if in jest, smiled upon me. I could not discover whether the slowness of the Austrians arose from a political object, or from a secret understanding with the Regent and the officers devoted to him. Could I only have had a fortnight, I might have assembled soldiers and militia enough to form a corps. With this force, I could have protected the retreat of the parliament, had Arcovito and his adherents succeeded in inducing them to adopt such a resolution.

No longer amidst the snows of the Abruzzi, and the approach of the fine season, were circumstances highly favourable to an insurrectionary war, which during the months of May, June, July, and August, would have been murderous to the Austrian troops. Besides, a war in the two principalities, having Basilicata on one side, and Upper Calabria, could be carried to a much greater extent than in the Abruzzi.

These considerations had raised my confidence in some degree, when being at table on the 18th at General Caracciolo's, who commanded the military division of Salerno, I was surprised by the arrival of a staff-officer, named Major Chianti. This gentleman had been sent by my brother with a letter, in which with his usual brevity, he informed me that not only none of the promises made me by the Regent and

Colletta were to be performed; but that directions had been sent into the provinces, that all orders given by me were to be considered as null and void. He afterwards stated that the first corps no longer existed, and that its Generals had nearly lost their lives by the hands of their own soldiers. Finally, that there was not a single obstacle between me and the Austrians. Thus all my hopes again vanished. I did not reveal to General Carascosa or to any one else the sad intelligence brought me by Major Chianti, accompanied by whom I started for Naples, after telling Caracciolo that business of importance called me there.

The Generals of the first corps had reckoned without their host. They had decided not to resist the Austrians; but to treat with them whilst they preserved for the King his troops intact. The Carbonari of the regiments of the line and of the militia were warned that their chiefs were treating with the enemy upon terms most unfavourable to the public cause; whereupon they not only deserted, but they threatened the lives of their Generals. Carascosa says, in page 397. "Il paraît que le meurtre des généraux et des officiers avait été recommandé aux soldats lorsqu'ils se débanderait, mais qu'ils ne mirent beaucoup d'empressement dans l'exécution de cette partie de leurs desseins." This is the cause why in the first corps, abounding with every thing they needed, and which never once met the enemy, they conceived the plan of killing their Generals and superior officers; whilst in the corps under my command, as I have already said, where the men were in want of everything, were forced to bivouac in the snow, and ill, or well, had fought during several hours at Rieti, not a single

officer was threatened or treated otherwise than with respect.

However, if in Naples several Generals showed themselves opposed to the Constitution, the same thing happened in Spain, in Portugal, and even in our own Piedmont, and in none of these countries did any General dare at first to declare himself in favour of his country's freedom. The people who aim at the destruction of absolute power and the establishment of liberal institutions, should reflect well before they put their trust in the Generals of a fallen Government or a fallen King. In 1823, when the army of Louis XVIII. advanced to destroy the liberty of Spain, the Spanish Generals, Balesteros, Morillo, and Laborbal, favoured the invader.

When I arrived in Naples on the morning of the 19th, I had not yet determined what I was to do, or which of the various plans I should adopt that crowded my mind. My first idea was to try to induce the parliament to depart for Calabria, now that they had no longer the excuse of saying that it was a premature measure; the second, that all the friends of the good cause capable of bearing arms should assemble between Salerno and Avellino; the third, to prevail on the National Guard of Naples which had been organized by me with such care, to compel the Regent to depart to Calabria followed by all the royal family. The historian, Colletta, who had embraced me with tears of tenderness on the 15th of the month, writes that I arrived in Naples the day after the affair of Rieti. I should have done so, for had I reached Naples on the 9th instead of the 15th, I should have been master of most precious time, in which I might have assembled

the friends of the good cause, and with their assistance constrained the Regent and the Congress to start for Calabria. But on the 19th of March, when the enemy might have entered the capital, at any moment, I could find no one to follow me. The Duke of Campo Melo alone, whom in happier days I had persuaded to accept the command of a battalion of the National Guard, and who, although extremely devoted to the Court, was actuated by feelings of honour, came and offered me his protection, and that of his friends. The parliament, had they departed two days earlier, might have stimulated the nation to an insurrectionary war, might even on the 19th have made them take up arms; but the Congress was far from thinking of adopting energetic measures. Any appeal to the citizens who had compromised themselves by their adherence to the public cause, and had been devoted to it would have been vain without the co-operation of the parliament, for the Austrians had given out that none should be molested for their political conduct during the past nine months. The Minister, Luigi Medici, the intimate friend of Metternich, told several of his acquaintances in London at the end of the year 1821, that had the parliament retired to Calabria, followed only by the officers of the army and of the militia, the Emperor of Austria would have granted the Neapolitans a Constitution, similar to that of France, in order to avoid an insurrectionary war. The report published by the enemy of unconditional pardon to all obtained so much credence, that two colonels who had accompanied me from Naples to my head-quarters at Avellino, at the head of their regiments, remained at their posts without the most distant idea that they would be imprisoned: they were both condemned to death, but this sentence was afterwards

commuted to imprisonment for life, loaded with chains. Amongst others, the Austrian General, Keller, as soon as he entered the kingdom, declared everywhere that all that had happened amongst us would be forgotten, and that we should have a Constitution similar to that of Bavaria. It is not difficult to make the unfortunate believe what is advantageous to them!

On the 19th of March, at mid-day, the intelligence which poured in upon me from all sides was so bad that I lost all hope of being seconded in the provinces in resisting the foreign invader, the more so from my not being supported either by the Regent or by the parliament. I expected the Austrian cavalry to enter Naples every minute. The Spanish Ambassador, Onis, sent me his secretary of legation to urge me to depart to Castellamare, there to embark on board a Spanish vessel destined for Barcelona. My friend Gaetano Coppola did not part from me the whole day, and warmly pressed me to depart, that I might save my life and wait for better days. Florestano was impatient to see me gone, and above all he urged me to give up every idea of making resistance in any of the provinces. He continued, "You would only be assassinated, and that would be another stain upon our unfortunate country." My brother and Gaetano Coppola were both gratified to learn that the Spanish vessel was ready to set sail; but for myself, the idea of embarking was so terrible that I could not bear it. Was it thus that my constant resolution of never quitting my country, of being buried in the last foot of land which should remain free on its surface was to be foregone? And yet, now I had no alternative left between killing or expatriating myself. It was resolved by my brother and my friends that I should quit the

capital at sunset. I intimated to Florestano my suspicions, that the Austrians or the King might wreak their vengeance upon his head in default of mine. He answered me coolly by a popular phrase, "They will spare God that trouble." As soon as night came on I entered a hired carriage accompanied by a generous friend of my infancy; I was followed by a faithful servant of my brother, who had served him in Spain and during the whole siege of Dantzic. I had so little time to prepare for leaving my country, probably for ever, that all my effects were huddled confusedly together in my trunks. I had no more than eighteen hundred ducats; but I left a brother who took more care for my wants than even my poor father could have done, had he not become too infirm to attend to any kind of business. My situation obliged me not to lose sight of my pistols. Through the whole country the invaders were generally detested; but at that time their few worthless partisans were too willing to show their zeal.

In the country around Naples armed citizens were on the watch to prevent the disorders which might be committed by the dispersed soldiers of the army. Between Torre del Greco and Castellamare, my carriage was arrested by some of these citizens, who were charged with the maintenance of public order. My friend showed them our passports, filled in with false names, and as I was wrapped up in my cloak, I was not recognised. We alighted at a wretched inn at Castellamare, from whence, in the night, we proceeded to the house of a common friend. The 20th of March was considerably advanced, and some difficulties had arisen to prevent the vessel from sailing, neither were they now certain of starting immediately. I was obliged to write

to this effect to my brother, adding, that if the vessel did not sail I should be obliged to take refuge in the Calabrias. Florestano foresaw how fatal would be the effect of my arrival in these provinces, even if I escaped being assassinated by the way. He thought I could do nothing more than produce a momentary commotion, which would be followed by immense disorders, for the whole country was surrounded by the enemy, both by land and on sea. He therefore wrote to me, " Offer any sum, however considerable, to the captain of the Spanish vessel, to induce him to set sail immediately. But should you not succeed in embarking directly, remember that you have two pistols with you." Whilst I write these lines, it is more than twenty-three years since I have seen Florestano. I possess no portrait of him; for even to please our mother, who so dearly loved him, he would not permit one to be taken, but instead of a portrait I have that letter, upon which I cast my eyes from time to time. It is a painful thing to advise a dearly-loved brother to destroy his own life, but to the severe and noble soul of my brother it was less so than would have been my dishonour by the useless effusion of the blood of our fellow-citizens.

A person endowed with the highest sentiments of patriotism, who was at Castellamare, put an end to the difficulties which were opposed to the departure of the vessel, and thus I got on board. This person, with the kindest consideration, did everything that was possible to soothe the anguish of my situation. All the thoughts of my brother were directed towards me. On the passage from Castellamare to Barcelona, I might have been taken by an Austrian, Neapolitan, or even French ship of war. To preclude the possibility, in such a case, of my being taken for a State delinquent,

Florestano sent me by Major Staiti a decree from the Regent, conferring upon me the title of Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States of America. That the decree might carry with it all the appearances required by diplomatic custom, it was accompanied by instructions from the Duke of Gallo, Minister of Foreign Affairs. With the decree, the Regent sent a sum of money as a gratuity. This was not accepted by Florestano. In the military chest of the corps under my command, was found the indemnity of representation, and of entrance into a campaign, which for a General-in-Chief formed a considerable sum wherewith to recruit my slender purse. Had I been taken prisoner by the Austrian navy, or by that of King Ferdinand, my appointment as minister could not have availed me, but my poor brother could do no more for my safety. The Regent had willingly signed the decree, and of his own accord sent me the money, which was not accepted. This kindness on the part of the Prince arose from his knowledge of the recent troubles in Piedmont, of the discontent existing against the Bourbons in France, and of the liberty which still reigned in Spain and Portugal. I am led to suppose this to be the case, in spite of my wish at all times to be grateful, because, years after, when the Duke of Calabria ascended the throne, he never annulled my condemnation to death, or the confiscation of my property.

The Austrians entered Capua on the 21st of March. Carascosa and Colletta stayed in Naples, expecting a different result from what occurred. The despots found them as unfitted for the high offices they had held, as the revolution found them opposed to freedom. The same thing happened to several other Generals. The arrest of Carascosa was ordered, but not carried into

effect: being obliged to embark, he proceeded to Malta, from whence he wrote many earnest letters to convince the King that he had all his life hated revolutionary principles. As will be seen later, this General obtained, through the English Minister, A'Court, an annual pension of one hundred pounds from the British Government. Colletta likewise looked forward to much favour, but he was sent to Austria with three other Neapolitans. The Austrians did not, however, treat them with severity. They were set free, and had an allowance of a hundred ducats a month assigned them. Colletta afterwards went to reside at Florence; he constantly attended the Austrian Embassy, and yet was well received by the Florentines who professed liberal sentiments. This latter circumstance caused great astonishment to the Neapolitans, who used to say that Florence being so little distant from Naples, the character of every one of our countrymen ought to be well known there.

I was sailing towards Spain, having quitted my country, perhaps for ever. For the liberty of my native land, I had been wounded; when a mere boy, loaded with irons; and finally, exiled for life. At nineteen years of age, for the same cause, I had been condemned to end my life in the Fossa del Maritimo. For the love of liberty, I had been miserable in the French army, where I had twice sought refuge, and I had been miserable under the reign of Joachim. This Prince, who was ever well-disposed towards me, often converted his benevolence into rigour, owing to my feverish love of national freedom. On the return of King Ferdinand he showed more than common kindness, causing Colletta to say, in page 229, "That General Pépé, regarded as an enemy and a traitor, governed two provinces with the

most extensive powers. He was extolled, and received in recompense of his services the Grand Cross of St. George, and was intrusted with the organization of the civil militia."

Certainly, King Ferdinand was very gracious towards me, more indeed than he was to many other Generals who had accompanied him to Sicily. But ought I, on that account, in the effeminate enjoyment of his favours, to forget my unfortunate country, my love for which was increased by her daily accumulating misery? As to my oath to the King, I did not at all think that I infringed it by obliging him to become a citizen King instead of an absolute monarch. And even if an absolute throne could give more happiness to the King than a Constitutional one, ought my faith to the King to make me forget my duty to my unhappy country? Noble was the sentence pronounced by General Foy at the French bar, when he said, "Le serment qui domine tous les serments, est la fidélité à la patrie." Attaching, therefore, small importance to the royal favour, so much valued by men, I strove to deliver my native land from servitude. For this I was condemned to death, and to pay the expenses of the late war. I was now sailing from my country, which I left more miserable than before, for it was again in slavery, unresistingly invaded by strangers, and disgraced in the eyes of the whole world. When was it ever more *à propos* to repeat—

"E se non piangi di che pianger suoli!"

After the fall of liberty at Naples, every one had foreseen with great sagacity, that it was impossible it could stand. But whilst it did exist, all those who now blamed the revolution, had, during the nine months

of the Constitutional Government, ardently sought to obtain military, administrative, and diplomatic appointments, and unfortunately for the country many obtained them without difficulty.

I have heard, and shall always hear people say, that we were not ripe for liberty. They who pronounce this silly sentence, do not intend to imply, I suppose, that we wanted the aptitude to abolish absolute power, for its destruction was effected without foreign aid. They therefore can only mean that we were not able to support our liberty against the Austrian army. I reply to this, that the Austrians did not think themselves sufficiently strong to oppose us alone, but they strengthened themselves with the avowed alliance of Prussia and Russia, and with the understood assistance of England and France. The two former powers, by putting their armies in motion, and the two latter, by sending their fleets against us, produced a most pernicious moral effect upon the minds of the people, caused the Congress to waver, and rendered our Generals unfaithful. Spain and Portugal both lost their freedom as we had done; nevertheless, unexpected circumstances enabled them to regain it; and favourable circumstances might have arisen in favour of the Neapolitans. For instance, the French Revolution of 1830, might have occurred nine years before, and that of Piedmont might have burst out a few days sooner, that is to say, some days before our fall. But without mentioning the action which foreign circumstances might have exercised upon us, I say that had two or three eloquent orators of our Congress possessed elevated minds and courageous hearts, either we should not have fallen, or if we had, we should have done so with so much glory, as to leave, according to the saying of Machiavel, "an open-

ing for future and less unfortunate attempts." I, therefore, with reason, exhort every enslaved people to destroy absolute power whenever a favourable moment presents itself. Fortune may smile upon them, as she did upon the Americans, the Spaniards, the Portuguese, and the Belgians. But if the result prove unfortunate, they open a path to future liberty, and at all events do not make worse a condition which is the most degrading in a civilized world.

I conclude this chapter by observing that, in 1647, when a young fisherman first raised the standard of revolt against the Spanish yoke, the common people embraced the country's cause, and resisted for nine months a power, then the most formidable in Europe. The nobles, the landed interest, men even the most enlightened, if not adverse, remained passive spectators.

On the contrary, in 1799, the republican enthusiasm began with the nobles and the learned, and extended itself among the landed interest and the intelligent; whilst the common people, instead of sympathizing with a political change, which would have redounded to the advantage of their class, much more than to that of the others, took up arms in support of absolute power.

In 1820, the strongest desire for liberal institutions manifested itself in the middle class. The rich and the noble greatly wished a Constitutional Government, but seeing all the potentates of Europe inimical, and as if the axe and the rope of 1799 were still before their eyes, they durst not expose themselves to the calamities which follow unsuccessful revolutions. The common people then, although inclining towards the new institutions, did not take part against the invaders,

with the warmth they had done in 1799 and in 1806. We may see in this the manner in which fortune was pleased to display her power in the unhappy events of my country. In these events, each class composing the nation, has braved all, and suffered all, in its turn for the love of liberty, but in no one instance have all classes been one in action, working to the common end of acquiring freedom and independence.

CHAPTER XV.

1821.

After sailing from Castellamare, I land in Sardinia—I receive intelligence there of the revolution in Piedmont—My arrival at Barcelona and subsequently at Madrid—Society of the patriots of Europe—I depart for Lisbon—I am attacked by robbers in the neighbourhood of Elvas, and plundered of every thing I had with me—My reception at Lisbon by the Cortes—I sail for England—A brief sketch of the Piedmontese revolution.

A VIOLENT storm obliged the Captain of the ship to seek shelter in Sardinia. In this island, I first became acquainted with the fact that a revolution had broken out in Piedmont; although I could neither learn the particulars nor the result. On hearing that the Piedmontese had risen, I bitterly regretted not having run every risk, while in the Abruzzi, to execute my scheme of traversing the chain of the Appennines with twelve thousand men, and reaching the kingdom of Genoa. I abandoned myself to these sad reflections, which, added to many others no less melancholy, oppressed my spirit, and caused me alternately to accuse myself and fortune. After about twenty days I arrived in Barcelona, where I was most courteously received by the chief authorities, and by General Villa Campa, who commanded that province. I had fought against

this officer during the Empire, between Quengua and Rechena. Colonel Deconcili, who had reached Barcelona a few days before me, conducted himself with dignity and honour: many others who had left Naples from less honourable feelings than because they belonged to the liberal party, behaved in a manner that recalled most forcibly to my mind those famous lines of Dante:

> "E quel che piu ti graverà le spalle
> Sarà la compagnia malvagia e scempia
> Con la qual tu cadrai in questa valle."

After a fews days' stay at Barcelona, I quitted that city to proceed to Madrid. On my way thither I stopped at Terragona, where the French General, Vaudincourt, who had served in Piedmont during the short period of the revolution, had the kindness to present me to all the Piedmontese officers staying there. They were upwards of two hundred, who had found themselves constrained to fly their country. Almost all were fine young men, who had served during the Empire, and who would have fought bravely in the cause of Italy, had the fate of our unfortunate peninsula permitted it. I will speak of the Piedmontese revolution at the end of the present chapter.

Before I had been long in Madrid, I perceived that the Constitutional Government in Spain would experience the same fate as that of Naples; but a little later, because the French Bourbons were accountable for their acts to the two Chambers, which although corrupt, and consequently complaisant, had within their walls an opposition which obliged the King to proceed slowly and warily, and to reflect a great deal before openly turning his arms against Spain.

The Duke of Canzano, Neapolitan Ambassador at Madrid, immediately started for Paris, on learning the fall of the Constitutional Government of his native land, leaving his wife and children behind him in Spain. The Duchess, wishing to show me kindness, desired a certain Ronca to look out for a house for me, which in those days was not easy to find at Madrid. Having written to her that my visits might perhaps compromise her, she courteously replied, that it was only necessary for me to take the precaution of not coming at the hours when she was in the habit of generally receiving visitors. This lady was upon intimate terms with the Princess Carlotta, the wife of Don Francisco de Paula, brother of Ferdinand, King of Spain, and was admitted to the palace at all times. The Duchess was one day informed, that she would no longer be received at Court, on account of her having admitted me into her house; and, in fact, on going to pay a visit to Donna Carlotta, she was refused admittance, and was never again allowed to enter the royal palace. I was astonished that the King of Spain, at the very time he was taking the utmost pains to make it appear that he favoured Constitutional principles, should disgrace the lady of an ambassador, merely for admitting me to her house. But neither this circumstance, nor others of greater weight, could open the eyes of the deputies of the Cortes. With the view of attaining popularity, the King had raised from the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel to that of Major-General, Quiroga, Riego, Arcoguera, and Lopez Baños, who, with the four regiments to which they belonged, had begun the revolution of 1820. All this proves how easy it is for a King to blind, not merely the mass of

the people, but even enlightened men, holding high situations.

The example offered by Naples, produced but small effect upon men who were as full of pride as they were void of intelligence; instead of availing themselves of the example held out by our misfortunes, they were wont to say, in my absence, "We are not Neapolitans." This sentence was put by the ministers into the mouth of the King, when reading a speech to the Cortes. It was afterwards my fate to behold these unfortunate beings either exiles from, or traitors to their country. These ill-advised words, uttered by the King on this occasion, recal to my memory that a Belgian deputy, likewise, but some years later, from the Tribune of the Chamber at Brussels, exclaimed that his countrymen were not Neapolitans. He unwittingly uttered a great truth: for the Belgians, having at their head a King who acted with justice and good faith, and certain of the prompt assistance of a French army, abandoned every thing at the very first appearance of the Dutch. If the Neapolitans could have reckoned upon any foreign aid, or had King Ferdinand acted sincerely in favour of the national cause, the Austrians would never have invaded the kingdom. Belgium is now prosperous and free: Naples—miserable and enslaved. Such is the power of capricious fortune over human destinies!

It was extremely repugnant to my feelings to suppose that my native land could be long deprived of an occasion of raising herself from the debasement of her humiliating fall. Aware that in all parts of Europe there existed men renowned for their virtues, and for their enlightened politics, I decided upon founding

an association, bearing the title of "Constitutional Brothers of Europe." The object of this society was to enable the members to correspond, and by these means preclude the possibility of a renewal of that want of union which had been experienced amongst the most noted patriots of Spain, Naples, Portugal, and Piedmont. Several deputies of the Cortes, were inclined to regard such an association as extremely beneficial to the public cause, more especially in their own Peninsula, where a great want of concord existed between the Portuguese and the Spaniards. The society was accordingly founded; several members of the Cortes formed part of it, as well as General Balesteros, Counsellor of State. I still preserve the regulations of this society, the great object of which was to open a communication between the most enlightened patriots of the different cities in Europe. It was decided that I should exert myself to give it extension in Lisbon, London, and Paris, and that in the event of my success, other members should proceed to propagate it over Italy and Germany. Is it strange, that in a state of mind and feeling like mine. I should nourish the illusion that the accomplishment of my desire was probable, if not easy?

I had made my preparations to depart for Lisbon. My kind brother, Florestano, without waiting for the sale of my horses, equipages, and other things, had sent me to Madrid, through Paris, a considerable sum of money. Not to lose upon the exchange, I decided not to convert it into checks upon a banker, but to keep it in ready money. In order not to expose my money and property to any needless risk, I requested and obtained from the Minister of War, an escort of eight dragoons of the Calatrava regiment.

Having hired a carriage drawn by five mules, I began my journey by easy stages from Madrid, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Pisa, a Neapolitan refugee, and my servant. On my arrival at Badajoz, I found there Arco Guero, one of the four Lieutenant-Colonels of the island of Leon, who, raised to the rank of Major-General, commanded the province. He appeared to be one of the most capable of the four; my reception by him was most cordial, and he told me that he was by no means satisfied with the political condition of the country. I next reached Elvas, which being in Portugal, my escort quitted me after receiving a gratuity for their trouble. I begged Lieutenant-Colonel Pisa to go to the local authorities, and request to have another escort. The commander of the province replied, that we were no longer in Spain, and that we might travel through the whole of Portugal with the greatest safety, so that on the next day I resumed my journey without my escort.

We were scarcely four leagues from Elvas, when on ascending a small hill we perceived at a distance several armed men on horseback advancing towards us. Pisa said that it was a detachment of cavalry, to which I replied, that he would soon see what kind of cavalry they were. They were ten robbers, armed with muskets, pistols, and daggers: advancing towards us, they ordered the muleteer to follow them out of the high-road. Pisa persisted in supposing that we had fallen into the hands of assassins paid by the Neapolitan Government; to which suggestion I replied, that we were at the mercy of robbers, who were masters of our lives and property. When we had arrived behind several large rocks, out of which trickled a stream of limpid water, they made us alight from the carriage,

and throw ourselves down with our faces to the ground, whilst they broke open our trunks, taking away whatever suited them. They ransacked the persons both of Pisa and the servant, but did not touch mine, and were, in a manner, courteous in their bearing. Pisa entreated the robbers not to destroy any papers which might fall into their hands, to which they replied that they would spare them all, adding that there was no danger of their discovering any secret, as none of them knew how to read. After having robbed us, not merely of our money and every other valuable, but even of our linen, they departed, saying as they went: "Many thanks, cavaliers." I thus lost the little money which I had brought away from Naples, the considerable sum sent me by Florestano to Madrid, my plate, clothes, and every other article I possessed. Pisa was exactly in the same predicament as myself. At night we were obliged to obtain our food and lodging upon credit, the muleteer himself engaging to pay on his return from Lisbon. I was informed later, that there did not exist any organized bands of robbers in Portugal, but that my travelling with an escort had awakened the supposition that I had considerable property about me, which caused me to be waylaid and plundered by an *impromptu* band of Portugnese and Spanish banditti. A few months later, the plate which had been taken from me, was in use at an inn at Badajoz. We were lodged and boarded on credit all the way from Elvas to Lisbon.

The intelligence of my disaster, as well as the circumstance of my having been refused an escort by the commander of the province, had reached Lisbon before my arrival, and the Portuguese Cortes had immediately decreed that a considerable indemnity should be awarded

me. To this noble conduct they added a most flattering expression of feeling. The President of the Cortes, Don Francisco Antonio Almeida Moraes, accompanied by two deputies, came to compliment me on the part of the Congress. Now that I was an exile every thing tended to sadden me: kindness affected me deeply; and rudeness reminded me of my changed fortune. However, I met with little of the latter, as I most carefully avoided exposing myself to it. When it became a question of the indemnity voted by the Cortes, I was extremely embarrassed as to the course I ought to pursue. I could have wished to have drawn a check upon my brother, and await the result at Lisbon; but to do that required much time, even if my letter and his answer took a sure and regular course. I was, moreover, reluctant to write, having received so large a sum from him a short time before. I did not like, on the other hand, to accept the indemnity; but several deputies of the Cortes, who showed me great friendship, pointed out to me, that having been robbed upon the Portuguese territory, and by the fault of the commander of the Province of Elvas, who had refused me the escort I had demanded, my declining to accept the offered indemnificaion would appear an excess of pride, by which Pisa would likewise be obliged to suffer. I ended, therefore, by accepting half of what they offered me, which was a sum of twenty thousand francs, which I divided with Colonel Pisa. My financial condition was entirely in the care of Florestano, since the Government had condemned me to death, and to pay all the expenses of the war, not to speak of the confiscation of all my fortune. It became urgent in such a situation, that I should seem to be disinherited by my father He, poor old man, now become nearly blind and paralytic, had,

from affection for me, imbibed liberal sentiments. During the short existence of the Constitution, he caused the papers to be read to him, enjoying keenly the satisfaction of hearing my name mentioned, as well as the orders of the day which I addressed to the National Guard and the army. I know not what means they took to inform him of my misfortunes without increasing, by the shock, the infirmities under which he laboured. He was now no longer capable of managing the family affairs.

My two brothers who had remained at home were too honourable to take advantage of my misfortunes; but Florestano would have deprived himself of every thing he possessed rather than have known me in want. He was led to pursue this conduct no less by affectionate feeling towards myself than by the elevation and noble disinterestedness of his nature. At the moment I write, twenty-three years have elapsed since the day of my exile, without any change in his feelings or conduct towards me. He will be the same to the last day of my life, whilst I have never been able to make him the most trifling demonstration of my gratitude.

During the brief period of my stay at Lisbon I occupied myself with the propagation of the society which had been formed at Madrid, the execution of which met with no opposition, and it was established even more successfully than in that capital. In Lisbon, two ministers, almost all the Counsellors of State, and several deputies joined the association, the President of which was Almeida Moraes, who presided over the Cortes; this circumstance gave me great hopes of the permanent success of the society.

On the day I arrived at Lisbon, preceded by the

report of having been waylaid and plundered, a man of ripe age and elegantly dressed in black presented himself to me. He stated that he was a native of Calabria, who knew my family; that his name was Antonio Marrura, and that he had been established for thirty years at Lisbon. He proceeded to state that he had landed in that capital as servant to the French Ambassador, and that he had endeavoured to turn to account the talent he possessed of manufacturing liqueurs and sweetmeats of every kind, for the sale of which he had opened a small shop. Having met with success in this undertaking, he next opened two *cafés*, and ended by acquiring a large fortune. He concluded his narrative by telling me that he had lost his wife, and was left with an only son in so deplorable a state of health that it was impossible he could linger long; and that he entreated me to take up my residence at his house, and accept whatever sum of money I might stand in need of. I thanked him for his generous offer, but only accepted a sumptuous dinner, which he insisted on giving me. During all the remainder of his life this warm-hearted man continued to send me every year to London, and then to Paris, a present of the most delicious oranges.

During the few days of my stay at Lisbon, I received letters from England, stating that Queen Caroline, who had just gained the cause tried against her by her husband, George IV., had expressed a desire that I should soon arrive in London. She had not seen me during our sojourn in Naples, as I was with the body of the army which occupied the Marches of Ancona, but she was well acquainted with my brother. As the Queen was supported by the liberal party, she was perhaps desirous of showing courtesy to an exile who

had been forced to abandon his country for the sake of his political opinions, and for what he had done in behalf of liberty.

Before sailing for England, the intelligence of Napoleon's death at St. Helena had arrived in Lisbon. I have never understood how the memory of Napoleon, although an extraordinary man, could be held in affectionate regard by an Italian. Himself a son of Italy, it was his duty to do all the good within his power to his native land, the more so indeed, that he would have acquired no small glory from Italy united and free, and such power as would have saved him from an exile's death upon a solitary rock.

The first officer who had declared himself in favour of the Portuguese revolution was Colonel Sepulveda. He often told me he could clearly perceive that the Congress was committing the very same errors as had been commttted by the Neapolitans, which led him to fear that the Constitution of Portugal would come to the same end as that of Naples. I now observed with sorrow that mankind knows not how to profit by the example offered by the misfortunes of others. Civilization was less advanced in Portugal than in Spain, and less in Spain than in Italy. But liberty in Italy had to struggle against more powerful enemies than those which threatened the freedom of Spain and Portugal. Painfully impressed by what I had remarked of the political condition of both these countries, I embarked on board the Lisbon packet for Falmouth, which place I reached after a tedious voyage of eighteen days.

Before I say any thing about my residence in England, I will conclude this chapter with a narrative of the Piedmontese revolution. What I am about to

relate was imparted to me, if not the prime authors of the revolt, by those who conducted it in the capacity of chiefs.

After the fall of the French Empire, Victor Emanuel, King of Sardinia, resumed possession of Savoy and Sardinia, to which he added the kingdom of Genoa. He governed badly, rather from incapacity than from any natural disposition to evil; and he was unable to stand against the old monarchical party which had come back with him, and which was obstinately bent upon the revival of the abuses of the ancient Government. The financial and judicial departments, as well as that of the army were directed to the exclusive interest of the courtiers. The power of Austria in Italy having acquired great strength, Piedmont had lost all influence in the Peninsula. The writings of Alfieri, himself a son of Piedmont, had rendered the youth of that country deeply sensible of the humiliating servitude of their native land. The French Tribune, the revolution in Spain, and the sect of the Carbonari, had tended to make the people eagerly desire the formation of liberal institutions; this excitement was considerably increased by the revolution of Naples. The first manifestation of the national will was evinced by the students of the university of Turin, on the 12th of January, 1821. The disapprobation openly testified by the multitude at the bloody measures of repression excited on this occasion, ought to have enlightened the Government as to its unpopularity. The conspiracy, which had extended itself through all the provinces, by the account of Santa Rosa, had various chiefs, but not one capable of conducting the whole undertaking. Many of the liberals of the more elevated class, conscious of this defect, and accustomed to be about the person of

Charles Albert, Prince of Carignano, cast their eyes upon him for their chief. The Prince of Carignano is now King of Sardinia, under the name of Carlo Alberto. When they supposed that they had obtained his consent to make a military movement, they perceived, but too late, all the weakness and versatility of his character. But they had him in their power, as they thought, and themselves holding superior ranks in the army, they expected that no officers would have moved with his troops before they gave the signal to do so. They soon became aware of their error, and of the imprudence of not having revealed their plan to the Neapolitan Carbonari, or to myself, who commanded the entire army of the Two Sicilies, and afterwards a military corps in the Abruzzi.

On the 11th of March, three days after the Battle of Rieti, the Captain of the Genoese regiment, Count Palma, which then garrisoned the fortress of Alexandria, made the corps under his command take up arms, and he proclaimed the Constitution of Spain. The King's dragoons, and subsequently several other corps, followed the impulse given at Alexandria, which became the seat of the Provisional Government. The scholars of the University of Pavia assembled in great numbers and joined the Constitutional troops in Alexandria. Two days afterwards, the free Government was likewise proclaimed at Turin. The King, Victor Emanuel, instead of dissembling his real feelings and affecting others wholly alien from his heart, as the Kings of Spain, Portugal, and the Two Sicilies had done, preferred to abdicate the crown, nominating the Duke of Carignano, Regent. The crown unfortunately devolved upon the King's brother, Carlo Felice, notorious for his retrograde views and opinions, who had hitherto resided

at Modena. The abdication of the Sovereign, and his subsequent departure for Nice were the first causes of the misfortune of the kingdom. On the 13th of March, Carignano published the Constitution of Spain of 1812, to which he swore fidelity on the following day. He let a full week of inactivity elapse after taking the oath, which may be regarded as the second cause of the disasters that ensued. Instead of adopting the necessary measures to bring the revolution, which had already commenced, to a favourable conclusion, he wrote to Carlo Felice; then awaited his answers and decision, whilst he was fully conscious that the latter Prince was the most bitter enemy of moderate, yet liberal institutions. A Ministry and a Junta, composed of twenty-eight members, were formed; these were honourable citizens, but little capable of governing the State under such difficult circumstances, although several amongst them were men of letters. The Austrian minister, Binder, quitted the country after some hesitation. Several Milanese, actuated by the love of Italy, presented themselves to the Regent, and offered their arms, as well as those of many of their countrymen; but such offers were but coldly received by him, who was at the head of the revolution.

The Count de la Tour, a Piedmontese General at Novara, was at first favourable to the new order of things. On the evening of the 23rd of March, the Duke of Carignano, Regent, with a degree of dissimulation which could never have been expected from a young man of twenty-three years of age, fled to the enemy, and what was still worse, carried with him the body-guard, the light artillery, the light horse of Savoy, and the royal Piedmontese regiment of cavalry. From that moment a civil war burst forth in the Piedmontese

army. If the liberal party still preserved any feeling of hope, it was desired more from the fever of patriotism than from any probable success, the adverse faction being supported by the certainty of speedy assistance from Austria.

The Piedmontese were already aware of the disaster of Rieti; but they hoped that the defensive war might be carried on for a considerable time in that kingdom. On the 23rd, fortune seemed to smile upon the Italians, the city of Genoa having declared itself in favour of liberty. The joy which this event had caused the Piedmontese patriots was soon destroyed by the disastrous intelligence of the fall of the Constitutional Government in the Two Sicilies. Then, for the first time, the Provisional Government of Piedmont listened to the offer of intervention made by the Russian Minister, Moncenigo. But the Government soon became aware that this minister had lost all influence from the moment that Carlo Felice, the new King, had thrown himself into the arms of Austria. To crown these misfortunes, General de la Tour, at Novara, had declared himself for Austria; not only the corps under his own immediate command, but many others followed his example, and deserted the liberal party. The provisional Government now felt the necessity of directing all the forces it could command against General de la Tour at Novara. Hopes were entertained that this General would be abandoned by his followers as soon as the Constitutional army should approach. Such a hope might not have proved fallacious had de la Tour fought only with Piedmontese against Piedmontese; but he had concentrated his forces within the walls of Novara, where he awaited the arrival

of the Austrians with whom he quitted the fortress, and successfully opposed the Constitutionalists. This Sardinian General, a partisan of Austria, had the manifold advantage of numbers, and the *prestige* of being supported by so great a power. He drove back the Liberals, although they fought with the bravery which is inspired by a noble cause. Still they suffered from the effects of the want of a chief, the want of order, and the misfortunes of the Neapolitans. They were consequently dispersed, and retreated towards Alexandria, leaving the capital in possession of the Austro-Piedmontese. La Tour, who had stooped to call in foreign aid to his assistance, had at least the decency to implore them not to enter Turin. The officers and citizens who were most compromised in the cause of freedom passed from Alexandria to Genoa. Here the inhabitants, although constrained to submit to the now absolute form of Government, received the fugitives with open arms, afforded them every possible assistance, and at their own expense hired vessels which conveyed them to Catalonia. This noble conduct of the Genoese is the more praiseworthy from the circumstance of its exposing them to the probable resentment of their new King and of Austria.

The result of the attempt made by the Peidmontese was disastrous, nor could it be otherwise with the conduct of their Prince, and the loss of liberty in the Two Sicilies. Nevertheless, the love of freedom manifested by the people in the proximity of the Alps, and their having moved in time to attack the Austrians in their rear, who surrounded the Abruzzi without even waiting to see the result of the war, are circumstances which clearly demonstrate that through the whole of Italy the

people feel themselves to be Italians. Such a conviction will not be unavailing to the Peninsula when the struggle against Austria shall be renewed.

What shall I say of the many and ardent hopes which have lately been excited in the Ecclesiastical States? In the first place, I must observe that they hourly become a more evident proof of what has been so often repeated in these memoirs: namely, that Italy is more than prepared for her political regeneration. For, without diminishing in the least the merit of the generous-minded Pius IX, it must be allowed that had he been raised to the Pontifical throne in times less propitious to new civil institutions, he would have felt less deeply the necessity of saving the temporal power of the church, by leavening it with at least a portion of those laws demanded by the age in which we live.

Hitherto, indeed, the elevation of Pius IX. has been but the opening dawn of a bright day, and the best informed continue to ask, "Will the new Pope determine on seconding the general expectation, and frankly support the political reform of his States?" This example would produce the resuscitation of all Italy: will the splendid idea of an immortal work prevail against the menaces of Austria, and the improvident and stupid counsels of some of those who hold the reins of that beautiful country?*

Such menaces would be but idle prattle, if a Pontiff would truly espouse the high, just, and holy cause of twenty-four millions of Italians. The small population of Genoa was sufficient in 1746 to drive the Austrian army from the oppressed city, and from all Liguria.

In 1647, the lowest among the Neapolitan popu-

* "Che anno in mano il freno delle belle contrade."

lation strenuously opposed the formidable powers of Spain; and in our own times, in 1799, with unparalled valour, they boldly faced the French troops, commanded by Championnet, which had been victorious in so many battles with the Austrians. During seven years, the oppressed peasants of Calabria placed Massena's glory in peril. Now what might not be expected from the military aptitude of the Italians, if the Vicar of Christ should bless their efforts in favour of Italian independence? History shows that Pius IX. would not be the first Pontiff who had made the experiment of encountering a foreign enemy; but the glory of Pius would infinitely surpass that of Alexander III., from the difference of the epoch.

Truly, no one can believe, or even imagine, that foreign potentates can turn the Pontiff from the glorious work he has so readily undertaken, and render vain the faith which Italy has placed in him, of attaining without convulsion a state not unworthy of the most illustrious nations for Italy, now a disheartened slave, though once free and honoured beyond all, and twice mistress of the civilization of the world. Too cruel would it now be to the Italians, to fear that such a noble spirit as that of Pius IX., after tasting the sweets of popular benedictions and universal love, should bear to see such love and blessings converted into curses and hatred.

Not only the enlightened few, but even the ignorant and uncultivated, that is to say, the multitude in Italy, now begin to feel the galling weight of opprobious servitude, and it is thought impossible that they will bear it much longer; hence the applauded Pontiff, were he now to stop half way, would render himself responsible in the sight of heaven and man for the blood

which would be shed in ineffectual revolt; and the name of Mastai, now so venerated by all, would descend to posterity covered with an indelible stain.

The experience, which years and misfortunes have enlarged, does not permit me to hope for great concessions from absolute Princes; but if we may ever make an exception to the general rule, it must certainly be in favour of Pius IX.

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CHAPTER XVI.

1821—1822.

Impressions produced upon me on reaching Falmouth by the climate, customs, and music of England—I reach London—My first acquaintances in England—I determine upon learning the English language—Campbell the poet—Society of the Constitutional Brethren of Europe—Lord Holland, General Foy—Other acquaintances which I form in London—English committee in favour of Italian exiles—Kindness of the English ladies; originality of some of them—My correspondenee with General Lafayette—I write to Count Capo d'Istria—What Lafayette desired to propose to the Cortes of Spain—I depart for Madrid, and my papers are examined at Falmouth.

My first impressions on entering the harbour at Falmouth were most melancholy. It was the middle of August, and we were obliged to wear our cloaks whenever we came on deck to defend ourselves from the cold. Every thing seemed strange to me at the inn to which I went with Colonel Pisa and my servant. The breakfasts, the dinners, and the wines, were all different to what I had been used to, and excessively dear. Then there was the inconvenicnce of being obliged to remain mute from my ignorance of the language, of which I had taken only a few lessons in my early years. The captian of the ship invited me to drink tea at his house. On a sudden, the whole

party of ladies and gentlemen began to sing. At the sound which met my ears I almost fancied myself amongst savages. It seemed strange to me that, in the midst of so much luxury, scientific knowledge, and such progress in poetry and in the spirit of freedom, the people should sing as in the days of Adam. I thought to myself, how happy I should be were we even to sing as they do in this island, and be deprived of the magic chisel and pencil of our great artists, could we but enjoy in exchange an equal share of liberty. I proceeded in the mail-coach towards London, and stopped at Exeter, where I was to pass the night. With my own ignorance of the language, and the noise and confusion of the inn where I had alighted, I really could have fancied myself in Babylon. This turmoil was produced by the assizes, which were then being held in that town. An Irish Catholic priest, who was my fellow-traveller, fortunately could speak French, which obviated in some measure my embarassment, else my journey to London would have been an extremly unpleasant one.

I reached this immense city, the habits and customs of which are so different from those of France, that one would fancy the two countries were separated by a vast ocean, rather than by a narrow channel. Immediately on my arrival, I met with the Marquis Antaldi of Pesaro, and the son of the Prince Ereolani of Bologna. They had been brought to London by the famous trial of Queen Caroline, who had breathed her last only a few days before my arrival at Falmouth. They informed me that the Princess had often inquired when I was expected to arrive in London; and they imparted to me all the particulars of her end. Many of her actions were calculated to make the deceased Queen looked

upon in the light of a mad woman, and yet she talked and acted at times like a woman of talent.

The affairs of Naples had created sufficient sensation in England for me to have made a thousand acquaintances in London. I did not like to associate with those whose political opinions were at variance with my own, and even the society of the radicals was often irksome to me from the perpetual necessity I found of justifying my unfortunate countrymen for having lost their freedom. I became acquainted with the famous radical, Sir Robert Wilson, a brave soldier, who was likewise attached to the Whig party; and by him I was presented to the Duke of Sussex, Lord Holland, Earl Grey, and other respectable English gentlemen. I likewise saw Colonel Napier, who was extremely courteous to me. We had a great deal of conversation respecting the war in Spain, upon which he published, at a later period, the best history which has hitherto been written of the Peninsular war. If I mistake not, it was Colonel Napier who introduced me to Sir Francis Burdett, who was in those days a very great radical. I had had a letter given me in Spain for the patriarch of the radicals, the celebrated Major Cartwright. On my arrival in London I was informed that this gentleman was so warm in his political opinions, and so disliked by the Government, that I should do well not to present my letter to him, as I might thereby incur the risk of being sent away by the ministers, the alien bill being then in full operation. They who gave me such advice were not Englishmen, and knew nothing of the habits of the ministry, which rarely availed itself of this law. The worthy Major Cartwright, not knowing that I had a letter of introduction to him, called and paid me a visit. He was more than eighty years of age at that time:

the expression of his countenance was extremely mild, his appearance was imposing, and his manners kind and courteous. An Irishman who accompanied him, served as interpreter between us. Subsequently, when I used to go and visit the Major, his niece, Fanny, became our interpreter; she spoke French very well, knew Italian, and was blessed with the most unequalled kindness of manner. It was at the house of the Major that I became acquainted with another radical, his intimate friend, the Orientalist, Gilchrist. The liberal sentiments of these two men, as well as their principles of philanthrophy, arose from the deepest conviction, and were entirely devoid of ostentation. I will not say that they loved freedom more than I did, for that was hardly possible; but I soon perceived that, although they had the advantage over me in point of years, they were far from possessing my fatal experience of things. They confounded the ardent desire they felt for extensive democratical institutions, with the possibility of obtaining and of maintaining them. Amongst other things they wished for a system of universal suffrage and annual parliaments. The worthy Major Cartwright died about three years after my arrival in England, but Gilchrist lived until 1840, and had the satisfaction of beholding the electors of Great Britain amount to upwards of a million. When I first reached England, the power of the Tories was so great, that the realization of such an event, which was calculated to undermine the aristocratical power, appeared quite fabulous. Cartwright and Gilchrist were the staunch friends of the exiles of every country. The latter promised me five hundred pounds for every revolution which should take place on the continent in favour of liberty. Thinking that I might be in need of money, Gilchrist

made me the most extensive offers of assistance. I was obliged to show him the checks which I received from Naples, to convince him that Florestano sent me more than I needed, even to live in London. From that time I remained upon terms of the greatest intimacy with this excellent man, and when I went to Paris after the French revolution of 1830, he came and settled there likewise.

One day, after dining with Major Cartwright and Gilchrist at the residence of the former, we were discussing politics, and as I could not speak English, the Major's niece was my interpreter. My political theory was widely different from that of my two friends, who feeling that they were not understood by me, were wont to say that military men were not well acquainted with political matters. I chanced to understand this opinion, which piqued my vanity, and prompted me to write a pamphlet upon the cause of the downfal of liberty in Naples, Spain, and Portugal. The amiable Fanny was kind enough to translate my little work into English. It was published in a selection entitled the *Pamphleteer*, in 1824. My two radical friends paid me the most flattering compliments upon my production, which raised their opinion of my political intelligence.

I took the resolution of studying the English language, but when I heard the watchman call "half-past one!" and heard that harsh word "handkerchief," I began to suspect that English was little adapted to an Italian mouth. I did not then think that the time would come when I should write off-hand, long letters to Gilchrist, which he proclaimed free from grammatical errors, and that I should have for my pupil in the study of the English language the philosopher of Pesaro, Mammiani.

On my first arrival in London I got a good master at seven shillings the lesson, and as soon as I had acquired a certain knowledge of the idiom, I had the advantage of very able instructors in the poet Campbell and my friend Gilchrist. I gave Italian lessons in return to the former, and the latter read a great many French works with me, having continued until then quite ignorant of that language. Ugo Foscolo was the means of my becoming acquainted with Campbell, who was soon one of my best friends. During a whole winter we spent all our evenings together at his house. He had no secrets from me: he confided to me his friendships, his pecuniary affairs, as well as all his likings and dislikes. During the many hours we spent together, either at his house or in the course of our long walks, he would, by the charm of his animated conversation, make me forget for the time my own misfortunes. I shall, in another chapter, transcribe a letter he wrote to me on the occasion of his being elected Lord Rector of the University of Glasgow, in opposition to Canning.

I did not forget the society of the Constitutional Brethren of Europe, but I soon became aware that I was pounding fluid in a mortar. A secret society in England amongst men of mind is a thing quite out of the bounds of possibility. Sir Robert Wilson and the Duke of Sussex, both read the statutes of the society, but merely out of a feeling of curiosity. I was talking one day upon the subject to Lord Holland, who said "I am not fond of hearing secret things; I am apt at the House of Lords to tell every thing I know." This was the last attempt I made to propagate the institution in London.

The Spanish Ambassador at Naples, Onis, had been

sent to England upon the same mission soon after the fall of the Constitutional Government in that kingdom, and he showed me the same degree of friendship in England as he had manifestsd in happier days when we were both in Italy. Onis not only advised, but he warmly urged my publishing a dissertation upon the events which had occurred at Naples. I followed his advice, and put forth a pamphlet, to which were annexed several important documents: it was extremely concise, my only object being to justify my countrymen, who, more than myself, were exposed to the censure of strangers. I did not pay much attention to the style: I had been accustomed to write only letters and orders of the day, a very different matter from an elucidation of the political and military vicissitudes of a people. I had not a single literary friend to whom I could read my little work before it was published, as Ugo Foscolo was extremely engrossed by his own labours, by which he lived. Sir James Macintosh offered to correct the proof sheets of the English translation, and informed me, at the same time, that the publication would be extremely expensive to me. To my infinite astonishment, a bookseller offered me three hundred pounds for my manuscript. I took one hundred pounds in money, and the remainder of the sum agreed upon in copies to distribute amongst my friends and to send to Italy, the work being published in English, French, and Italian. That this production was generally commended in England did not produce much impression upon me, for the English are generally extremely indulgent; as a proof of this, I still preserve a letter addressed to me upon the subject by Lord Holland. I was far more astonished by the unexpected approbation evinced in a letter from Ugo Foscolo, and

another from General Foy, member of the French Chamber of Deputies. I foolishly gave Foscolo's letter to Lady Acton, widow of the minister, who being in London, was extremely desirous of having an autograph of this celebrated Italian. This letter flattered me extremely, for it began "Viva, tre volte viva," and terminated as follows: "I have shed many tears over the latter part of your memorial." This tends to show that the simple truth, written from the soul, invariably has its effect, for certainly my work was without any literary merit. The following is a copy of the letter of General Foy:—

"Mon cher Général,

"Je ne veux pas laisser partir M. Richter sans vous dire que j'ai été profondement touché de la bonne foi, du patriotisme et des sentiments élevés que respire votre rélation de la révolution Néapolitaine. Vous avez été malheureux, mais vous êtes resté sans reproches. Il me paraît impossible que les peuples Italiens si avancés dans la civilization demeurent long-temps sous le joug de plomb des souverains étrangers. Votre ouvrage ne peut que servir la cause de l'indépendance des nations. Vous ferez avec votre plume un peu du bien que de malheurs inouis ne vous ont pas permis de faire avec votre épée.

"Agréez, mon cher Général, l'expression de mes sentiments d'estime pour votre personne.

"M. L. Foy."

An English gentleman whose name I have forgotten, invited me to dinner that I might make the acquaintance of Lord William Fitzgerald, Joseph Hume, and Alderman Wood, all three members of parliament, and

of the opposition. Lord William was extremely civil to me during the whole time of my stay in London, and the other two became my intimate friends. I often dined at Lord William Fitzgerald's with the Prince Larderia of Palermo, who, on his way back to Naples, reached Rome, where the Neapolitan Ambassador, the Marquis de Fuscaldo, said to him, that he was extremely grieved, but that he had orders from his Government not to allow him to enter the kingdom because he had dined several times in London with General Pépé. Prince Larderia wrote immediately to the Minister Medici, stating that the mere fact of having met General Pépé at dinner at the house of his friends could not cast any imputation upon himself, and he obtained leave to return to Naples.

Joseph Hume, Alderman Wood, Cartwright and Gilchrist, at my instigation, formed a committee of their political friends for the assistance of the Italian exiles, who were in want of the common necessaries of life. A daughter of Alderman Wood, named Catherine, who afterwards became Mrs. Stephens, Mrs. Hume, and the niece of Major Cartwright were all extremely charitable, and spared no pains to increase this committee. The English ladies are morally what they are physically; the beautiful are truly lovely, and the kind are angels. I have not seen Catherine Wood for upwards of fifteen years; indeed I scarcely know whether she yet lives, nevertheless, it is a source of real pleasure to me whenever I can talk of her virtues to those who have known her. The warm, kind, and charitable heart of Mrs. Gilchrist does honour to human nature; and during an acquaintance of twenty-one years I have never known one of her admirable qualities fail or at fault. Amongst

my friends, who were not indeed numerous, Sir Thomas Dyer was unequalled in a kindness and generosity of feeling wholly devoid of ostentation. This gentleman expended annually a sum of two hundred pounds in the assistance of the Spanish exiles. I was obliged to be extremely discreet in addressing any of my distressed countrymen to his notice, so prodigal was he in his liberality. Had I chosen to take up my residence at his country-house, I should have afforded him much satisfaction, but as I was never fond of living with strangers, I only paid him two visits, one for three days and another for two. Sir Thomas was so extremely plain in his dress, that on one occasion when he was travelling with Lady Dyer, her ladyship got out of the carriage and entered the inn first; when he was about to rejoin her, he was prevented by the people of the hotel, who took him, from his appearance, for a man of the humblest station.

I became acquainted likewise with Lady Morgan, who had the extreme kindness one evening to take me to a party. I found Lady Caroline Lamb in the carriage with her, and was conducted by these ladies to the house of Miss Lydia White. It would be necessary to know the originality of these three charming ladies to be able to form any idea of the gentle originality of the English character. The singularities I observed in the great English people would furnish surprising anecdotes, sufficient to fill a volume; but the object of this work is of a nature more serious than that of merely affording amusement. I shall only recount an anecdote related to me by Campbell. When the political interest of the Whigs was in a state of great jeopardy, recollecting that Iphigenia had been sacrificed in Greece to propitiate the Fates, and obtain a better fortune, it was proposed in

jest to sacrifice Miss Lydia White, a maiden of some eighty years' standing, in hopes that by means of such a sacrifice the Whigs might resume power.

At the house of Mrs. Trollope, I first met Miss Fanny Wright, who, when in Paris, was in continual intercourse with General Lafayette, who looked upon her as his adopted daughter. She had published an account of her travels through the United States of America, and the unbounded pains she bestows upon the federal Republic had completely won the affections of the companion and friend of Washington. Through Miss Fanny Wright, I entered into correspondence with General Lafayette; not forgetful of the interests of the Society of the Constitutionalists of Europe, I sent him the statutes of this society. He approved them, and determined to associate himself with us, as will be seen in the following letter:—

"La Grange, le 3 Mai, 2822.

"C'est avec un grand plaisir, mon cher Pépé, que je me suis associé à votre confédération des patriotes Européens. Cette Sainte Alliance opposée à celle du despotisme, et du privilège ne peut qu'être fort utile; la cause des droits du genre humain triomphera sans doute, et nous nous applaudirons d'avoir contribué à son succès. Vous connaissez ma confiance en vous, et par suite en toute personne qui aura mérité votre confiance. Je recommande d'avance tous vos amis aux miens, bien sûr de la réciprocité de votre part.

"Recevez tous mes vœux et l'impression de l'amitié personelle, et de la fraternité patriotique que je vous ai voué de tout mon cœur.

(Signé) LAFAYETTE, F.C.E."

These three letters were intended to represent *Fratello, costituzionale Europeo.*

The Spanish Ambassador, Onis, had been informed by several Russians that the Emperor Alexander had declared himself against the Neapolitan constitutional system, because he had been led to believe that it had been forced upon the nation by a handful of rebels, and that it had plunged the country into a state of the greatest anarchy. As Onis was aware that I had been upon terms of intimacy, at Corfu, with Capo d'Istria, who had become Minister of Russia, he urged me to write and tell him that, as his Majesty the Emperor of Russia had granted Constitutions to various States of Europe, after the entrance of the Allies into Paris, he could not co-operate to the destruction of that of Naples, were he properly informed of the mode of its formation and proceedings. I then proposed to go immediately, and frankly to make known to him the whole particulars of the events which had taken place in the Two Sicilies in 1820, should his Majesty grant me permission to do so. Capo d'Istria sent my letter to the Neapolitan Government, but I conclude that he was forced by the Emperor to commit so unseemly an act. Like a drowning man, I caught at every straw, as a means of my salvation, and by my salvation I mean that of my country. Through General Lafayette and Cobianchi, who as I have already stated, had been on my staff in the Abruzzi, I was well informed of the movements of the French liberals. It seems scarcely credible that a man like Lafayette should run after every petty conspiracy, so strong in him was the love of better institutions for his country. At the time of that got up by General Berton, I was in constant expectation of hearing that Lafayette had been arrested,

for he had been fully aware of the proceedings of Berton, whom he had assisted by his advice, and with money. A man who finds himself at the head of a party ought carefully to avoid exposing his life in every passing skirmish. The attempt made by Berton terminated in his death, he having been judged and condemned by a court-martial. Lafayette and the enemies of the Bourbons did their utmost to cause a revolt amongst the troops forming a *cordon sanitaire* at the foot of the Pyrenees, and who were stationed there in the event of the war with Spain, which had not yet been declared by the French Government. I succeeded in sending Colonel Pisa to the Pyrenees with a sum of fifty thousand francs to a French General, named La ..... The latter officer, conjointly with Lafayette, was to bring about the desired movement amongst the troops of the cordon. This money had been furnished by Zea, who had already contracted a loan of two millions sterling, for Columbia, his native place. He hoped that through the influence of Lafayette, the Cortes of Spain would be induced to acknowledge the independence of Columbia. Pisa was concealed at Paris by Cobianchi and managed to escape the famous police agent, Vidocq, who states that he had been ordered by the Duchess of Berri to arrest Colonel Pisa, the aide-de-camp of General Pépé.

Whilst Pisa was proceeding to the Pyrenees, and afterwards to Spain, perceiving that the downfall of freedom in the Peninsula would be fatal to the liberty of Europe, I determined upon going to Madrid to await there the result of the machinations of the Cordon, as well as to present to some of the warmest patriots amongst the deputies of the Cortes certain letters of Lafayette, of the greatest importance. In

these letters, he recommended them to declare the independence of Columbia and of Mexico, for which these nations would furnish to Spain the sum of a hundred million of francs, besides the assistance of all the land and naval forces they could. One half of the hundred million of francs was already in the hands of Zea, and for the other fifty millions Mexico would have negotiated a loan in England as soon as the Spaniards proclaimed their national independence. The ministers of Mexico and of Columbia had authorised Lafayette to conclude this secret treaty with such members of the Spanish Congress as he should select for the purpose. Lafayette on his part was anxious that Spain should employ two million of francs to enable the French patriots to cause a revolt amongst the troops of the Cordon. Such a movement would have insured the fall of the Bourbons, and then the liberties of Spain and Portugal would have ceased to be in danger. It was not easy for Lafayette to correspond with me, and by such means reveal the above circumstances and the importance of my journey to Madrid. It was settled that I should proceed to Dover, and that Miss Wright and her sister Camilla should bring over his despatch to me. I received it accordingly from the hands of these ladies, whose hearts teemed with the warmest feelings of patriotism. They gave me hopes that France was on the eve of a revolution, and it was with my soul full of such illusions that I returned to London.

I soon took my departure for Falmouth, where, in opposition to English regulations and English laws, the Custom-house officers, under pretence of searching my trunks, began to peruse my papers. I threatened to make their conduct known to Sir Robert Wilson and Sir Francis Burdett, who were in the opposition ; fearing to compro-

mise themselves, they gave over reading my papers, amongst which were the letters of Lafayette. They committed this illegal act by the orders, or at the instigation of Lord Castlereagh, who was desirous of pleasing the French Ambassador, who had discovered my correspondence with Lafayette, and perhaps the object of my voyage. I embarked on board the State packet which sailed weekly for Lisbon, and which was commanded by the brave Captain John Bull: this name has a jocose celebrity in England, and yet such was his real appellation. Whilst sailing towards Lisbon, I perceived, that after dinner, when Captain John Bull was under the influence of wine, he was a warm liberal; whilst at breakfast upon nothing but tea, he became a violent Tory. I could never understand how that good man contrived to command the vessel after dinner. But he always performed his duty well, and was extremely polite to everybody. The surgeon of the vessel, who was an old French *émigré*, related to me that, during the late war between France and England, Captain John Bull happened to pass close to another ship of his own nation one very dark night; what with the gloom which really existed, and the circumstance of its being after dinner, he took it into his head that it must be a French vessel. Under this idea he began to fire; the other ship fired a discharge in return, which inflicted a severe wound upon John Bull. This lesson did not, however, correct the brave sailor of his devotion to Bacchus.

Had I only been obliged to endure my own personal misfortunes, I should have had courage enough to triumph over them, but the intelligence which reached me before my departure from Falmouth respecting the fate of my companions in arms, who, trusting in me, had declared themselves in favour of the national cause,

was such as to overwhelm me with sadness, and to depress all the energy of my soul. Ye who have read with horror the atrocities perpetrated by Austria, by a foreign Prince upon the poor Lombards confined within the walls of Speilberg, listen to the humane conduct of Ferdinand the First of the Two Sicilies towards honourable officers who had nobly fought and bled for their country in Spain, in Germany, and in Italy. If these brave men had assisted a General in destroying absolute power; as soon as they became conquerors in the short struggle, they respected the Prince they had compelled to submit, and evinced the purity of their patriotism by refusing the recompense awarded them in return for the benefit their actions had conferred upon their country. Princes seem to believe only in one virtue—the questionable one of blind devotion to their own persons.

On the arrival of the Austrians in Naples, orders emanating from the King caused the arrest of sixty officers accused of having borne a part in the revolution. Thirty-four of them were condemned to death by bribed judges, after a trial filled with irregularities. General Frimont, who commanded the Austrian army in the Two Sicilies, on hearing this sentence, went immediately to the King, and told him that the Emperor of Austria regarded it as far better policy to punish without bloodshed all who were accused of high treason, and that, at the utmost, the two Lieutenants, Morelli and Salvati should be beheaded, as having been the first to raise the revolt. To this the King replied, that he would not have dared to reprieve any of the prisoners, but that such being the Imperial will he was ready to conform to it. Morelli and Salvati perished on the

scaffold. Morelli met death so courageously as to remind the people of the heroes of 1799. On the scaffold, he wished to protest his adherence to the cause for which he suffered, but his voice was drowned by the noise of the drums.

The magnanimous favour granted by the King to the other thirty-two, was, that instead of being put to death, they should be confined in chains for thirty-two years in the island of San Stefano. This island is situated to the east of that of Ventodene, sixty miles from Naples, it has a circuit of about eight miles, is entirely barren and uninhabited, and totally without water, which is obliged to be brought from Terra Firma.

The Bagnio is a large edifice, calculated to contain fifteen hundred galley-slaves. Its form is oval, and in size it may be about twice that of the theatre of San Carlo, at Naples. Besides the ground floor, which is divided into thirty-two small rooms or cells, each of the three upper floors contains an equal number of rooms, amounting in all to a hundred and twenty-eight cells. The entrance to this edifice is across two draw-bridges; in the centre of the building is a chapel which is so disposed, that the inmate of each cell can see the altar where mass is celebrated on Sundays and holidays. Each of these small rooms, which are all of the same size, contains from twelve to fifteen galley-slaves.

The thirty-two officers, several of whom were of superior military rank, instead of being kept apart from the common culprits, each of them being separated from his companions, were placed in a room among the criminals. As if this humiliation were not sufficient, each officer was fastened by a chain to one of the galley-

slaves, that is to say, the ring which held the foot of the one was linked by a chain to a ring around the ankle of the other.

Every morning after the irons had been examined by an inferior officer, the prisoners, chained as they were, had permission to walk in the cloister surrounding the chapel for a couple of hours. During this space of time forty armed soldiers kept watch upon the draw-bridge. Their presence, however, did not prevent the galley-slaves from sometimes quarrelling and even stabbing each other. These men, however, contrary to the expectation of the Government, constantly manifested the greatest respect and affection towards the officers confined with them.

After the two hours' walk, they returned to their cells, when each officer and galley-slave had distributed to him thirty-two beans, boiled in plain water, and seasoned with a little rancid oil poured into a wooden bowl. Every second day, these unfortunate beings received a loaf of black bread, weighing about two pounds and a half, and about a pint and a half of water to drink and wash themselves.

They slept upon the bare stones without even a board or a truss of straw, and with no other covering than a blanket made of asses' hair. They wore a cap made of the same material, a pair of trowsers, and a kind of frock with sleeves of the roughest material; a pair of slippers and a couple of canvas shirts were likewise provided them. These articles were renewed once a year. At such indignities the thirty-two officers shuddered, but they were not subdued.

The iron gratings of each cell looked upon the interior of the edifice, and consequently afforded no view of the surrounding country.

Every Saturday the cells were examined, and a book was regarded as a more guilty object than a poniard. Each man had his head shaved, and this operation was more strictly performed on the thirty-two officers than on the criminals. In 1829, after eight years of this horrible existence, and more than nine months after the accession to the throne of Francis, Duke of Calabria, this King, to show his clemency towards officers whom he had extolled in 1820 as the promoters of national freedom, caused them to be removed to a village in the island of Favignana, where each of them received for food and clothing the sum of two-pence a day. He decreed that they were to remain there during four-and-twenty years, and that if they ever quitted the village, and roamed about the island, they were to be punished by the bastinado. Six years after, on the death of Francis the First of the Two Sicilies, and on the accession of his son Ferdinand, these unfortunate but honourable officers were set at liberty. The reader may imagine what anguish I endured at the intelligence communicated to me of the sufferings and indignities inflicted upon these brave men, many of whom had more than once, under my own eyes, in the field of battle, upheld the honour of the nation, and given every testimony of the purest patriotic feelings: all were dear to me, and attracted my thoughts to their misfortunes, which keenly affected me. In my dreams, I beheld Nicolo Staiti, a superior officer, who had been my aide-de-camp, and who had shown the firmest constancy to his principles, and the most dauntless coolness at the sentence of death which had been read to him. Often did I imagine him raising his arms covered with chains, and pointing out to me the galley-slave fastened to his side, as he exclaimed:

"This is all we have gained by our moderation; by our respect for the defeated King, guilty of such horrors in 1799, by our faith in his promises accompanied by tears, which we thought tears of contrition, whilst they were but of anger." I suddenly awoke from such dreams, which rent my heart and lacerated my soul with remorse, as if I had been an accomplice in the iniquities of fortune against my companions, and in these moments of despair my persevering patriotism appeared to me almost a crime.

CHAPTER XVII.

1822—1823.

My arrival in Lisbon—State of Portugal—I proceed to Madrid—Assembly of my political friends—Neither the letters of Lafayette nor my own reasoning avail to urge this meeting to have recourse to vigorous measures—I turn towards the Greeks, who had just shaken off the yoke of Turkey—The answer I receive from Mavrocordato—I depart for London—My duel with Carascosa—Article published upon it by Count Santa Rosa—Letter written to me by Lafayette upon the same topic.

On reaching Lisbon, I found my political friends and brethren of the sect in great embarrassment, from a division of five thousand men having retired to the mountains proclaiming absolute government. Whether from a political feeling, or because he was unwilling to commit perjury, I know not, but the King of Portugal conducted himself so well on this occasion that he received the approbation of the warmest of the patriots. I made my friends acquainted with the object of my journey to Madrid, and as they held the Portuguese Government in their hands, they furnished me with letters from several of the most influential deputies of the Cortes at Madrid, assuring them that the Government of Portugal would with pleasure ally itself to that of Spain, by putting an end to the secondary question

relative to Monte Video in South America. I quitted Lisbon to proceed to Madrid, passing through Seville. My travelling companion was the Count de Capitane, a young Milanese, who had quitted England at the same time as myself. Travelling by land in Portugal is rather a dangerous thing, as I had already experienced, and in the month of June it was moreover extremely inconvenient, owing to the intensity of the heat.' As I proceeded on my way, I could perceive that the inhabitants of the provinces of this State were indifferent to the advantages of a Constitutional Government. When I reached Seville, I was minutely informed of the attempt made by Ferdinand VII, King of Spain, to bring about the destruction of freedom. This endeavour proved wholly ineffectual, as will be seen hereafter. I continued my journey through Cordova, and finally reached Madrid. Nothing was thought of here but the vain attempt which had been made by the King, and the revolution which had burst out in Catalonia against the Constitutional system. General Balesteros was charged to oppose the royal guard, which had raised the standard of revolt in the precincts of the royal residence, and which had advanced through the streets of the capital against the Constitutionalists. The guard was driven back and put to flight. When the King became aware of the unfortunate result of the enterprise, not only did he endeavour to show that he was unacquainted with the rebellion of his followers, but he loudly declared his disapprobation of the attempt of those unfortunate men, whom he had in secret excited to the execution of this purpose, and whom he called Picaros. Not satisfied with this, he led Balesteros to an elevated window, from whence could be seen an extensive view

of the surrounding country, and pointing out the fugitive soldiers and officers of the routed guard, desired that some squadrons might be sent out to cut them to pieces. I could not have given credit to such vile perfidy, notwithstanding the practical experience I had derived from the Bourbons of Naples, had not Balesteros himself related the fact to me. I expressed to this General my surprise at the indifference of the Castilians, who left it in the King's power to make another attempt which had cost the lives of so many citizens. Balesteros replied, that in the heat of the conflict with the royal guard, the patriots, and the National Guard had both sworn to put the King to death; but that as soon as this Prince appeared before them distributing cigars with his own hands, all their anger evaporated; not a trace of the public indignation was left. Balesteros added, that he ought himself to have arrested the King; but he could not have found any one willing to undertake the office of his keeper. On hearing this, I repeated to myself the Italian adage, "Tutto il monde è paese."

I began by explaining to many of the principal deputies of the Cortes the object of my arrival at Madrid, as well as what Lafayette and his friends of the opposition proposed to the Cortes. Several among the Spanish deputies agreed with my opinion, the others were undecided. After many efforts I succeeded in obtaining, that at least twelve of the most influential amongst them should assemble at the residence of Riego to discuss what Lafayette and I proposed to them. The following are the names of the deputies forming this assembly, at least all that I have retained in my recollection: the Duke del Pasque, Riego, Balesteros, Counsellor of State, Quiroga, Isturiz,

Galiani, Flores Estrada, Ramon Salvato, Beltrand de Lis, Romuero Alpuente, and Palerea. It is impossible to form any idea of the jealousy which existed amongst them, and which rendered the formation of a meeting a most difficult task. Added to this, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, Bulgari, and the British Ambassador, A'Court, told the deputies, that by listening to me, they laid themselves open to the displeasure of France and of the Allied Powers. General Balesteros informed me that I had done wonders in effecting a meeting at all. The appointment was for one o'clock, and the latest arrivals reached the house of Riego at four o'clock;—three hours' delay is thought little of in Spain. I had already in private made known to each individual the subject of the meeting, nevertheless, when the assembly was complete, I was invited to read the letters of Lafayette, and to detail fully what both of us wished to propose.

I began my speech in French, but Galiani stated that I knew the Castilian language, and requested that I would continue in Spanish. I began by stating that there did not exist a doubt that the Bourbons of France, from their natural leaning towards absolute government, and their desire to gratify the wishes of the Allied Powers, had designed and decided upon employing money, seduction, and a powerful army, to destroy the freedom of the Peninsula. I proceeded to show that the recent insurrection in Catalonia bore evidence of the effects of French machinations, and of the little resistance which would be offered to their troops, should they cross the Pyrenees. That this time it would not be as under Napoleon, when the French army were opposed by all the clergy in Spain, and by England with all the resources of that mighty

power. I continued by declaring, that if the Cortes wished to preserve their national liberty, not only they must prepare for their defence, bnt they should secretly afford Lafayette and his numerous faction, who aimed at the destruction of the Bourbon despotism, all the assistance they could. That these two things might be accomplished by their acknowledging the American colonies, the envoys of which had extensive powers, and offered through the medium of Lafayette, a hundred million francs to the Castilian Government, half of which lay ready in the hands of the envoy from Columbia, Zea, in London. That when once the independence of the colonies should be acknowledged, Spain would withdraw her troops from America, which although not numerous were well trained. Finally, that such a step was a mere matter of form, since there was little hope that the Spaniards could continue to exercise their sway over the colonies they had formerly possessed in America.

My speech seemed to meet the approval of part of my audience, when the eloquent Galiani arose and replied: that unless they had enjoyed the highest popularity, the Cortes could not have been able to defend the independence of the nation, and that the acknowledgment of that of the colonies would be an act of the most unpopular kind. That in the event of the Constitutional Government of Spain causing a war by secretly abetting the French liberals, the Castilian people would not look upon the aggression of Louis XVIII. as unjust, and would consequently be very slow in their defence. This argument of Galiani, into which he entered at great length, made me lose my cause, and it was decided to give no assistance to the projects of Lafayette, still less to acknowledge the independence

of the colonies. On our return home, I said to Galiani, that I expected to meet him again in London before long, and that during the period of his exile I hoped he might be blessed with relatives as affectionate as my brother. This time my words were prophetic, neither did it require any very extraordinary degree of perspicacity to foresee the events which occurred in the succeeding months.

Men in general, and especially great reasoners, are extremely partial to half measures. Absolute Princes, notwithstanding such a tendency, are accustomed sometimes to encounter perils in support of each other in times of misfortune. This is never observed amongst free people; although their common interest might be expected to lead them to imitate the princely policy I have adverted to. The Americans of the United States never would give any assistance, either directly or indirectly, to enable the Mexicans and Columbians to shake off the yoke of Spain.

I left no stone unturned to obtain my end, but all in vain. I then directed my eyes towards Greece, which had just accomplished its revolution. I imagined that the Greeks, who had still a great deal to do to prevent their falling again into the power of Turkey, would have looked upon it as advantageous to themselves to give extension to the liberty of Europe, and especially to establish it in Italy. I must relate in what manner I addressed myself to the chief of the Greek Government, Mavrocordato, asking him for a thousand chosen Greeks, with whom I would have landed in Calabria. A Calabrian, a countryman of my own, who had been extremely compromised by his political opinions, and who, accordingly, had been driven to emigrate, proposed to me at Madrid to become the bearer of my letter to

Mavrocordato, and explain my ideas to him more fully than they could be written. He took with him, likewise, the following letter from my friend the Spanish Minister of War, which served to give weight to my request:

"Lisbonne, ce 23 Janvier, 1823.

"A M. Mavrocordato,

"En qualité de Ministre de la Guerre de la nation Portugaise, et comme un citoyen qui aime le bonheur de sa patrie, et celui de tous les peuples, je vous prie de vouloir bien prendre en considération la mission dont M. — a été chargé par Monsieur le Général Pépé, car je la crois d'une grande utilité pour les peuples du midi de l'Europe.

"J'ai l'honneur, etc., etc.,

"Le Ministre de la Guerre,

"MANUEL GONSALVES MIRANDA."

This is the answer I received some time after from the chief of the Greeks. I will not mention the name of my countryman, who proceeded from Lisbon to Greece, and subsequently returned to London. He is still alive, and I do not know whether he would wish his name to be published.

"Tripoliza, le 4 (16) Mai, 1823.

"M. le Général,

"M. —, porteur de votre lettre du 22 Novembre, datée de Madrid, avec un post-scriptum du 18 Janvier, en date de Lisbonne, l'a exactement remise au soussigné Secrétaire Général d'Etat, chargé de la correspondance extérieure, qui s'est empressé de la mettre sous les yeux de son gouvernement.

" Vos talents, votre réputation, et la persuasion de l'intérêt sincère que vous prenez à la cause de la Grèce, étaient autant de motifs pour attirer toute l'attention du gouvernement provisoire de la Grèce sur le contenu de votre lettre ; mais je ne puis et je ne dois pas vous dissimuler, Monsieur, que malgré les avantages incontestables que présente le projet exposé dans votre lettre, et plus amplement expliqué par M. —, le gouvernement a cru trouver dans l'adoption de ce projet une déviation manifeste des principes qu'il a établi pour base de sa conduite, et qu'il regarde comme les seuls qui peuvent déjouer les projets des calomniateurs. Comme ami de la liberté il est attaché par principes à la cause de la Grèce, qui est celle de la justice et de l'humanité. Cette explication franche et loyale ne pourra que vous satisfaire M. le Général, et je suis persuadé d'avance que vous ne manquerez pas d'employer vos bons offices près de vos amis, pour le succès de la négociation d'un emprunt que le gouvernement entreprendra probablement bientôt.

" Je viens de répondre aussi aux lettres du Colonel Doyle, et de M. G. Gregory auxquels je manifeste le même désir relativement à l'emprunt. M. — qui s'est acquitté dignement de la confiance que vous lui accordez, vous rendra un compte exact des conférences qu'il a eu avec moi, et avec les membres du gouvernement, dont, je suis sûr, vous n'approuverez que trop les principes.

" Veuillez bien agréer, M. le Général, l'expression de mon estime et de ma plus haute considération.

" Le Secrétaire Général d'Etat,

" A. Mavrocordato."

Having nothing more to detain me at Madrid, I

left Colonel Pisa there to keep me informed of what might occur in the Peninsula, and proceeded, viâ Lisbon, to London. The rebellion of several thousand Portuguese troops, the insurrection which had burst forth in Catalonia, and the threats of France, had placed the two Peninsular Governments in a most disastrous condition, as was clear to the eyes of all, except the deputies of the Cortes, who were bent upon not seeing the real state of things. I travelled from Madrid to Lisbon in company with an English Colonel, Sir John Milley Doyle, who many years later became aide-de-camp to the Emperor Don Pedro. My compatriot, who was proceeding to Mavrocordato, went with me to Lisbon, and then continued his route to Cadiz, whence he embarked for Greece. I embarked on board the Government packet bound for Falmouth. This vessel was commanded by a young officer of the royal navy, who was doing duty for his father, who had been attacked by severe illness. This young man was about to marry a young lady of Falmouth, and in his eagerness to reach that port he set sail in such tempestuous weather that we nearly perished at the mouth of the Tagus. Having surmounted this danger, a strong but favourable wind carried us in four days to our destination. I immediately pursued my way to London, where in common with all the reflecting portion of the public, my thoughts were turned to the future fate of the Peninsula. I did not fail to write to Lafayette what had occurred at Madrid, and to impart to him the blind policy of the liberals in that country. I said that Pisa would inform him of what might take place in Spain, where he remained to watch the development of the discontent which existed in France against the

Bourbons, and the execution of their threat to send an army across the Pyrenees.

In February of the same year, 1823, I received a challenge from General Carascosa, whom I had thought still at Malta. After having vainly endeavoured to be restored to favour by the Government of Naples, he had quitted Malta, and proceeded to London with the intention of fighting with me. As I had avoided everything personal with every one, and particularly with him, I was extremely surprised by his challenge, which I could not attribute to any other motive than to a design of proving to the King of Naples how much he was adverse to my principles and to me. On perusing the letter containing the challenge, it is impossible to ascribe it to any other motive, especially as he declares in it all his hatred to me, to my political principles, and to the Carbonari sect. I replied, that for a challenge his letter was unnecessarily long. That it was upon the borders of the Lebeto when he accepted the portfolio of Minister of War, and not upon those of the Thames, that he ought to have revealed his aversion to conspiracies and the Constitution of Spain. That he ought not so soon to have forgotten that he had conspired with me against King Joachim to oblige that Prince to grant a Constitution to our country, and that he had abandoned me when we came to the point. I ended by saying, that I had selected the Count Santa Rosa for my second, to whom he might send his own. Santa Rosa had been Minister of War during the few days of the Piedmontese Constitution. He was a man of great merit, and subsequently ended his career whilst fighting for the liberty of Greece. His memory will ever be held in the most sacred veneration in Italy, for he had been the perfect model

of the purest and most esteemed civic virtues. Santa Rosa, however, was by no means versed in duelling matters, nor was the second of my adversary a greater adept. This gentleman was a Frenchman, Carascosa having been unable to procure the assistance of any Italian upon this occasion. When we reached the place of meeting, our seconds presented us with two swords, which they had purchased at a neighbouring shop, and which were of the description made use of on the Continent for great funerals. The blades were triangular, and consequently produced very injurious wounds, but at the same time they were weak and the hilts were bad. Carascosa assaulted me with impetuosity; as I warded off the blow, my sword broke at the hilt and became useless. I informed Santa Rosa of this circumstance, to which he paid little heed, supposing that the guard only was broken. My pride made me continue to defend myself with my broken sword, and things would most likely have gone against me, had not the approach of persons obliged us to put an end to the combat. There exists a society in England which gives a reward to those who prevent a duel.

Another day for the meeting was named, and this time a remote spot called Combe Wood was selected. I took care to provide myself with a couple of good Italian swords, which I knew would stand me in stead, having been made after a good pattern. In 1806, Carascosa had been engaged in a duel with sabres, and rushing violently upon his antagonist, he had inflicted upon him many severe wounds. His name was Adriano Introne. The General seemed to intend adopting the same course with me; scarcely without giving me time, to defend myself, he began his attack in a furious manner. I parried his thrusts, and he drew so near to

me, that we were body to body. I seized hold of his sword with my left hand and held it out of the line, whilst by bending my right arm I brought my weapon against his side. He remained for more than a minute in this situation when I might have run him through the body with the greatest ease. Our two seconds gazed with astonishment at what was going forward, but did not interfere. I finally drew back, relinquishing my hold of Carascosa's sword, to whom I said, that I gave him his life. To my great surprise, he replied, that he would not accept his life at my hands, and that he meant to continue the combat. My astonishment increased when I found that my own second, Santa Rosa, as well as Carascosa's, did not object to the continuance of the duel.

Thus, after having generously given him his life, my own was again exposed. This serves to show how necessary it is to be cautious in the choice of one's second. We were for the second time on our guard. Carascosa attempted again to attack me with impetuosity, but the point of my sword was always opposite to his eyes; I saw him hesitate a moment, upon which I advanced in my turn, and wounded him in the shoulder, whence the blood flowed freely. He seemed desirous to continue the fight, but not being able to make use of his arm, the duel ended. At this moment I forgot all the harm he had done to our country, and recollecting only the time when we had fought together against the Austrians, under Joachim Murat, and his distinguished gallantry at Castel di Sangro, I went up and embraced him. Both from nature and on principle I have constantly avoided personal feelings, my only enemies being despotism and foreigners adverse to our independence. After the two duels which I had at Saira,

when I was in my seventeenth year, the others, whether right or wrong, were not with Italians. The reader will find evidence of some of the above particulars in the following article from an English newspaper which was published by the Count Santa Rosa, to expose the erroneousness of the account of the duel given by other papers.

To the Editor of the British Traveller.

"Sir,

"Your statement of the late 'Affair of Honour,' between Generals Carascosa and Pépé, not comprehending all the circumstances of that affair, General Pépé, in a letter which I received yesterday, has requested me to detail more fully the particulars. This request it is impossible to refuse, although I feel no slight repugnance in recurring to an affair which I anxiously endeavoured to prevent, so far as was compatible with the strict and delicate laws of honour. I, therefore, feel myself obliged, Sir, to request that you will insert in your paper the following statement, together with the two other letters subjoined.

I have the honour, &c., &c.
(Signed,) Count de Santa Rosa.

2, Great Marylebone Street, Portland Place.
March 10, 1823.

"In the month of October last, General Carascosa arrived in London, where General Pépé also arrived on the 2nd February. Very shortly after his arrival, the subjoined letter (marked A), was addressed to him by General Carascosa—to whom the letter (marked B)

was immediately transmitted by General Pépé in reply.

"On the 20th of February, the two Generals met near the second bridge at Paddington, attended by Mr. Brunet, as the second to General Carascosa, and by the Count de Santa Rosa, as that of General Pépé. Having arranged the preliminaries of the combat, General Carascosa, with great vivacity, attacked his adversary, who, from a painful feeling of coming to such extremity with a fellow countryman, an old friend and comrade, at first slightly receded. The two swords coming into close and vigorous contact, both gave way near the hilt; the combatants, nevertheless, continued fighting until the appearance of several people of the neighbourhood approaching the scene of action, constrained them to desist.

"On the 28th of February, the two Generals with the same seconds, met at Combe Wood; General Carascosa commenced the attack with great impetuosity, whilst General Pépé received him with great firmness. Suddenly, the Generals found themselves in close contact, almost within an inch of each other, at which moment General Pépé had the sword of General Carascosa in his left hand, and certainly at that instant, General Pépé possessed the power of *killing* his antagonist. As to the right of terminating his existence, it was my opinion that he ought not to have done so, but in that respect both Generals differ from me. It is, however, proper to add, that the attitude and movement of General Pépé at this critical moment, were such as rendered it fully evident that he had no intention of availing himself of the advantage which he indisputably possessed.

"The Generals then separated, and having again taken their distance recommenced the combat with equal

vigour, when General Carascosa was shortly after wounded in the right shoulder, in such a manner as to disable him from continuing the combat."

Such was the article published by the Count Santa Rosa upon this event. For the first days succeeding our duel Carascosa showed himself extremely grateful towards me, and often came to dine tête-à-tête at my house. He manifested a desire to become reconciled with the liberal party, and as Spain was then threatened by the Bourbons of France, he told me that he would go and serve in the Peninsula, were it not for the fear of being assassinated by his political enemies. I replied that we would proceed thither together, and that before attempting his life they must deprive me of mine. As he was desirous of becoming acquainted with some of the English liberals, I introduced him to Colonel Leicester Stanhope, by whom he was extremely well received. A short time after this, Carascosa ceased to visit me, and published his Memoirs upon the Revolution of Naples. Seven years later, in 1830, when the French revolution had awakened so many hopes in the liberal party of Europe, Carascosa paid a visit to General Lamarque, to whom he said a great deal in my favour. At the same time he begged the Baron Pocrio to bring about a reconciliation between us; but I replied that after the Memoirs he had published we could never meet again, since in those, according to my opinion, not only the liberal party, but all the Neapolitan nation, were unjustly discredited.

General Lafayette, who on every possible occasion manifested towards me great kindness, wrote me the following letter:

" Paris, 13 Mars, 1823.

"J'ai besoin de vous exprimer, mon cher Général,

toute la part que j'ai prise à votre patriotique et généreux combat; ce n'est pas seulement un effet bien naturel de l'amitié que je vous ai voué. J'y vois une explication du passé aussi utile pour la cause qu'honorable pour vous. Parmi les circonstances dont j'ai joui sous tous les rapports publics et personnels, il en est une qui m'a fait un plaisir particulier, c'est le nom de votre témoin. Offrez-lui, je vous prie, l'expression de mon bien sincère attachement.

"Vous ne doutez pas du tendre intérêt avec lequel nous parlons de vous, nos amis et moi: ce n'est pas que nous n'ayons à vous reprocher votre silence. Il n'est parvenu qu'une lettre depuis votre retour à Londres, et depuis votre affaire pas un mot. La politique est une belle chose lorsqu'elle est dirigée vers notre but; mais l'amitié réclame aussi ses droits.

"Notre Chambre des Députés est en désarroi à l'occasion de l'expulsion violente de notre éloquent collègue, Manuel, qui par la mesure d'ostracisme décernée contre lui, et par sa belle conduite dans cette persécution, avait un double droit à l'appui de ses amis. Le refus prononcé de la Garde Nationale, et les dispositions des vétérans dans la séance du 4, sont un événement important. Quelque inique et insensée que soit la guerre d'Espagne, il paraît que la faction contre-révolutionnaire est décidée de l'entreprendre.

"J'espère que vous aurez vu un de nos généraux les plus distinguées s'il est encore à Londres; les amis de la liberté, et de l'indépendance des nations ne sauraient être trop unis. Chargez-vous de mes amitiés pour l'excellent Pisa, lorsque vous lui écrirez, et recevez tous les vœux du patriotisme expansif, de la cordiale affection, et de la haute estime que vous adresse votre vieux ami. "LAFAYETTE."

CHAPTER VIII.

1823—1824.

The French army enters Spain—I sail from Falmouth and reach Lisbon—Blindness of the Portuguese Liberals—I embark for England and arrive in London—Misfortunes of Spain, invaded by the French—My design of going to America, and letters which I receive from Lafayette for the United States—I alter my intentions, and do not go thither—Letter written to me by Lafayette, dated on board the Cadmus, bound for New York.

In April of the year 1823, the French army entered Spain, passing through Bidassoa. The deputies of the Cortes, who seven months before had refused to listen to the proposals made them by Lafayette and myself, now authorized the French and Italian exiles to assemble, and to display the tri-coloured flag to the eyes of the enemy's troops, to induce them to desert the Bourbons. But it was now too late. It would have been easy to have excited the French troops to revolt against the Bourbons, whilst they were stationed at the foot of the Pyrenees; but this facility no longer existed now that they were under arms, with a thousand precautions taken by their Generals, and marching forward as conquerors. Everybody is acquainted with this campaign, if such it can be called, when the common people and the privileged classes of a nation join

together to support the invader. Colonel Pisa, who was at Madrid, kept me informed of everything. I have never approved of military men engaging in a foreign service, and although a decree of the Cortes invited me to serve with my own rank in the Spanish army, I decided upon going to the Peninsula, merely in the hope that, if things went well, I should obtain two battalions and ten thousand muskets, with which to land in Calabria. A rebellion in the Two Sicilies would have greatly animated the Spaniards, who were truly attached to the liberty of their country.

On my arrival at Falmouth, I found the packet ready to sail. It was commanded by my old acquaintance, John Bull, who, after his dinner at least, showed himself extremely devoted to me. I reached Lisbon on the 21st of May, where I was soon made aware of the rapid progress of the French, who were upon the point of entering Madrid. My political friends at Lisbon, who either belonged to the Ministry, the Council of State, or the Cortes, told me that preparations were making to hasten to the assistance of Spain, with which Portugal had not as yet formed any alliance. I had much conversation with the Minister of War, Manuel Gonsalves di Miranda, who told me that the Government was making every effort to increase the army to the number of forty thousand men, after which it would declare itself allied with Spain. I replied by asking the minister why this was not declared immediately? why the Spanish forces were not strengthened, without loss of time, by the troops which were ready, as the least delay might prove fatal to the liberty of Spain? The minister answered by informing me that I was in great error, and that the Peninsular War would last for many years. I spoke

to him of my intended project of landing in some part of the Kingdom of Naples. To this, he said, that if the Spanish Government would consent to such an expedition, Portugal would join her, and contribute one half of the men, arms, vessels and money necessary to the accomplishment of the attempt. I spoke of my plan to several deputies of the Cortes, and Counsellors of State, all of whom approved of my intentions; and I then prepared to set forward to Madrid, where Pisa wrote to me that I was expected.

Whilst the Portuguese liberals, far from forcing any internal commotion, were making preparations to assist their natural ally—Spain; Don Miguel, the eldest son of the King, quitted Lisbon, and not far from that city, hoisted the Anti-Constitutional banner. At every moment, intelligence was received that first one and then another corps had gone over to the rebels. The same was the case with the superior officers and Generals; and even the Brigadier Lepulveda, who in 1820 had been the first to declare himself for the Constitution, followed the same pernicious example: the last to go over to the enemy's camp was the King himself, but he did so, and in the course of forty-eight hours the freedom of Portugal had ceased to exist. The ministers of the Liberal Government had laid an embargo upon all the vessels in the Tagus, a few hours before their fall, so that I had no means of going to Spain by sea, and still less by land, the whole country swarming with the armed partisans of Don Miguel. My situation became extremely perplexing, and I was in constant danger of falling into the hands of my enemies.

I went to see Captain John Bull, who having just finished his dinner, received me very kindly, and

promised me a berth in his vessel, which was to sail the next day for Falmouth. He informed me that before he could receive me on board, it was indispensable that my passport should be authenticated by the English Minister at Lisbon. This gentleman told me that he could not authenticate it without a request from the Lisbon Minister for Foreign Affairs. But where to find this personage, since all the ministers of the fallen government had fled? By adhering to these punctilios at such a time, the British Minister might have accomplished my ruin. Fortunately, however, a Provisional Government was formed, and a member of it, holding the portfolio for Foreign Affairs, I obtained from him the necessary authorization, and was enabled to embark on board the packet. The vessel being filled with fugitive Portuguese, Captain Bull had the extreme kindness to give up his own cabin for my use. I had reached Lisbon the 21st of May, and on the 1st of June, I was sailing towards England. Many amongst the Portuguese emigrants on board, had held the first situations in the fallen administration, and beguiled the time by exposing, although too late, all the errors of which they had been guilty. After a long voyage of twenty-four days, owing to a continual calm, we reached Falmouth, from whence I immediately departed for London.

I had but a very faint glimmering of hope, that the freedom in Spain might survive, nevertheless I prepared to sail for Cadiz. My first care in the morning was to read the papers which contained a minute account of the war against the liberty of the Peninsula. Before the month of June the French had entered Madrid, without meeting with any resistance, even at Saragossa, —that same Saragossa which had so long held out

against the troops of Napoleon. Mina, who had defended part of Navarre against the French, at the head of bands of peasants, under the Empire, was now raised to the rank of Lieutenant-General, and to the command of the corps of the army. He was charged to defend Catalonia, but was compelled to retreat to Barcelona, so changed were the features of the struggle between France and Spain. The Cortes, taking with them the King and the royal family, had retreated from Seville to Cadiz, but the English no longer afforded any assistance to this place. Tortosa, instead of holding out bravely as it might have done, had surrendered. The Spanish General, Morillo, not only refused to oppose the invaders, but even joined his troops to theirs to the detriment of his country's freedom. Some faith was still placed in General Balesteros, who had not only shown much vigour during the war against Napoleon, but had refused out of his love of country to obey the English General. But Balesteros, after a slight skirmish, instead of retreating upon Cadiz, even alone, had he been abandoned by his troops, submitted with them to the enemy, taking care to stipulate for his own personal advantage. Not satisfied with this, he declared himself for the Provisional Junta, which the Duke of Angoulême had formed of Spaniards, in opposition to the Cortes sitting in Cadiz. When I read in the public papers that Balesteros had acted thus, I gave up my intention of proceeding to the South of Spain. General Riego, who was always faithful to the cause of liberty, advancing against the enemy with about three thousand men, was forsaken by his troops and made prisoner in a State called Banqueirzones, in the vicinity of Arquillors. He was conducted to Andujar, at a short distance from Sierra Morena: the population wanted to

put him to immediate death; Riego turned round to the French officer, who was protecting him from the fury of these brutes, and said, "These men, who but for you would ere this have put me to death, carried me in triumph only a year ago, and obliged me to accept a sword of honour." Towards the end of September, the Cortes vainly requested either the protection of England through Sir William A'Court, who was at Gibraltar, or mild conditions from the Duke d'Angoulême. This Prince declared that he would only treat with King Ferdinand free, that is to say, in the midst of the French army. The Cortes consented to this after much hesitation, but the Madrid militia, which had followed them to Cadiz, with more good sense than had been shown by the deputies, opposed themselves to the entire liberation of the King. Nevertheless, the threats of the French who were besieging Cadiz, and the disorder which had arisen between the deputies of the Cortes, the militia and the troops who garrisoned this place, caused Ferdinand VII. to be set free. When this Prince saw himself amidst the French, he kept his promises to the Cortes in the same manner as Ferdinand I. of Naples had done, when he found himself free and surrounded by the Austrians.

The downfal of freedom in Spain and Portugal, and the consolidation of the Bourbons upon the throne of France, left no prospect of any change in the fortunes of miserable Italy, so that I determined upon visiting the United States of America. I wrote to General Lafayette, to ask him for some letters of recommendation to his friends in that vast country. No one could be more useful to me in that respect than himself, and in fact he sent me letters, which I still preserve, for James Monro, President of the United States, Washington

City; Honourable W. S. Craufurd, Secretary of the Treaty; Thomas Jefferson, Esq., Monticelo, State of Virginia; General Willen, New York; Honourable Judge Richard Peters, Philadelphia; Rufus King, Esq., New York; Honourable Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, Washington City; another for General Bernard, who was afterwards Minister of War in France. He is now dead; and as the letter was open, I insert it here:

"Paris, 16 Mai, 1824.

"Je ne sais, mon cher Général, si cette lettre doit vous arriver avant moi; elle est portée par le Général Pépé, illustre ami de la liberté, et mon ami personnel, avec qui, sans avoir eu le plaisir de le voir, j'ai contracté les rapports les plus intimes. Il a fait à Naples et dans la Péninsule, tout ce que dépendait de lui pour servir la bonne cause, et aujourd'hui il projette un voyage aux Etats Unis. Je connais d'avance votre empressement à faire connaissance avec lui, et je vous rends un bon office à tous deux en vous adressant l'un à l'autre. Je m'occupe de mes arrangemens de voyage. Vous approuverez sans doute que je n'ai pas profité de l'offre honorable d'envoyer un vaisseau de l'Etat exprès pour moi. Il y a de très bonnes occasions de passer la mer sous pavillon Américain, et dès que j'aurai terminé quelques affaires j'irai porter sur l'autre rivage les hommages de ma reconnaissance et de mon attachement. Mettez le Général Pépé en rapport avec nos amis, et recevez l'expression de l'amitié que je vous ai vouée de tout mon cœur.

"LAFAYETTE.

"General Bernard, New York."

The desire of beholding a country so different from those of Europe, and of being cordially received through the kindness of Lafayette ought to have excited me to undertake the voyage I had projected. But finding myself deprived of every means of conducing to the welfare of my country, I fell into such a state of moral lethargy, that all things which ought to have given me pleasure, pained or at least annoyed me. During the whole course of my life, I have never had any energy but for actions I considered as useful to that country which, under any circumstances, I shall ever cherish as my revered native land. In the hope of being useful to my country, I studied with perseverance in prison, and devoted myself with enthusiasm to the profession of arms, and neglected all the advantages of fortune. Had my country not been constantly before my eyes, and in my mind, I should have been regarded as a man unfit for every thing. Now for her advantage I impose upon myself the no slight task of compiling these Memoirs. In a short time that heart, which has only beat for Italy, will have found its last asylum, perhaps, in a foreign land, but it exults in the thought that sooner or later, Italy will shine forth again in all her pristine glory. It is true, indeed, that had I wished to have gone to America, I was kept in London by the situation of Colonel Pisa, who had been detained prisoner at Madrid. I had warmly recommended him to an excellent young American, of the name of Appleton, who was secretary to the legation of the United States in Spain. He behaved like a brother to Pisa, to whom I contrived to send three hundred pounds, half of which was my own, and half had been given me by Major Cartwright, and was the amount of a subscription got

up amongst his political friends in London. I had the pleasure of seeing Pisa again after he had passed two years in prison by order of the Spanish Government. When he was set at liberty and had returned to London, I advised him to go to Greece. He was pleased at this suggestion, which he followed, and entering the service of that classical country, he rose to the rank of General, and finally, an exile from his native land, he ended his days in Greece, where he was greatly honoured and esteemed.

I requested Mrs. Trollope to translate into English verse, an ode written by Alfieri in honour of the Marquis Lafayette, when he, forsaking all the pleasures of Paris and the Court, had gone over to America to assist in the sacred cause of that country's independence. The poet, Thomas Campbell, assured me that the translation possessed much merit. I had it published in the English papers, several of which I sent to Lafayette. He addressed me the following document, which I give in his own words, not being certain that history has recorded it, as it came from the General's pen.

"Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen, présentée par le Général Lafayette dans l'Assemblée Constituante, le 11 Juillet, 1789.

"La nature fait les hommes libres et égaux; les distinctions nécessaires à l'ordre social ne sont fondées que sur l'utilité générale.

"Tout homme naît avec des droits inaliénables et imprescriptibles; tels sont la liberté de toutes les opinions, le soin de son honneur, et de sa vie, le droit de propriété, la disposition entière de sa personne, de son industrie, de toutes ses facultés, la communication

de ses pensées par tous les moyens possibles, la recherche du bien-être, et la résistance à l'oppression.

" L'exercice des droits naturels n'a des bornes que celles qui assurent la jouissance aux autres membres de la société. Nul homme ne peut être soumis qu'à des lois consenties par lui, ou par ses représentans antérieurement promulguées, et légalement appliquées.

" Le principe de toute souveraineté réside dans la nation; nul corps, nul individu ne peut avoir une autorité qui n'en émane expressément.

" Tout gouvernement a pour unique but, le bien commun. Cet intérêt exige que les pouvoirs législatifs, exécutifs et judiciaires soient distincts et définis, et que leur organisation assure la représentation libre des citoyens, la responsabilité des agens, et l'impartialité des juges.

" Les lois doivent être claires, précises, uniformes, pour tous les citoyens. Les subsides doivent être librement consentis et proportionnellement repartis.

" Et comme l'introduction des abus, et le droit des générations qui se succèdent, nécessitent la révision de tout établissement humain, il doit être possible à la nation d'avoir dans certain cas, une convocation extraordinaire de députés dans le seul objet d'examiner et de corriger, s'il est nécessaire, les vices de a Constitution."

In the following year, 1824, Lafayette embarked for the United States of America, nor did he forget me on his voyage. He wrote me the following letter. To understand it properly, it is necessary to know that he termed Colonel Pisa, who was still in the prison at Madrid, my Pylades.

"A bord du Cadmus, 1 Août, 1824.

" Me voici en route pour les Etats Unis, mon cher Général, sur un bon paquebot Américain, accompagné de mon fils et d'un officier Français, que nos dernières querelles politiques ont mis hors de service. Nous sommes parvenus au Banc de Terreneuve, et dans une dixaine de jours, j'espère que nous serons à New York. J'aurais un grand plaisir à vous embrasser sur cette terre de liberté, mon cher Général; mais je suis trop uni au grand intérêt d'amitié qui nous occupe, pour m'étonner de votre retard tant que vous pourrez être utile à notre cher Pylade, (Colonel Pisa). Je ne serais pas parti moi-même, si j'avais pu faire quelque chose de plus pour sa délivrance. Avec quelle joie je le verrais arriver aux Etats Unis! Je n'ai pas oublié les conseils de votre affection pour moi; néanmoins, mon cher ami, il est des devoirs auxquels vous ne voudriez pas plus que moi vous soustraire. Mon projet actuel est d'aller de New York à Boston, et après cette visite de passer par New York en allant à Philadelphie, Baltimore, Washington et puis en Virginie et de me retrouver à Washington pour le mois de Décembre, époque de la réunion du Congrès; mais je voudrais être de retour en France avant le 1er Mai. Au reste les événements des deux hémisphères sont encore incertains. Mes projets particuliers en dépendent plus ou moins. Quelque vif intérêt que nous prenions aux succès de notre cause dans les diverses parties de l'Amérique, ne désespérons pas de la liberté Européenne.

" Mes chères filles adoptives ont dû passer à la Grange à la fin de ce mois, et se proposaient d'en partir pour le Hâvre, où elles trouveront la famille

Garnett, de manière à s'embarquer aujourd'hui même pour New York. Nous les y rejoindrons mon fils et moi, à mon retour de Boston. Mais depuis le 13 Juillet que nous avons quitté la bonne ville du Hâvre, nous n'avons plus eu de nouvelles. Offrez mes tendres amitiés à l'excellente Mme. Trollope, et à son mari, et recevez, mon cher Général, l'expression de celle que je vous ai vouée de tout mon cœur.

"LAFAYETTE."

CHAPTER XIX.

1825—1829.

Reception of Lafayette in the United States—Death of Ferdinand I. of the Two Sicilies, and accession of his son Francis—I go to Brussels, where I become acquainted with Thibeaudeau, Siéyes, Barrère—I am introduced to Scrope Davies by General, Sir Robert Wilson—I vainly ask for permission to reside in France —Letters from Lafayette upon this subject—First symptoms of the revolution which burst forth in France.

I WAS pleased with the gratitude manifested by the population of the United States towards Lafayette. It often happens that the multitude is more touched by services rendered by a foreigner than by its fellow-countrymen. The Siracusans were not only grateful to Timoleon of Corinth, but they made him choose a chief for them, when he was stricken in years. During the Republic many of the cities of Italy placed a foreigner at the head either of their government or of their tribunals, for whose services they always evinced the most unbounded gratitude. I confess, for my own part, that rather than serve a foreign country which would heap reward and honours upon my head, I should prefer devoting my whole being to my native country, though certain of meeting with nothing but ingratitude

in return. The best part of life resides in the imagination, which according to my feeling is never better satisfied than when one can say "I did this for my country; I suffer this from her ingratitude, and nevertheless I love her."

Towards the end of 1824, or at the beginning of 1825, Ferdinand, King of the Two Sicilies, died. He was succeeded by his son Francis, Duke of Calabria, of whom I have already spoken, and from whom several letters are published in these Memoirs. The mass of simpletons said, that this Prince, who had shown himself so liberal during the Constitution, would now at least do some good; for myself, I had no hope that he would do either much or little. Nevertheless, faithful to my system of not being guilty of any omission, I wrote to him a reasonable letter, in which I urged him to bestow liberal institutions upon our unfortunate country. I requested Lord Holland to peruse it; he did so, and told me that he approved its contents. I asked his advice whether I had better publish it or not in the papers. His Lordship advised me not to do so. I sent it privately through the medium of one of my acquaintances who had friends at Court. As I expected, the letter produced no effect. Towards the end of 1821, this Prince learning that a certain Neapolitan banker named Politi was just returned from Paris, sent for him to come to the palace at midnight to discuss some matter of business. Before dismissing him, the Prince asked whether he had been to London, and if he had seen General Pépé. Politi replied in the negative, and the Duke of Calabria resumed: "What a man—he was really sincere!"

One day, in the presence of Lady Acton, widow of the celebrated minister, several courtiers, thinking to gratify

the Duke of Calabria, said: "Pépé, like the others, under the assumed mask of liberalism, only aimed at higher honours." The Prince interrupted them, saying; "You err greatly; Pépé was never guilty of such weak ambition." When the Duke of Calabria became King, whether to please Austria or himself, or because he was too well acquainted with my character, he never insulted me by offering me permission to return to my native land, neither did he revoke the sentence of death, nor the confiscation of my possessions, which confiscation exists even at this day under the name of payment of the expenses of the war of 1821, which amounted to many millions of francs.

The French Government would not allow me to enter France, as will be seen by a letter from General Lafayette, so I determined upon dividing the fine season between Brussels and Spa. I was greatly afraid lest the Minister of the Low Countries should refuse me a passport, but I was mistaken. This gentleman with the greatest kindness made his government acquainted with my desire, and immediately obtained permission for me to enter those States. I was not surprised at this urbanity, when on reaching Brussels I became aware that King William had received the French who had been exiled for having voted the death of Louis XIV. Amongst these I often saw Sièyes, Barrère, Berlier, Cavignac and Thibeaudeau. With the last I contracted the greatest friendship, which exists undiminished after a period of nineteen years. I was in the habit of playing at chess with Siéyes, and when, undecided as to a move, I touched the pawn he used to say "Le général leur tâte le pouls." I often employed all my address to make him talk upon the events of the Republic and of the Empire, because much

information was to be derived from his discourse. He was, however, more animated when conversation turned upon matters of religion rather than politics. By nature he was taciturn, but his remarks manifested great depth of thought. He told me once that he had said to Buonaparte, during the first month of his Consulate, "If you wish to make war against the Northern powers, instead of threatening them with your army, establish gratuitous universities upon the Rhine; let liberal principles be heard in them; and you will soon see the change which will take place in the public mind in Germany, and the weakness of the Northern Princes." I often talked with Barrère upon the French revolution, the particulars of which nobody knew better than he; and from what I learned from him and from his fellow-exiles, I am convinced that a genuine history of this admirable revolution is still to be written. But the conversation which I enjoyed the most was that of Thibeaudeau. He was cheerful, well-informed, and endowed with the greatest good sense.

I became acquainted with the Princesse de Chimay, better known as the celebrated Madame Tallien. She was a most amiable woman, and acquainted with the minutest events of the revolution. It was necessary, however, to be on one's guard with her, as her vivid imagination caused her, at times, to give too high a colouring to facts. When I told Sir Robert Wilson of my intention of going to Belgium, he gave me a letter of introduction to his friend, and the friend of Byron, Scrope Davies, whom I found at Ostend, where I remained a few days enjoying his society, and playing with him at chess. The works of Shakespeare, Bacon, and other great writers, were all treasured up in the mind of Davies. He was an ardent admirer of the

English language, and used to say that to know one's own language one must be married to it. This predilection prevented his cultivating the French; but he was well versed in Greek and Latin, which he, however, spoke with the English pronunciation, and therefore I could not understand him. Scrope Davies has a rich vein of satire, and his intercourse with all the first characters who have flourished in his time, has furnished him with an ample fund of anecdotes of high life and amusing conversation.

In December of the year 1825, the Emperor Alexander of Russia died, and the liberal party, which built great hopes upon war, flattered themselves that they should now see the political changes they had expected from his successor. I returned to England in the beginning of the winter, where I received the following letter from Lafayette, who had returned to France some time before. He was in the habit of writing to me about twice a month, but I only insert such letters as are likely to interest the reader.

"La Grange, 8 Janvier, 1825.

"Voici le moment, mon cher Général, où vous devez revenir à Londres. Je vais moi-même à Paris avec ma famille pour deux ou trois mois de l'hiver, et je voudrais bien pouvoir me flatter de l'espérance de vous y voir. Mais nous sommes destinés l'un et l'autre, avec un grand désir de nous embrasser, à nous en tenir à une correspondance épistolaire, heureux pourtant de penser que notre excellent ami n'est plus dans les griffes de la tyrannie. Dites-lui mille tendresses pour moi, et donnez-moi de vos nouvelles. J'aurais bien voulu que mes connaissances Anglaises pussent lui être de quelque utilité: mais nous avons les mêmes, et les deux

hommes de ce pays à qui j'aurais le mieux aimé l'adresser sont à Paris, Lord Holland et le Duc de Bedford. Je les verrai ces jours-ci; et j'espère ne pas tarder à recevoir une lettre de vous. J'avais pensé que l'avènement au trône de votre compagnon constitutionnel ferait des changements au sort des patriotes Néapolitains. Jusqu'à présent ils sont presque imperceptibles. La mort de l'Empereur Alexandre doit en apporter dans la situation générale de l'Europe. Les gouvernements soi-disant chrétien qui disposent d'elles seront tous flétris par la postérité pour leur conduite envers les Grecs, dont il est si facile d'arrêter le massacre, et d'assurer la liberté. Les journaux prétendent que les cabinets de Londres et des Tuileries prennent quelques mesures diplomatiques pour mettre un terme à la conduite barbare et honteuse qui a eu lieu jusqu'à présent à l'égard des malheureux Grecs. Ce serait le cas de dire, vaut mieux tard que jamais. Mais d'autres journaux sont moins satisfaits à cet égard, et dans tous les cas comment cette intervention sera-t-elle modifiée? Le connu donne peu de confiance dans l'inconnu. Adieu, mon cher Général, recevez mes bien cordiales amitiés.

"LAFAYETTE."

I rather vegetated than lived in London, and the most distant hopes alone soothed my dreary existence. I had to struggle against affliction, but never against ennui; for reading and writing occupied my days, so that they seemed short rather than otherwise. Indeed, for more than three years, I never went to bed before three o'clock in the morning. My country was always present to my mind. When I reflected that my long and numerous sufferings had only tended to increase its

misfortunes, I could find no comfort. These bitter thoughts so engrossed my soul, as to keep me an isolated being in the midst of the crowded capital of England. More than once both Englishmen and Frenchmen have said to me, the former, that London, the latter that Paris, were well worth Naples, whilst in my own heart I could not help thinking, "Beasts of burden! who know not the meaning of a native country." In Europe, I could only reside in England or the Low Countries, and perhaps this privation awakened in me a desire to go to France. I should have been ashamed to apply to any but the liberal party there to obtain this permission, so I addressed myself to my affectionate and respected friend Lafayette, who exerted all his credit with the ministers that I might attain my object. In the summer of 1826 I again went to Brussels, where I remained till the end of 1827. Before I returned to London, I received the following letter from my dear friend Thomas Campbell, the illustrious poet:

"No. 10, Seymour Street West.
"December 5, 1826.

"My dear General,

"I often take shame to myself that I have not sooner answered your last kind note. But I think you know I am among the friends who can never forget you.

"I hope we shall soon see you in London. I have often heard you say you should like to visit Scotland. Now, I mean to revisit my native country the beginning of next April, and it strikes me if you should be in Britain, that it would not be disagreeable to you to accompany Mrs. Campbell and myself. We shall go down by the first steam packet that sails for Edinburgh in April, and from thence travel by land to

Glasgow, of the university of which you may perhaps have heard that I have been elected Lord Rector. I gained the appointment by an immense majority of votes of the students against Mr. Canning himself, for whom the aristocrats made a push. The triumph is so glorious that I have now nothing to do but to sit down like Alexander, and weep that I have no more Cannings to conquer.

"May I hope to hear of you soon, or rather to see you? Mrs. Campbell joins me in best regards.

"Believe me, my dear General, with unabated regard,

"Your affectionate friend,

"THOMAS CAMPBELL."

It was now May 1828, and Lafayette who had more than once requested leave from the ministers that I might reside in France, wrote me the following letter, which sufficiently betrays the importance attached to my entering that country; to such small dimensions do Princes dwindle when seated on a throne.

"Paris, ce 3 Mai, 1828.

"Si j'ai été long-temps, mon cher Général, à vous rendre compte de votre commission, c'est parce que je souhaitais la faire le mieux possible, et que tenant à causer de cette affaire avec Monsieur de la Ferronaye chez lui, quelques contretemps ont retardé notre conversation. Je suis bien persuadé que si votre arrivée ici ne dépendait que du ministre, et même du ministère actuel, elle ne souffrirait pas la plus légère difficulté. Mais vous connaissez le caractère de l'ambassadeur de Naples. Il ne se bornerait pas à traiter cet incident ministériellement, ce qui pourrait produire des désagré-

ments pour vous-même. Certes il est bien étrange qu'il en soit ainsi, lorsque le royal complice de vos nobles et patriotiques efforts est sur le trône de Naples. Mais n'est-il pas lui-même soumis à des influences moins honorables que ne l'aurait été l'influence légale de ses compatriotes ? J'ai lieu de croire qu'ici on verrait avec plaisir cesser les proscriptions Néapolitaines, et vous jugez bien que je ne parle pas seulement de l'opinion nationale qui a toujours été avec vous. Mais le résultat de ma conversation a été le conseil d'ajourner votre projet de voyage. Il serait possible de prendre l'affaire en plainte publique de ce qu'un étranger, et un homme tel que vous éprouve des obstacles au projet de visiter la France, car il n'existe pas d'Alien bill dans ce pays-ci. Mais outre qu'il faudrait à cet égard votre autorisation expresse, vous préférerez peut-être l'ajourner pour quelque temps. Vous savez, mon cher Général, combien en tout temps, et de toute manière, je serais heureux de réclamer vos droits, et de vous recevoir ici à La Grange. J'aime à penser que je n'attendrai pas longtemps cette satisfaction, et je vous renouvelle mes cordiales amitiés.

"LAFAYETTE."

The French Court and Government showed more obstinacy in preventing my entrance into France, than was evinced by Lafayette and his political friends in demanding permission for me to do so. Lafayette had requested me to forward him a letter that could be shown, in which I could express my desire to obtain a passport for Paris. Having received this letter, the following is what he wrote to me respecting this permission which Charles X. could never be prevailed upon to grant.

" Paris, Mai 31, 1829.

" Aussitôt que j'ai reçu votre lettre, mon cher Général, je l'ai montré au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, en réclamant la promesse qu'il m'avait faite, et l'approbation de sa main que je possède encore. Il m'y indiquait très obligeamment la marche que vous aviez à suivre auprès de la légation Française. Vous sentez bien que je ne puis pas admettre de restriction à la faculté qu'à tout étranger à se rendre sur la terre Française; le ministre ne cherche point à le nier; mais il m'a dit confidentiellement, qu'il avait quelques motifs pour souhaiter que vous différassiez un peu votre visite. Ces motifs n'ont rien de désobligeant pour vous, à beaucoup près, et quoique je ne les connaisse pas, je me suis chargé de vous exprimer entre nous ce vœu particulier. Il m'a paru que c'était une affaire de cinq à six semaines, et à moins que vous ne fussiez venu tout de suite, je n'y perdrai pas beaucoup, attendu que je compte après la session faire un court voyage dans la Haute Loire, où je suis né, et dans le département de l'Isère, où je suis attendu par ma chère petite-fille Natalie Périer. Je serai de retour à La Grange au 1er Septembre, et vous jugez avec quel plaisir nous vous y verrons, ma famille et moi. Mandez-moi, mon cher Général, quels sont vos arrangements en conséquence de cette lettre confidentielle, et recevez l'assurance de l'amitié que je vous ai vouée de tout mon cœur.

" LAFAYETTE."

"P.S.—Vous jugerez, mon cher Général, de la surprise que j'ai éprouvée en recevant votre dernière lettre.

J'avais droit de me plaindre, et je l'ai fait par une note au ministre : nous nous sommes vus depuis ; il m'a prié de vous prier de suspendre votre arrivée à Paris. J'ai voulu connaître le motif, mais en m'assurant qu'il n'y avait rien qui put vous être désagréable, ni à moi relativement à mon amitié pour vous, il n'a pas voulu me dire sa raison, qui tient peut-être à quelque puérilité de cour, ou à quelque rapport momentané avec votre ancien royal complice. J'ai pensé qu'il valait mieux consentir à vous transmettre le vœu que d'annoncer votre arrivée en contrariété de son désir exprimé très obligeamment. Bien entendu que si vous venez plutôt je n'en défendrais pas moins votre droit, et les nôtres. J'ai donc écrit la lettre que je lui ai montré pour être assuré de son approbation formelle, et d'un nouvel engagement. J'attends votre réponse, et à la lettre semi-ministérielle et au postcriptum qui est de moi seul, et je vous renouvelle l'expression de ma sincère amitié.

" LAFAYETTE."

On the perusal of such a letter it would be supposed that I finally obtained the leave I desired. But neither Lafayette, nor M. Mauguin, nor Benjamin Constant, who were at the head of the opposition, could obtain it, although they even threatened openly to tax the ministers with their narrowness in the Chambers. I therefore continued to spend my winter in London, and my summer in the Low Countries, and found myself in Brussels at the beginning of the spring of 1830. Lafayette had been received in triumph passing through Lyons ; and at Paris the National Guard had been disbanded. When I heard that Prince Polignac was

Prime Minister, I was in great hopes that France would rise. When he was charged to form the French Ministry, I received a letter from Lafayette beginning thus: "Mon cher Général, je ne sais plus où nous en sommes." On my part I replied, "Mon cher et respectable Général, j'espère beaucoup que M. de Polignac me fera avoir le plaisir, que je souhaite depuis long-tems, de vous embrasser à Paris."

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CHAPTER XX.

1830.

At Brussels I receive intelligence of the French revolution—Impression produced by this news upon Thibeaudeau and Siéyes—I leave Brussels for Paris without a passport—On arriving there I find Lafayette—Various conferences with him and other heads of the Liberal party respecting an expedition to Italy and another to Spain—Generals Lamarque and Haxo, Benjamin Constant and Laborde—I design going to Corsica, and from thence to proceed to Italy, but am dissuaded from doing so—Letter from the King to Lafayette—Expedition which was to take place in Italy and Spain with the knowledge of Lafayette and the Ministry—I am asked for a memorial which Louis Philippe sends to Francis I. of Naples—My interview with the Ministers Lafitte and Molé—Departure for London.

It is my intention in this chapter to enter into more minute particulars than I have hitherto done, because it appears to me useful to give exact information upon the march of events immediately after the French revolution.

On the 28th of July, whilst I sat writing in my room at Brussels, the landlord of the house, who was a native of France, entered in great agitation to tell me that Paris was in a state of revolt, and that the population was opposing the troops. I continued my writing, not putting any faith in such intelligence, which seemed to

me too good to be true. But when he showed me a letter, dated the day before, and directed from Paris, I ceased writing, and so great was my eagerness, that I could not stay at home, but hastened out to see Thibeaudeau and Siéyes. The former encouraged great hopes, which were in fact obtained; but the latter persisted in saying, that were the intelligence well founded, and the people victorious, they would certainly treat with the King, who would still keep his throne, so that the only result would be a change of ministry and some trifling concessions. All the French exiles at Brussels were waiting with contending feelings of hope and fear the result of this great struggle. When on the following days the particulars of this eventful revolution reached Brussels, I prepared to start for Paris. I entreated the Marchese di Prié, a Piedmontese exile, to ask his friend, the Governor of Brussels, to give me a passport. The Governor replied, that it was not in his power to grant me one without an authorization from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was then in Holland, and who would certainly not have granted such a permission, for he would have been fully aware of what my intentions must be in going to France in its present political state. This was enough to plunge me into great agitation, and to make me bethink myself how I could get to France, and with the least possible loss of time.

At the house of Lord and Lady Bolingbroke I met an English gentleman, whose name I do not recollect, but who offered not only to take me to Paris in the disguise of his valet, but whom I had great difficulty in persuading to let me defray my share of the expense of the journey. While, delighted at such an arrangement, I was preparing my baggage to depart, the same gen-

tleman entered the room and informed me, that to his great regret, he could not fulfil the offer he had made me, having been informed, that being a resident with his family in Brussels, he exposed himself by such a step to be expelled from thence. This communication plunged me into great perplexity, which fortunately was not of long duration, for the celebrated Italian oculist, Lusardi, who was established at Lisle, came to call on me before starting for Paris in his own carriage with post horses. We agreed to depart together the same evening, and as he was provided with a passport for himself and servant, it was settled that I should pass for the latter. My servant, a Belgian by birth, was to take my baggage by the diligence, and wait for me at the gates of Lisle, where I found him the next day. My trunks ought to have been examined at the Custom-house, but on Lusardi telling my name, the Custom-house officers, imbued with the enthusiastic patriotism of the day, refused to search my effects in honour of the principles I professed. On entering Lisle, I again beheld, for the first time after fifteen years, the tricolor flag under which I had fought in my early youth. I hastened on by the post towards Paris, and in a small town, the name of which has escaped my memory, whilst we were at dinner, some National Guards came up to us, suspecting that I might be the fugitive Prince Polignac; my friend laughed heartily as he told them my name. When we were about twenty leagues from Paris, the carriage broke down; as my impatience could ill brook the several hours' delay which this accident occasioned, I got into the first diligence that passed, and thus reached the ardently wished-for capital of France on the 6th of August.

General Lafayette, Commander-in-chief of the

National Guard, which in Paris alone amounted to eighty thousand men, in the course of a few days was established at the Hotel de Ville. It was difficult to get myself announced to him, as he was surrounded by a crowd of persons all eager to speak with him. Cobianchi, who had accompanied me, whispered my name to the officer on duty, and desired that he would announce me to General Lafayette. He immediately gave orders to admit me, and we thus met for the first time after nine years of uninterrupted correspondence. He informed me that not later than the 3rd of August, he had sent me an order for my passport to Belgium. It arrived in Brussels after my departure from that city, and I received it in Paris some time after; it was couched in the following terms :—

"Ministère des Affaires Etrangères,
"Paris, le 3 Août, 1830.

"A M. le Marquis de la Moussaye, Ministre de France, près les Pays-Bas.

"M. le Marquis,

"Le Lieutenant-Général Pépé, Néapolitain, qui se trouve en ce moment à Bruxelles, avait depuis longtemps exprimé le désir de se rendre à Paris. Il y avait même été autorisé par le Comte Portalis; mais certaines difficultés l'avaient empêché de profiter de cette autorisation. Ces difficultés n'existent plus, et je vous prie de vouloir bien délivrer à M. le Lieutenant-Général Pépé un passeport pour se rendre à Paris.

"Agréez, M. le Marquis, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

"ED. BIGNON."

I gave a copy of this letter to show how studiously prudent and ridiculously legal were the forms used by the directors of the revolution, at a moment when the blood which had caused it was scarcely dry.

Lafayette asked me to lend him my arm, and stood thus for several hours giving audience, or talking upon business with the members of the Provisional Government. He asked me to dine with him the next day that we might talk over the affairs of Italy. I availed myself of his invitation. The first thing he said to me was, "At least we have you in the midst of us." "Yes, but you should send me away as fast as possible," was my reply. He asked me what means I required, and I told him two thousand men, ten thousand muskets, and a couple of frigates to convoy the expedition. He thought me very moderate in my request; but asked for five or six days to reflect upon the matter, and to communicate it to the Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, then upon the eve of being proclaimed King of the French. Lafayette added, that as soon as this proclamation should have taken place, it would be proper for me to go and present my respects to the King. I promised the General that I would be guided by him.

Six days seemed an eternity to wait, recollecting as I did the adage of striking whilst the iron is hot. It was important that I should become acquainted with those who were at the head of the liberal party, and in the Chamber of Deputies. I went immediately to General Lamarque, who forgetting our former quarrel, received me with the utmost kindness, and warmly espoused the Italian cause. Through him, I became acquainted with General Haxo, an old companion-in-arms of my brother and myself in Spain, with whom I

became united by the firmest friendship which lasted until I was deprived of him by death, eight years after my arrival in Paris. He loved his country almost as much as I do mine, and its welfare was dearer to his heart than his own. It is well known that he was highly appreciated in the engineer department, in which perhaps he was the first officer in Europe. He was an ardent admirer of Italian literature, in which he was well versed, and he was also a great lover of our language. When of an evening, Pocrio, Mammiani, Oriccoli, Bozzetti, Leopardi, and other Italians were assembled together at my house, Haxo used to come and join them for the pleasure of hearing them converse. Sometimes we played at chess together till morning: on my part I did so, less out of love for the game than for the sake of talking with that excellent man. He informed me, that on the fall of the Empire, the first person who spoke of fortifying Paris had been the Duchess d'Augoulême. Haxo had never quitted the side of Napoleon during the Battle of Waterloo, and although to my mind he entertained too high an opinion of the genius of that great conqueror, believing him superior to Alexander; nevertheless, he said to me, that the battle had been lost by the Emperor's fault. Haxo did not admit the excuse advanced by the hero himself whilst at Saint Helena, that the badness of the weather had prevented the artillery from acting early in the morning. I renewed my acquaintance with the Deputy Mauguin, whom I had known in Barcelona in 1821. I went likewise for the first time to visit Benjamin Constant: he was surrounded by several persons, but on hearing my name he left them and hastened forward to embrace me. A few days after, I introduced to him Galeano, a former

deputy of the Cortes, and we had a long and animated conversation together. The great political question then was, whether to proceed immediately with the propaganda, or wait until an army of four hundred thousand men should have been formed: all were, however, of opinion that France should not long remain without Allies. Some Generals affirm that it was wiser to temporize, as the army only amounted at that moment to fifty thousand men with which to open the campaign. General Lamarque replied to to this, "If with time we increase our forces, the enemy will do so likewise."

The five days were no sooner elapsed than I presented myself to Lafayette. He told me that he had not been able to arrange my business, being so exceedingly occupied amongst; other things, with the nomination of the King of the French, but that, as soon as this was accomplished, he would speak about my expedition. Such loss of time caused me great vexation, but I was obliged to submit to it. I was introduced to General Delaborde, aide-de-camp of the King. One morning I found assembled at his house a knot of warm patriots, all of whom were of opinion that the propaganda should be followed up, and as soon as possible. They added that I was a treasure to France, for that, not having at that moment any great military force at her disposal, I could with a few troops cause an insurrection in Italy, which would serve to keep the Austrian forces in check. They were all so eager upon this subject, that there was a question of having me presented to the King, by Delaborde, who was on duty that day, so that the expedition to Italy might encounter no unnecessary delay. Whether to satisfy these patriots, or because he shared in their opinion, I know not; but the General

agreed to conduct me to the King. I thanked the assembly for their generous feelings in behalf of my country, but added, that I could not stir a step without the consent of Lafayette, who was warmly advocating the same cause. It was therefore settled, that as soon as Delaborde should have seen the King, he would call for me at my lodgings in the Rue de Rivoli, and that we should proceed together to Lafayette to conclude the matter. This was accordingly done, and on reaching the apartments of the latter, in the Rue de la Chaussée d'Antin, we sat round a large table covered with a cloth. Delaborde began to explain what had been deliberated upon that morning at his house, and whilst he was doing so, Lafayette kept treading on my foot under the table, and put a stop to the discourse, by saying, that he had already proposed the matter in question to the cabinet of ministers; and that he would further it to the very utmost of his credit, so as to ensure a favourable result. Delaborde and myself then took leave, but Lafayette signed to me to remain, and said to me, that although Delaborde was really an excellent man, yet he was so absent that he might injure rather than serve so important an undertaking as an expedition to Italy.

The month of August was far advanced when Lafayette told me that he would present me to the King, to avoid my going alone and thus not to give occasion to the newspapers to publish the audience I was to receive, and which it was better should not be made public. I was astonished at this, and surprised that Lafayette should not look upon such a precaution as strange, not to say superfluous. I did not let my feelings transpire, but after quitting Lafayette, I returned home and commenced packing up my trunks, for I now

began to lose all hope of obtaining the assistance which had been promised me. My intention was to proceed to Corsica, to assemble five or six hundred of those brave islanders, and land with them upon the Tuscan or Papal shores; from whence by forced marches I could reach the Abruzzi. At the period in which I am now writing, this appears like the raving of a man under an extraordinary illusion; but at that epoch I might easily have executed such a scheme which would most probably have been crowned with success. Lafayette, Lamarque, and Mauguin, would have given me letters to the civil and military authorities of Corsica, enjoining them to afford me every assistance instead of opposing my operations. At this moment when the government was secretly abetting the entrance of Mina into Spain, it could not oppose my attempt with any degree of efficacy. Neither the Grand Duke of Tuscany, nor the Pope, taken by surprise and ill-supported by their people, could have obstructed the road leading to the Tronto. From what occurred at a later period, it is very evident that on landing in Italy, far from being opposed, my band would have increased, so as to enable me to direct my steps upon Naples. The inhabitants of Bologna, and those of the Roman States, would have done then what they did alone, and unassisted, in the month of February of the following year.

In my own country, and still more in Calabria, my birth-place, I had acquired the reputation of being a most obstinate man; nevertheless, two or three times in the course of my life, I have acted so as not to warrant such an opinion, and in those cases I have invariably had cause to repent my moderation. In the meanwhile, Lafayette, and several persons of his party, advised me not to stir from Paris, on the plea that

the government would certainly afford me means of executing my intent, and that I should not venturously risk an enterprise of so much moment.

The person who really induced me to give up my intention of starting, was my learned friend Bozzelli, He insisted, that sooner or later the government must afford me the requisite assistance, and that if I did not value my own safety I ought at least to preserve myself for my country, which my loss would greatly injure. There are some cases, especially during a revolution, when two much prudence is injurious. I gave up my plan of going to Corsica, and relied entirely upon the friendship of Lafayette, who in that and during the following months, would have been of the greatest service to me, had his mind been as firm as his heart was upright.

It was not long before I perceived that every day diminished the probability of my being seconded by the French Government in my designs upon Italy. I was at the house of Lafayette at one of the *conversazione* which he was in the habit of giving every week. He called me apart to read a letter he had received: it was from the King, and ran as follows: "Mon cher Général, if faut ajourner la présentation de l'étranger, votre ami." I begged him to let me have it for a moment, that an English friend of mine and his wife, who were then present, might read it. He consented, upon condition that it should not be taken out of the room where we were. If I mistake not, it was on this same evening that Prince Talleyrand came to General Lafayette's. He had been just appointed Ambassador to England, and came to that *conversazione*, composed of the most noted liberals, as if to purge himself of his political sins. When the Prince had

quitted the room, Lafayette told me that it was more than thirty years since Talleyrand had set foot in his house. The letter which the General had given me to read, the fact of Prince Talleyrand being made Ambassador to England, and other circumstances which I had remarked being mentioned one after the other, made me lose all hope of being assisted by France.

I did not, however, desist from my endeavours, and as Lafayette was most affectionately attached to the Royal Family, I told him, that should I land in Naples, Francis I., constrained to bestow a Constitution upon the country, would unite his son, the Duke of Calabria, in marriage to one of the French Princesses. The following is the letter, which Lafayette wrote to me upon this proposal.

"Paris, 25 Août, 1830.

"Il y a un sort qui me poursuit, mon cher Général, dans mon désir de communication avec vous. J'ai envoyé hier chez vous, vous prévenir que ne pouvant pas me tirer d'ici, je vous y attendais. La commission a été mal faite, et pour réparer cet accident, je vous ai écrit bien vite en vous priant de venir passer avec nous votre soirée de Mardi. On m'avait assuré que vous demeuriez Rue de l'Université, No. 69, mon commissionaire a couru après vous sans vous trouver; aujourd'hui je n'ai qu'une resource, c'est de m'adresser à votre ami Bozzelli, qui vous fera parvenir ma lettre. Il n'y a pas de temps perdu pour la commission que vous m'avez donnée; elle a été reçue avec beaucoup de bienveillance, mais on m'a demandé quelques jours pour une raison que vous devinerez aisément, et que je vous expliquerai. Toute ma matinée a été tellement prise, que je n'ai pu aller à la Chambre, ni m'occuper d'autres choses que d'affaires intérieures. Je tâcherai

bien d'être arrivée Rue d'Anjou demain à cinq heures. Si vous ne pouvez pas y venir, et qu'il vous convient d'être ici après-demain, vendredi à huit heures du matin, nous pourrons causer ensemble.

"Recevez, mon cher Général, l'expression de ma bien constante amitié.

"LAFAYETTE."

I was careful not to miss this appointment, and my hopes began to revive again. General Lafayette's conversation was extremely agreeable to every one, but especially to myself whom he honoured with his most intimate friendship. One day, I recollect an Englishman, Colonel Webster, saying to me, "that old republican Lafayette, kept General Gérard for more than an hour kneeling at the foot of his bed, before he could bring him to consent that the Duke of Orleans should be named King of the French." Just suppressing the expression "old republican," I related this to Lafayette, who replied that the account was by no means exact, for he was not in bed, but reclining upon a mattrass thrown on the floor of the Hotel de Ville. Another of my English friends made me promise faithfully, that I would warn Lafayette not to rely entirely upon the King. On imparting this to the General, he said: "The English understand nothing of my affairs. Of all the men I know, Louis Phillipe has the most liberal principles, and only a few evenings back he said to me, that as a record of the happy days he had spent in America, he was desirous of holding a *conversazione* for the inhabitants of the United States, myself and my family." I asked Lafayette whether under the restoration he had conspired with the Duke of Orleans. He replied, that this could not have been the case, as he

had never seen the Duke of Orleans from the period of his republican campaigns, until he met him at the Hôtel de Ville, after the late revolution. Count Thibeaudeau and General Haxo both told me they wished to see General Lafayette, to converse with him upon the interests of their country, but that it was extremely difficult to meet with him. Lafayette to whom I communicated this wish, said that he should have great pleasure in conversing with such worthy men, and made an appointment with them through myself. Thibeaudeau, however, did not find him at the appointed time, which occasioned me the following letter from Lafayette.

"Mon cher Général,

"Il m'est arrivé une aventure très pénible avec M. Thibeaudeau. Au moment de sortir pour notre rendezvous, je n'ai eu ni voiture, ni chevaux. Le temps nécessaire pour rétablir cet oubli, m'a fait arriver comme il sortait de chez moi. J'ai écrit un billet d'excuse, et ja'i demandé un autre rendezvous. Mais voilà que je n'ai pas son adresse. Donnez-la, je vous prie, au porteur de ma lettre. Salut et amitié.

"LAFAYETTE."

"Samedi."

Seeing the high esteem in which Layfette held Thibeaudeau, I observed to him that, were the latter sent as Ambassador to Naples, his presence in that kingdom would be extremely useful, either as a warlike or a pacific minister, but I added that Thibeaudeau, having been one of the conventionalists who had voted the death of Louis XVI, perhaps it would be wiser not to propose it to the ministry. Lafayette replied that his having

voted according to his conscience might have been a crime in the eyes of Louis XVIII, but it certainly would not be so considered by the King of the French or his government.

I did not give General Lafayette a moment's rest, entreating him not to forsake the cause of Italy. I said, that it was his duty to advocate it, less as a philanthropist desirous of the welfare of human nature, than as a Frenchman, since France would derive immense advantage from the independence of Italy. The Spaniards were no less eager than myself to procure his protection so as to obtain some assistance to get up a revolution in Spain. But as they could not easily get aceess to him, they entreated me to plead their cause for them, and to beg that he would appoint a commission of five amongst the Spanish exiles in whom he could place the greatest confidence, that he might treat with them upon the best means of assisting the liberal party in Spain. By these means he would avoid being worried by different persons, and the exiles themselves would be upon better terms among themselves. Lafayette received this proposal favourably, and appointed a commission of five members, amongst whom were my most intimate friends, Isturiz and Galieno. After a few days, Lafayette begged me to bring the above mentioned members of the commission to him, and in my presence he informed them that he had succeeded in persuading the ministry to grant a million of francs for the expedition to Spain, and half a million for that of Italy. He added, that as the legitimists in both chambers might ask the ministers the cause of such an expenditure, Lafayette would reply that he had obtained the sum from various bankers, who were his political friends. As to the

means of covering the ministerial responsibility for the said sum, I did not enquire, as it in no way concerned me. On quitting the room of the General, the members of the Spanish Commission turned round and embraced me, and Isturiz and Galieno said: "if we succeed in Spain before you have been successful in Italy, we shall certainly not be deaf to your call, as we were at Madrid in 1822, but we will make common cause with the Italians."

I now at length hoped I had gained my object, and to avoid having any pecuniary responsibility, I proposed to nominate as the financial manager of the expedition, a brother of General Matthew Dumas, who was inspector of the National Guard under Lafayette, and who had been Minister of War under King Joseph in Naples. He held my expediton. so much at heart, that he was thinking of giving me his son, a captain in the army, to serve as my aide-de-camp. The brother of General Dumas, of whom I have spoken, had held the rank of Intendant at Naples under the French, which is equivalent to the same office as that of Prefect in France. One morning General Dumas, his brother and myself, entered the apartment of Lafayette, with a written account of my intended expedition, accompanied with every possible particular. I demanded two thousand men to be enrolled in Corsica, selecting officers and soldiers who had already served. In the event of my not finding the requisite number of men in Corsica, I would have completed the number in Provence or out of the regiments stationed in that military division. Besides these two thousand men conveyed by French men of war, I demanded ten thousand muskets.

But the hour of Italian freedom was not yet arrived.

It is well said: "Help yourself, and God will help you," and experience has firmly engraved this maxim on my mind.

But to say the truth, fortune has a great deal to do with human vicissitudes. Lafayette, whom I never lost sight of, said to me one morning as I entered: "J'ai de mauvaise nouvelles à vous donner, les ministres ne veulent plus rein faire." Although I had experienced many partial deceptions, I was by no means prepared for this complete delusion. Had the ministers really decided upon an expedition to Italy, and had they changed their intentions owing to some despatch from the Northern powers; or had only some of the ministers adhered to the wishes of Lafayette, whilst they were opposed by the majority of the Cabinet?

These are circumstances which I have never been able to discover, nor can I openly state what is my opinion, since I will not say that of which I am not entirely sure. The strangest part of the affair was what Lafayette related to me. He said that one of the ministers remarked, that when I was at Naples during the Constitution, I had opposed the demands of the deputation from Benevento, when it asked the annexation of that small State to Naples. I begged Lafayette to tell the would-be sage, that had I even committed such a blunder, it ought not to serve as an example to the more enlightened cabinet of the Tuileries. Secondly, that the inhabitants of Benevento had already shaken off the Papal yoke, and were far more free than the Neapolitans themselves, since they had no Prince and were governed as a Republic; and that at the time I had assured the said deputation, that I had forwarded my orders to the frontier, not to allow the passage of any of the Papal troops; and that such being the case, it

was needless to entertain a proposition which would entail upon us a useless correspondence, serving only to draw upon us the attention of the hostile powers, and affording them a pretext to turn against us. Finally, that the Two Sicilies had not the same advantage to expect from the revolution of Benevento as the French from that of Italy.

Two or three days afterwards, Lafayette told me, that the King of the French wished to see the kingdom of the Two Sicilies governed constitutionally, but that he could do no more to effect this object, than send his brother-in-law, Francis of Naples, a memorial, showing how liberal institutions might be established in the country, without either effusion of blood or political commotion. I felt that this mission would be mere loss of time, since liberal institutions are extorted by arms from Princes, and never obtained by reasoning and entreaties. Nevertheless, not to leave anything unattempted, I gave the General the following memorial, of which I have kept a copy:

"Dans l'état de détresse, de violence, et de compression morale, où se trouve actuellement le royaume des Deux Siciles, une nouvelle révolution dans ce pays est désormais devenue inévitable, et elle sera sanglante parce que l'irritation des peuples est à son comble, et que maintenant, il s'agit moins de sauver quelques principes, que de défendre le droit sacré de l'existence de la nation. Là tout le monde est persuadé qu'il n'y a lieu aucune transaction; il faut que le gouvernement et les gouvernés se rencontrent sur le champ de bataille pour décider la lutte. En 1820, le peuple montra à quel degré de civilisation, et de sagesse il était parvenu; il fit une de ces révolutions de salut qui visent aux choses

et non pas aux personnes. Il est à craindre qu'il ne se jette aujourd'hui dans une révolution de vengeance qui renverse en même temps les personnes et les choses.

" Ce fait n'a pas besoin de preuves, si le gouvernement de Naples n'en était lui-même convaincu, il ne déployerait pas cette immense étalage de persécution de toute espèce, dont il fait l'occupation exclusive de son existence pour contenir les commotions par la terreur, et pour reculer autant que possible devant l'abîme qui menace de l'engloutir. Se tourner vers les bayonettes étrangères pour comprimer l'élan des peuples, c'est reculer la difficulté, et non pas la résoudre.

" Ainsi le moyen unique de maîtriser une révolution éminente dans les Deux Siciles, est celui de la prévenir, en se rangeant du côté de la raison, et de l'inflexible nécessité; il faut que le Roi lui-même, en prenne franchement l'initiative, et qu'il donne la Constitution établie en France, sauf toujours les modifications qui pourraient être exigées par des circonstances de localité. Le Roi de Naples a certainement le droit de le faire, à moins qu'il ne veuille se considérer lui-même comme dépouillé de son autorité souveraine. La possibilité du succès lui est assurée, parce que la nation Française placée à la tête de la civilisation Européenne, riche de force, et de gloire, avec un Prince qui se trouve attaché à la dynastie de Naples par les liens du sang, ne refusera certainement pas de faire usage de la prépondérance morale et redoutable, pour le soutenir dans une aussi salutaire entreprise.

" On devrait commencer par renvoyer immédiatement le Ministère Néapolitain actuel, et par lui en substituer un autre composé d'hommes dévoués à la cause de la liberté, et de la dynastie, qui puissent inspirer de la confiance au peuple, et déterminer les

moyens les plus prompts. M. Ricciardo qui a plusieurs fois exercé les fonctions de ministre, pourrait en être le président. Un nouvel ambassadeur Français serait envoyé à Naples, qui réunissant en lui énergie et libéralité de principes aiderait le gouvernement de ses conseils. La nomination d'un nouveau diplomate Néapolitain compléterait l'ensemble de ses premières opérations.

" Une seule question se présente, et elle est forte et positive. Dans ces momens de transition, comment être sûr que le peuple impatient ne s'élance dans un mouvement prématuré, et en se livrant à des désordres ne dérange pas le plan conciliateur qu'on se serait tracé pour atteindre le but sans aucune convulsion politique. Cette difficulté n'est pas insurmontable. Le Général Guillaume Pépé se chargerait de calmer l'effervescence des esprits, et éloignerait tous les obstacles avec pleine certitude de succès. On connaît bien l'ordre qu'il sut maintenir dans le royaume en 1820 et 1821. La dynastie serait ainsi à l'abri de toute atteinte. Ce qui est nécessaire de remarquer en conclusion, est que le temps presse, et que si le gouvernement de Naples ne court pas rapidement au-devant des dangers, il s'y perdra sans ressource."

I was informed some time after, that the above note had been forwarded by the King and Queen of the French to King Francis of Naples. This Prince was confined to his bed by illness when it was given him. He replied, "Thank Pépé for his good intentions, but the danger is by no means so near as he supposes." It was the will of fortune that the King should be right, when he laughed at me and my prophecies. Before long, King Francis, whom Lafayette was wont to call

my royal accomplice, died. I had never expected that friendly counsels, unaccompanied by threats, could produce any effect upon the King of Naples. Nevertheless, I continued to flatter myself that the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian Cabinets, by their conduct towards France, and the ill-humour of the Tories at the Revolution of July, would have driven France to have adopted the propaganda, as a means of preventing the nation from being left to stand alone against the Holy Alliance. The worthy Lafayette flattered himself with the same hopes, and exerted all his immense influence to bring me in contact with the most powerful of the ministers, Lafitte and Count Molé. The former received me with affection, the latter with courtesy. How greatly Lafayette used his best exertions—which were unfortunately unavailing—to second my plans, may be seen in the following letter:

"Paris, ce 28 Septembre, 1830.

"J'ai fait votre commission, mon cher Général, des les premiers jours, et M. Lafitte m'a répondu que vous le trouverez tous les jours chez lui vers cinq heures précises. Il ne vous propose pas les heures du matin, puisque il va de bonne heure chez le roi. Salut et amitié de tout mon cœur.

"LAFAYETTE."

Lafitte told me that he would find the money for my expedition, if Lafayette, and still more, political circumstances, and further the demeanour of the northern sovereigns, should induce Louis-Philippe to permit my landing in Italy. Count Molé, Minister of Foreign Affairs, received me twice, early in the morning, so that

I might avoid meeting the ministers of the northern powers. He was extremely frank and courteous in his bearing, and told me it was his opinion, that France ought neither to promote the propaganda, nor to allow the other powers to do so. According to the Minister Molé, no government should interfere with the internal affairs of other nations. By an adherence to this principle, as will be seen hereafter, Italy would have been saved. The second time I saw the Count, he said to me, "Should you see Lafayette this morning, tell him that I have received telegraphic intelligence of the entrance of Mina into Spain; but if by any chance he is unsuccessful and should re-enter France, I shall be compelled to assign him a residence in a department very far from the Pyrenees."

In the midst of many events which agitated me, I one day happened to dine with the beautiful, amiable, and highly-accomplished Lady Blessington. Among many enlightened men, I met there Lord John Russell and Monsieur Mignet. I was seated near a young Lord, who related that Charles X. when he landed in England, was received at the house of his father, to whom he said, among other things, that his ministers, instead of having caused his fall, had retarded it by several months, because the French were become ungovernable. To convince this young Lord that King Charles was in the greatest error, I asked the opinion of each of the company. The opinion was unanimous, that if Charles X. had not promulgated the fatal *ordonnances*, he would have died on the throne, and reposed at St. Denis.

Finding that I was only wasting my time in Paris, I decided upon going to London, where the Whigs and

Radicals were in great hopes of driving out the Tory ministry. I was bent upon trying to obtain from the new ministry, or otherwise from private speculators, the means of executing my enterprise, which at that period might have been attempted with a thousand men. The political atmosphere was so impregnated with storms, that a war seemed inevitable: such an event must infallibly have been of great advantage to miserable Italy.

CHAPTER XXI.

1830.

My arrival in London—My first occupations in that capital—Public spirit in England after the French revolution—My letter to General Lamarque as to the opinions of the most conspicuous Liberals in Parliament—Opinion of Lord Brougham—Promise made me by the Whigs in the event of their return to office—I return to Paris—I persuade several of the French and English Liberals to open a correspondence—Letter sent me by General Lamarque to show to Mr. Hume; reply of that Member—Dislike of General Haxo to the English—I receive intelligence of an expected insurrection at Modena and Bologna.

I REACHED London in the middle of October 1830. My first care was to acquaint myself with the effect that had been produced by the French Revolution upon the public mind in England; and my second, to learn what the Whigs and Radicals, who formed the parliamentary opposition, and who, it was hoped, would soon take the reins of government, thought upon the matter. Lafayette, Lamarque, Mauguin, and others, had desired me to inform them quickly of the political movements in England, which were likely to be of interest in France. My third object was to see if I could meet with any capitalists willing to risk the sum requisite to undertake an expedition to Italy, the successful result of which would have assured the most

liberal interest. I was happy to remark, that the Revolution of July had done more towards the progress of public spirit in England, than half a century would have effected in the regular march of things. I do not exaggerate when I say this. If, a few days prior to the French Revolution, any one had asserted or predicted that before long England would have had about one million two hundred thousand electors, he would have been regarded as out of his senses.

Alderman Wood invited me to dine at his house, with eight other aldermen, who were discussing the question, whether the King could accept the invitation to dine with the Lord Mayor. The prevailing opinion was, that he would not go; as the citizens would inevitably insult the Duke of Wellington, who would be obliged to accompany the King in his capacity of Prime Minister. Amongst the Liberal members of the two Houses whom I went to see, were Mr. Brougham, Lord Nugent, Mr. Hume, and Lord Grey. His Lordship was extremely reserved in what he said to me; but not so the others, who were so animated in favour of France, as to forget their eternal jealousy of the aggrandizement of that nation. These gentlemen, seeing that they would soon come into power—thanks to the French Revolution—and that they would then be able to bring about the reform they were so desirous of obtaining, were anxious that France should consolidate the revolution she had so gloriously accomplished in the short space of three days, as fears were entertained that she would be attacked by the Allied Powers.

The following is the letter I wrote to General Lamarque, according to the promise I had made him:

"Dear and respected General,

"I am about to give you the most minute details of several conversations I have held with various conspicuous members of the English parliamentary opposition, as well as the observations I have been enabled to make upon the political views of this powerful empire.

"On the 20th of last month, Mr. Brougham bade me assure General Lafayette, that France had nothing to fear from England, since the English ministry is by no means strong enough to defy the opposition, which is supported by public opinion, and certainly extremely opposed to war. I addressed the following question to Mr. Brougham: 'Do you suppose that England would go to war with France, in the event of the latter country proceeding to Belgium, and even to the Rhine, declaring solemnly, however, that she will not pass that river?' The learned gentleman replied to this question, 'I do not believe that we should go to war with France in such a case.' 'Do you suppose,' I resumed, 'that the Duke of Wellington will long remain Prime Minister?' 'He will only keep in office,' was Mr. Brougham's reply, 'upon condition of declaring himself in favour of reform, and not interfering in the affairs of France.' I put the same question to Mr. Hume, Lord Nugent, and several other Members of Parliament, all of whom agreed with Mr. Brougham, with the exception of General Sir Robert Wilson. Lord Grey, although with the greatest civility, refused to impart to me his ideas upon the subject.

"I have referred all this to General Lafayette, who

will be able to tell you what more was contained in three letters I wrote to him, at the desire of Mr. Hume and Mr. Brougham. The assertions contained in them were fully verified.

"After the King's speech, Brougham, in the House of Commons, opposed the idea of the Ministry, of adopting even an amicable interference in the affairs of France. When they became aware that the French Government inclined to such an intervention, they were extremely mortified. I told my political friends that they would do well to open a correspondence with the most influential of the French deputies. Brougham approved this idea, and told me that it would be the greatest satisfaction to him to open a correspondence with Lafayette, Lamarque, and Mauguin. Hume told me the same, giving me a letter for Lafayette. Hume wished to know, whether the English Ministry had written to that of France, to prevent the Spanish exiles from being allowed to cross the Pyrenees, because in that case the English opposition would censure the Ministry for having meddled with the affairs of other countries.

"Brougham threw much blame upon the French ministry, for not having been firm enough to prevent the Spaniards from assembling together and crossing the Pyrenees; or sufficiently liberal to afford them such assistance as would ensure the success of their enterprise; regarding the French Government as having needlessly compromised itself in the eyes of the Allies.

"Whether the King of England and the Duke of Wellington would have exposed themselves to serious outrages, by going to the dinner of the Lord Mayor; or whether this supposition was exaggerated so as to

intimidate the landed interest, is a problem difficult of solution. I heard the matter discussed at a meeting of aldermen and of members of parliament, and they all seemed to believe that it would have been impossible to avoid serious disturbances.

"At this moment the English people seem to have found out that they are far more miserable than the French, and they are burning to follow the example set them by the Parisians in the memorable days of July. I do not myself think that they will ever bring such a project to bear, especially if the government acts with due wisdom. In this country, not only the nobles but all persons in wealthy circumstances, including the radicals, dread the very possibility of any popular movement, for they do not look upon the lower classes in England as being equally civilized as those of France. Brougham said to me, that ardently as he desired reform he would give it up, if it could not be obtained without a revolution.

"I am convinced that both Whigs and Tories have the desire of opposing the aggrandizement of the French territory; but I believe, at the same time, that a war with France would, at this moment, be extremely unpopular in England, and that it would be opposed by the majority of the Commons. Finally, I will tell you, my dear General, that when there was a current report of your being made Minister of War, all the liberals I have mentioned, manifested the warmest satisfaction. I shall return to Paris in the course of a few days, and will then tell you many things which would considerably exceed the limits of a letter.

"Your affectionate and devoted,

"W. PÉPÉ."

"London, November 10, 1830."

After writing to General Lamarque, and ascertaining whether the English speculators were disposed to furnish the necessary means for an expedition composed of at least a thousand men, I was told that if a Whig ministry was formed, and manifested a wish to see a rising in Italy, I could obtain money, men, arms, and ships, from private speculators, but not otherwise. The fall of the Tory Ministry was expected by every one, and in fact it soon occurred. But in my uncertainty, I could not remain any longer in England to see this expectation realized. I took leave of my political friends, who, like all men who are not yet in office, made me the most brilliant promises in favour of the Italian cause, in the event of the Tory Ministry being superseded by a Whig or Radical one; then quitting London I returned to Paris.

I found the state of political affairs just the same as at my departure; and to do what little I could for the advantage of the cause of liberty, I endeavoured to open a correspondence between the French and English liberals of note. To give a more direct idea of the utility which might have been derived from such a correspondence, as well as of the state of the political mind towards the end of the year 1838, I must submit to the reader one of the letters which were to be shown, written to me by Lamarque, to send to London, as well as the answer of Hume to this epistle.

"Paris, le 11 Décembre, 1830.

"A M. le Général Pépé.

"Mon cher Général,

"L'insurrection des Polonais est un grand malheur s'ils ne sont pas soutenus. Car si les forces de la

Russie ne suffisent pas pour les écraser, les armées Autrichiennes ne tarderont pas à marcher au secours des oppresseurs, et tout germe de liberté et de résistance sera étouffé à jamais dans cette partie du monde. La France seule ne peut rien, mais si l'Angleterre voulait! La France et l'Angleterre réunis bouleverseraient le monde. Pourquoi M. Brougham ne ferait-il pas sentir à ses collègues que l'intérêt de l'Europe exige la résurrection de la Pologne, et qu'on établisse cette barrière entre la barbarie et la civilisation? Mais il ne faudrait pas perdre un instant: il faudrait qu'une escadre Anglaise et Française se présentât dans vingt jours devant Constantinople, et qu'elle obligeât les Turcs à recommencer la guerre, et que pénétrant dans la Mer Noire, elle leur en facilitât les moyens. Il faudrait que des négociations engageassent les Perses à se reporter sur l'Araxe, et à reprendre les provinces qu'ils ont été obligés de céder. Il faudrait enfin que Bernadotte voulût reconquérir ce qui appartenait aux Suédois, et qu'il se montrât ainsi digne du trône sur lequel il s'asseoit.

" Il serait facile à l'Angleterre de contenir l'Autriche en menaçant de faire soulever l'Italie et la France, en même temps envahissant la Belgique et les provinces Rhénanes, occuperait aussi la Prusse pour l'empêcher d'aller au secours des Russes.

" Dix mille hommes donnés à Mina, deux ou trois vaisseaux de guerre qu'iraient chercher à Terceira les partisans de Donna Maria, occuperaient assez la Péninsule pour n'en avoir rien à craindre. Ainsi les deux principes se heurteraient à la fois dans toutes les parties de l'Europe, et le succès de la liberté, et de la civilisation ne saurait être douteux; mais pour parvenir à ce but, il faut que l'Angleterre se dégage de ses

vieilles préventions, il faut qu'elle ne craigne pas de voir la France forte et puissante, qu'elle renonce à ses craintes puériles de nous voir maîtres de l'Escaut, et qu'elle se dise bien, qu'en battant le colosse Russe, qui dans le moment menace plus l'Orient que l'Occident de l'Europe, nous servirions plus ses intérêts que les nôtres.

" Pardon, mon cher Général, de ces lignes que je trace à la hâte, et que je n'ai pas même le temps de relire; je suis sûr qu'elles trouveront de l'écho dans votre cœur, qui comme le mien ne bat que pour le patriotisme et la liberté!

" Recevez l'assurance de tout l'intérêt que je vous porte, et de l'attachement d'un Français qui est demi Néapolitain.

" Votre affectionné camarade,
" Lieutenant-Général Député,
" LAMARQUE."

The following is the answer of Mr. Hume to two of my letters, one from Lafayette, and another from General Lamarque. What an immense difference between the characters of Lamarque and Hume! The Englishman, sedate and positive; Lamarque, full of mind and imagination! The Wellington ministry had fallen, and was succeeded by one having Lord Grey at its head. Brougham, elevated to the Peerage, was made Lord Chancellor.

" London, December 29, 1830.

" To General Pépé.

" My dear General,

" I have received both your letters, and also the letters of Lafayette and Lamarque.

"I have delayed an answer until I could clearly ascertain the course which our new ministry were likely to take under the circumstances which you supposed likely to occur in Europe; and I think the opinion I shall now offer may be taken as correct.

"Lord Grey's Ministry is pledged to propose Reform in Parliament, by which the elective franchise shall be extended, and the popular influence in the House of Commons increased, to counteract the influence of the aristocracy, which for ages has directed and ruled in the councils of the nation; and the result has been that measures generally have supported the power, influence, and profit of the aristocracy at the expense of the millions.

"The large establishments maintained, and the excessive taxation for their support, have gradually reduced the labouring classes in England to a state of great privation and suffering, and also press so much on the middling classes, that great discontent prevails, and has been manifested in the eastern, southern, and western counties of England, by riotous assemblies of the people, the destruction of agricultural machinery, and the burning of corn stacks and other agricultural produce.

"There are now in the prisons of England arrested for these violations of the laws upwards of a thousand persons, and special commissioners are now sitting for their trial, and the greater part of them will be transported as convicts to Botany Bay.

"A degree of comparative quiet now exists; but unless there is relief from our present taxation, a reduction of our large Church Establishment, and a reform in our public establishments, I do not expect we shall have quiet for any great length of time.

"The ministry, therefore, are pledged to bring forward such reform as shall satisfy the people. They are pledged also to a reduction of expenditure in every practicable way, and also not to meddle with the internal affairs of any other country.

"As the country is unanimous in its determination not to interfere with any other nation as to the kind of Government they may think proper to adopt, you may receive as an answer to the questions you have put, that our ministry will not interfere with the Belgians, or any other nation, in whatever measures they may adopt for their own internal government.

"You ask what would be the conduct of the British Government if France should take possession of Belgium? The union of Belgium with France would not be well received in this country; but she might occupy the fortresses of Belgium to protect them against an invading enemy; and, provided she declared her intention of giving up the fortresses on the conclusion of hostilities, no objection on our part would take place.

"It is natural in you to expect that England should aid in the struggles making for freedom in Belgium, Poland, and every other State; but the pressure of our taxation, and domestic discontent, and distress, must prevent any ministers from interfering as you point out.

"'Tis true that France and England united in any contest would be most formidable to the whole of Europe, but the situation of our country at the present time must prevent our ministry from doing more than wishing well to the progress of freedom.

"The Duke of Wellington's Administration were certainly pledged to the Holy Alliance to favour the attack upon the independence of Belgium; and fortu-

nately for the liberties of Europe, the Wellington Administration is no more; and his conduct, since his resignation, has certainly sunk him low in the opinion of the public, and there is little chance of his ever being minister again.

"The struggle now going on in Poland interests every friend of freedom; and whilst I deplore the disinclination and inability of England to join with France in supporting the glorious revolution they have begun, I am confident that England will not interfere for or against the Poles.

"The British nation are as zealous in favour of the Poles as they were in favour of the French nation after their glorious success in July last; but they cannot do more, in the present state of England, than wish them well.

"The plans proposed by General Lamarque, in his letter to you, would, if carried into effect, give full employment to the Russians, Prussians, and Austrians, and leave the Poles triumphant and at liberty to settle their own affairs; but it would be a perfect delusion in you to expect that any one of the measures which you suggest, could be carried into effect.

"I have consulted several of my political friends, who all concur that France should consolidate and settle her own government before she meddles with that of any other; at the same time, I shall be most happy to see France taking the commanding station she is entitled to hold in Europe, and give every opposition she can offer to the interference of the military despots on the continent, with Belgium, Poland, Switzerland, or any other State.

"I have shown General Lamarque's letter to Lords Grey and Palmerston; and although I am not informed of any observations they have made thereon, I am

satisfied I have stated to you the course they must follow in their dealings with the affairs of Europe.

" In England the great mass of the community are now awakening from the state of delusion in which they have long been, respecting their own government, and are loud in their demands for Reform as a means of obtaining a cheap government, more under the influence of the people than of the aristocracy; and if their wishes are not conceded by the aristocracy, you may expect a change by physical force.

" The people of England are attached to monarchy, but they have paid so dear for its support, that they now look for the interference of the voice of the people to check the monopoly which the aristocracy have so long had of power and profit.

" I shall write to Generals Lafayette and Lamarque in a few days, and be happy at all times if I can afford them any information of what is going on here.

" I remain,

" Your obedient servant,

(Signed) " JOSEPH HUME."

This correspondence between the most noted French and English liberals gave satisfaction to many, although General Haxo was not of the number. He hated England and the English; and when I used to tell him that such a feeling was unworthy of his mind, he replied, " Be quiet, for you have so completely the appearance of an Englishman as to be taken for one when you walk about the streets of Paris." These words sounded harshly to my ear; for the greater the misfortunes of my native land, the more I honour myself, first in being an Italian, and next that I am a Calabrese.

About this time several Italians of little note arrived

in Paris, propagating the intelligence of a speedy insurrection in the Duchies of Modena and Bologna. I did not pay much attention to such reports, first, because I was unacquainted with those who spread them, and secondly, because it never agreed with my views to suppose that a successful movement in Italy could have its commencement in those provinces. These reports had been repeated to General Lamarque who imagining that I encouraged such an outbreak, said to me: "An insurrection at Modena would soon be quelled by an Austrian regiment, and one at Bologna as easily put down by a brigade."

One day a brave old officer of the kingdom of Italy, Colonel Ulinò, called upon me and began to speak of the insurrection of Bologna, as an impending event. I was not personally acquainted with this officer, who presented me with a letter of introduction from a countryman of his, of whom I had not a very high opinion. The conversation of Colonel Ulinò did not prove his mind equal to his military merit, and induced me to pay little attention to what he was saying. Besides, with the best desire of assisting the Bolognese in their undertaking, I really had not the means. If, indeed, I had had at my disposal a thousand or even a smaller number of men, I should have regarded landing in Calabria as a more prudent step, in Tuscany or at Civita Vecchia, whence I could have passed immediately into the Abruzzi.

Thus, between the uncertainty and the desire of landing in Italy, and the vain attempts made in every direction to effect my purpose, the year 1830 passed away. This year was rendered memorable by the French revolution, which had shaken England, Belgium, Switzerland and Poland, and which had caused strong commotion in the two Peninsulas.

CHAPTER XXII.

1831.

In England the Tory Ministry is succeeded by the Whigs—Lafayette gives up the command of the National Guard—I start for London—Letter from General Lamarque to Mr. Hume—I receive intelligence of the revolution which had burst out in Central Italy, and I quit Calais for Paris, from whence I proceed to Marseilles—At Lyons an expedition is preparing to proceed into Savoy—My design of embarking for Italy—I attempt to embark between Toulon and Hyères—I am concealed by the Mayor of the latter place—The vessel is ready to convey me thence, when I learn that the Austrians have invaded Central Italy.

At Paris, when I learned that the Tory ministry no longer existed, and that the Whigs were in power, I hoped to obtain from them the support of which I stood in need. I indulged snch illusions because the human mind is blinded and dazzled by violent passions, and not from any defect of sagacious foresight, or from a want of knowledge of the political system of that nation. The French Government began to display considerable tenacity in following a course which was disapproved by the mass of the nation, both in its interior and foreign policy. The ministry found itself powerful enough to force Lafayette by means of subterfuges to give in his resignation as Commander-in-chief of the National

Guard, which they immediately accepted. This occurred shortly after the General had exposed himself to the loss of his popularity by consenting to further the secret views of the government, and by co-operating to save from the fury of the multitude the former ministers of Charles X. Although they were not sentenced to death by the Chamber of Peers, they were likely to have been torn to pieces by the people and the National Guard, had not Lafayette interfered to calm the fury against the obnoxious ex-ministers. When I beheld the rapid and unexpected change in the demeanour of the French Government, I felt all my hopes of assistance at their hands dissipated, and I determined upon again crossing the channel to make another attempt on the Whigs.

I found the conversation of General Lamarque produce the effect of a momentary balm poured upon my wounds. He was one of the few eminent Frenchmen who were just towards the Neapolitans. How often did I employ my art to lead him to repeat to me the ever agreeable opinion which he was used to express? "If," said he, "the Neapolitans evince some hesitation on the first appearance of danger, as soon as they are in the midst of it, *il n'y a pas de danger au-dessus de leur courage.*" As Lamarque had attacked and taken by their assistance the almost impregnable island of Capri, and had fought with them against the English in various parts of the Peninsula, his opinion seemed to me calculated to combat the unjustly unfavourable one manifested against my countrymen. At that moment Lamarque thought that the French Government could not long maintain its present course of constitutional policy. He advised me to go again to England, saying that on my return he hoped I should

find the system of Government changed. He desired me to convey the following letter to Mr. Hume. I insert it here, to give an insight into the political opinion of those times, as well as of the honourable and brave spirit of the French General.

" Paris, 30 Janvier, 1831.

" A M. Hume, membre de la Chambre des Communes.

" Mon cher Monsieur,

" L'honorable Général Pépé veut bien se charger de la réponse à la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 30 Décembre.

" Oui, nous avons tous les deux à cœur la cause de la liberté, et d'un gouvernement qui la garantit. Mais notre position respective nous fait voir l'état de l'Europe sous un aspect différent. Défendu par les flots, ayant de vieilles institutions qui ont poussé des racines jusqu'au centre de la terre, surchargée il est vrai, d'une aristocratie puissante, mais d'une aristocratie qui a du patriotisme, et de la nationalité, l'Angleterre n'a rien à craindre des puissances étrangères, aucune d'elles ne viendra s'immiscer dans vos dissensions intestines : vous pouvez renverser des trônes, changer des dynasties, sans que la Sainte Alliance vienne vous imposer des lois !

" Il n'en est pas de même de la France ; le despotisme nous assiége des Pyrénées à Dunkerque, et ses maximes trouvent de nombreux échos dans notre noblesse qui est Russe, Autrichienne, Prussienne, et qui depuis 1789 a oublié qu'elle avait été française. Dépouillés de nos frontières naturelles, nous avons été privés des

barrières artificielles que nous avait données Louis XIV, et par cinq grandes issues. L'ennemi sans faire un seul siège peut arriver dans huit ou dix jours dans notre capitale, et dans huit à neuf heures à Lyon, la seconde ville du royaume.

" Un tel état de choses est intolérable ; il nous oblige à avoir sur pied une armée immense, à être enfin comme une sentinelle qui doit toujours craindre d'être surprise. Cela vous explique une partie de l'impatience des vrais Français, leur indignation de voir sous un nouveau gouvernement le respect des traités consentis par la dynastie que nous avons chassée, leur mécontentement de ce qu'on ne profite pas des circonstances uniques.

" Nul doute que si au lieu d'envoyer à Londres, un grand chambellan de Charles X, un vieux diplomate qui s'était habitué à Vienne à ramper devant les grandes puissances, d'où dépendait le sort de son maître qui était intéressé par amour-propre à maintenir les actes de 1814 et de 1815, nous avions confié nos intérêts à un Français de la nouvelle France, qui eût senti ses besoins, et qui eût été pénétré de sa dignité, nous eussions obtenu de reprendre le rang que nous devons occuper parmi les nations. L'Europe ne peut rester constituée telle qu'elle l'est ; on n'a pas plus respecté les arrêts de la nature que l'intérêt des peuples. La guerre des trente ans est peut-être terminée, mais le traité de Westphalie n'est pas fait. Les Piémontais doivent être séparés de la France par les neiges éternelles des Alpes, les petits états d'Italie doivent renaître à l'indépendance. La barrière doit repasser le Rhin, la Prusse ne doit plus être de Mamel à Luxembourg et Givet une ligne d'étapes pour les Cosaques.

" Ce redressement de tant de torts, n'exigerait soyez

en sûr, que la volonté ferme de la France et de l'Angleterre.

" Vos journaux nous accusent d'avoir pour vous des sentiments de haine lorsque nous déplorons les fautes de votre gouvernement; n'en croyez rien! j'admire votre patriotisme, votre noble caractère, le courage de vos soldats, avec qui je me suis quelquefois mesuré, et je ne désire que de voir les deux nations unies par leur intérêt commun. Je suis convaincu qu'il dépend d'elles, des efforts seuls de leur diplomatie de sauver la Pologne, de remettre dans de justes limites ce colosse qui touchant d'une main au Golfe Persique, et de l'autre aux rives de l'Oder, menace à la fois la civilisation de l'Europe et vos possessions de l'Inde. Je ne repétérai pas ce que j'ai dit à ce sujet dans un de mes derniers discours à notre Chambre, et j'ajouterai que cette Russie, qu'on croit la domaine tranquille du despotisme, renferme de grands seigneurs qui sont dans la position où étaient nos barons des 12e et 13e siècles. Ils se lassent d'être envoyés en Sibérie au premier signe de l'autocrate, de savoir que leurs fils peuvent être dégradés, mis à la queue d'une compagnie et soumis au châtiment du knout. Les serfs même rougissent de leur dégradation; il semble qu'il sort du sein de toute la terre une émanation de liberté! Il semble que l'espèce humaine est arrivée à une nouvelle période, et qu'on ne pourra plus la faire reculer sur le passé.

" Nul doute que le ministère de Wellington n'eût renoué la Sainte Alliance, et lancé ses armées sur nous. Le généralissime eut volontiers compromis le sort de l'Angleterre pour ajouter quelques palmes à ses palmes; comme militaire je l'aurais désiré, car j'ai la ferme conviction que sa gloire est usurpée, et que ce fils de la victoire, est le fils de nos sottises.

"On fait un grand éloge de Lord Grey, et Lord Palmerston, de Lord Althorpe, du Marquis de Blandford, tout le monde rend une justice éclatante à leur talent et à leur éloquence; mais nous craignons qu'ils ne soient un peu dominés par la tradition aristocratique. Il est si difficile de tirer le char d'une ornière profonde! C'est en le traînant dans cette ornière qu'on verrait avec peine en Angleterre la réunion de la Belgique à la France. On y pense toujours à l'Escaut rivale de la Tamise, à l'impossibilité d'établir une croisière entre les deux fleuves, et on oublie que l'invention des bateaux à vapeur a changé toute question, et rendu hostile pour vous tous les points de nos côtes de Dunkerque à Cherbourg.

"Je crois donc qu'il serait d'une sage politique de laisser la France s'adjoindre la Belgique. Ouvrez la carte et vous verrez que Bruxelles tient à Paris bien plus que Lyon, bien plus que Bordeaux. La force des choses nous y ramènerait, en traversant peut-être des torrents de sang, et aujourd'hui si l'Angleterre ne s'y oppose pas, la volonté des deux peuples peut l'accomplir, sans qu'il en coûte une larme à l'humanité.

"Je vous remercie, mon cher monsieur, de m'avoir autorisé par votre lettre à correspondre avec un homme que je considère comme une des illustrations de l'Angleterre, que j'ai cherché à voir dans mon dernier voyage à Londres, et à qui je ne manquerai pas d'offrir une main amie, si les circonstances m'y ramènent jamais.

"Agréez l'assurance de ma profonde estime,

"Le Lieutenant-Général, Député,

"MAX. LAMARQUE."

I had this and several other letters from the French liberals to the whigs and radicals of England, towards which country I now turned my steps. An English friend of mine, who had business to transact at Brussels, accompanied me on my journey. We reached Lisle together, and I determined upon awaiting there his return from the Belgian capital. On the second day after my arrival there, I read in the papers that Bologna, and various other cities in the Roman States had risen and had shaken off the Papal yoke without any opposition. I would certainly not have employed any forces I could have assembled in an expedition to Italy, to assist a revolution broken out in the Bolognese territory; but as one had occurred in the night of the 4th of February, it became the duty of every Italian to co-operate in its support. I immediately wrote to Cobianchi at Paris, requesting him to write to me at Calais, and to give me such particulars of this insurrection, as had not been contained in the papers, that I might judge of the necessity either of continuing my journey to England or of returning to Paris before proceeding to Marseilles. Not only Cobianchi, but several other Italians wrote me that no time was to be lost, for that the whole of central Italy was up in arms. I therefore proceeded immediately to Paris, having first confided the letters entrusted to my care to my travelling companion, who promised to deliver them in London. Having desired him to recommend the Italian cause warmly to my political and parliamentary friends, we parted.

It was the opinion of Lamarque, that the fund raised in behalf of the Poles ought to be employed to assist the Italian revolution, which, if it had acquired consistency, would have tended to knit together the people of

the South of Europe, who would have been able to render efficacious aid to Poland. Lafayette was of a totally opposite opinion. Lamarque in the presence of my friend Bozzelli, made me an offer of money, from his private fortune, to further my views in Italy. I thought it right not to accept his offer, as the sum in question was too much for him to give, and too little to ensure success to the enterprise. However, both this officer and Lafayette gave me letters to their political friends at Marseilles and Corsica, whom they warmly urged to facilitate my proceeding to Italy. Neither Lamarque, Lafayette, nor any other French deputy, could suppose that the French Government would interfere to prevent my departure from France. The following are the friendly letters written to me by Lafayette and Lamarque, in which they express their good wishes for the liberty of Italy.

"Paris, le 20 Février, 1831.

"Vous allez donc partir, mon cher Général, et je ne m'en étonne pas; car l'heure de l'indépendance et de la liberté vient de sonner pour votre belle et intéressante Italie. J'ai été le témoin et le confident de vos vœux et de vos efforts patriotiques. La pureté de votre caractère est connue de tout le monde: tel va être le signe distinctif de cette nouvelle révolution, pure d'excès, brillante de générosité qui se prépare pour l'Europe. Je joins ici quelques lettres pour des amis Français sur votre route: une fois arrivée en Italie, votre nom est un excellent passeport, du moins, auprès des patriotes. Il faut que je me rende à la chambre pour la séance extraordinaire d'aujourd'hui, dimanche.

Recevez donc ici l'expression de l'amitié que je vous ai vouée.

" LAFAYETTE."

The following is the letter from Lamarque:

" Paris, le 20 Février, 1831.

" Mon cher Général,

" Je conçois tout votre empressement à vous rendre en Italie. Croyez que mon amitié prendra une vive part aux succès qui, j'espère, vous attendront. Il est temps que cette nation généreuse secoue enfin le joug des barbares, elle qui a légué des exemples au monde.

" Adieu, mon cher Général, croyez à ma haute considération, et à mon inaltérable attachement.

" LAMARQUE."

I was now on my road to Versailles. I would willingly have sacrificed all I possessed in the world to reach Bologna before the Austrians could invade it. A Provisional Government had been established in that patriotic and populous city, in which the priestly yoke had vainly endeavoured during centuries, to extinguish the sentiment of nationality. I did not stand in need of its assistance to put my plan into execution. In the Marches of Ancona where I had many adherents, I should have been followed by several hundred young men, who would have defended me from the gens-d'arme on first entering the Abruzzi. Afterwards the inhabitants of the latter district would have protected me in flank as far as Naples. Such an idea was no mere chimera. A gentleman of great consideration in the town of Ancona said to me some time later in Paris, that had I succeeded in reaching the Marches, I should

have been accompanied across the Tronto by a great number of patriots. A Neapolitan named Ferrari, now a Lieutenant-Colonel in the French service, a few days after his arrival in Paris from Naples, informed me, that the revolution would have burst forth in the Two Sicilies as soon as I had crossed the Tronto. But I did not require such reports to feel convinced that the French revolution had disposed the public mind in the South of Italy to shake off a second time the yoke of absolute power, and that the movement which had taken place at Bologna, had made them ardent to follow the xample.

I therefore decided upon endeavouring, as soon as I reached Marseilles, to find out whether the banner of Italian freedom had been raised on any of the shores between the confines of Genoa and Civita Vecchia. In that case, I intended to land there without loss of time, accompanied only by the three officers who had come with me from Paris. These were Cobianchi, Toppia, and another who now resides in Italy. In the opposite case, I had determined upon assembling between Marseilles and Corsica about two hundred men, with whom I would have landed upon the nearest shore, and by their means opened myself a way to Bologna.

On arriving at Lyons, I was visited by a native of Pavia, named Pisani, and several other Italian patriots, who together with some hundred liberals of Lyons and the neighbouring district, had composed a small column, with the intent of marching into Savoy to raise a revolution there, and subsequently in Piedmont. Pisani communicated to me the correspondence he had held with the patriots of those provinces of Italy. If such a correspondence did not assure the success of their attempt, it at least gave me great hopes of it. In

such cases there is no saying how much dependance is to be placed upon revolutions promised by conspirators. I allude to cases in which events of deep importance, such as those of the French revolution of 1830, communicate hopes and an extraordinary impulse to the spirit.

I reached Marseilles brimful of hope. On presenting Lafayette's letter to the liberals of that city, they immediately formed themselves into a committee to deliberate upon the best means of affording aid to the cause of Italy. I was informed at Marseilles by our own patriots, residing there, that along the shores of Massa and Carrara, in the Duchy of Modena, the movement there had been followed up. I now determined upon giving up all thoughts of Corsica, and to lose no time in hiring a ship to convey me with my three officers to those shores of Italy, now become free, whence I would proceed to Bologna. But on the third day of my arrival at Marseilles I was summoned to appear before the Secretary-General of the Prefecture, who did duty for the prefect, who was absent. This gentleman informed me that he had received a formal order from Paris to prevent my quitting France. In vain I remonstrated, saying that the ministry had no right to keep me in France against my will. The vice-prefect only replied, that it was not his business to judge my reasons, but merely to execute his duty and the orders received, both by telegraph and by an estafette. I quitted the Prefecture half distracted, and hastened to meet Cobianchi, who was a faithful and intelligent adherent. I requested him to see if he could not find in the port of Marseilles some vessel, great or small, which would secretly convey us to the Italian shore. At first, the captain of a Greek vessel consented to do

what I desired, but the rigorous vigilance of the police increased hourly, and prevented our putting to sea. Two corvettes sailing along the coast had orders to examine, at every telegraphic notice, the vessels quitting the port. What most tended to deprive me of the hope of escaping the vigilance of the police, was the circumstance of myself and my friends being surrounded by spies. I lodged at an hotel, and spent great part of my time at the house of the banker, Dunant. Both the hotel and Dunant's house were surrounded by numerous spies, several of whom followed me about like my shadow. The officers, my companions, were likewise dogged by these men, and I am convinced that no less than a hundred were employed in watching us. If I was not arrested and obliged to reside in one of the departments away from the Mediterranean, it must be ascribed to the fact of the Government not being sufficiently strong to defy, by such an act, the clamour of the opposition in the Chamber of Deputies. As to the expedition prepared by the Italian patriots and Lyonese, to enter Savoy, it was dissolved by order of the Government, and dispersed by strong detachments of French troops.

During this time, I was in a state of inexpressible agony. The papers gave daily accounts of the progress made by the cause of liberty in the central part of Italy, the cities of which were become free, and I found it impossible to proceed thither to give them the advantage of the assistance of the Two Sicilies in the decisive struggle about to take place with Austria. Without the support of the Two Sicilies, it was utterly impossible for the revolted provinces to stand against the numerous and veteran troops of Austria. I had no longer the slightest hope that France would prevent the Austrians

from crossing the Po, after the illiberal orders issued by the Government to the Sub-Prefect of the Bouches du Rhône to stop the departure of an individual unaccompanied by an armed force.

There resided at Marseilles Manuel Marliani, of Milanese origin, although a native of Spain, where he was made a Senator, many years later. This gentleman offered to conceal me in the house of the banker Flaming, of Toulon, which was in the neighbourhood of this city, and from whence I might endeavour to sail from those shores. The Princess of Belgiojoso favoured me with a letter for M. Denis, Mayor of Hyéres, begging him to afford me concealment if necessary, and to facilitate my departure by every means. Such resources were extremely advantageous to me; but how to quit Marseilles secretly, how to escape the vigilance of the Prefect of this city, who, like Argus, had a hundred eyes bent upon my every movement? We concerted and executed our flight as follows: In one of the streets of Marseilles there stands a house which has two separate entrances, one in one street, and the second in another. I entered one door, which was immediately closed upon me, and made my exit at the other, where I found Cobianchi, who drove the cabriolet of Marliani, with a spirited horse. We were soon proceeding at full gallop along the road leading from Marseilles to Toulon. The spies of the police lost their scent by the extreme rapidity with which I effected my escape. At about a mile from Marseilles I was joined by Marliani and his gifted wife in their carriage. We then proceeded together until we reached the country-house of the banker Flaming, in the neighbourhood of Toulon. As if to renew old grief, this house was con-

tiguous to the one in which Murat had lodged before embarking for Corsica, whence he unfortunately sailed for the fatal shores of Calabria. The three officers, my companions, were unable to follow me, nor could even my servant, so much precaution being necessary to effect my concealment.

Paul, and his son Denis Flaming were prodigal of their kindness towards me; but ministerial letters had likewise reached Toulon, so that that port was also closed upon me. I now found myself under the necessity of proceeding to Hyères to the Mayor, Monsieur Denis, with the intention of embarking at night on the first vessel I could find. Monsieur Denis lived out of the city; his house stood in the midst of a large garden planted with orange trees, which were the first I had seen for ten years. They recalled most vividly to my mind the South of Italy; but when I tasted the fruit of these trees, I soon discovered that they were not the oranges ripened under that heavenly sky. Monsieur Denis was extremely kind to me; he showed me the official letters addressed to him for the purpose of preventing my departure, and even of arresting me if necessary. During the five days I passed at Hyères expecting a vessel from Toulon, I saw Lord Normanby, who was residing in a small house on the shore of Hyères; he could not conceive that the French Government could act thus towards me. In the meanwhile, Denis Flaming wrote me that he had hired for me a vessel carrying the French flag, and that I could embark off Hyères at dark the following evening. I thought of Italy, upon which all my ideas were fixed: the hours had never seemed longer

to me than at that time. On awaking in the morning, I said to myself, "This is the last day-break I shall behold in France, to-morrow's dawn will find me sailing towards Italy." My illusion was but of short duration. Two hours later, Monsieur Denis arrived with the French papers containing the most minute particulars of the entrance of the Austrian troops into Modena and Bologna.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Answers which I receive from the Generals Lafayette and Lamarque to letters I had written from Marseilles upon the obstacles to my departure made by the French Government—Observations upon the events which took place in Central Italy in 1831.

THAT the reader who peruses these pages may understand the depth of my sorrow, on again beholding, after ten long years of exile, all my ardent hopes for the deliverance of my country vanish, it is not enough that he should fondly love his native land, should have devoted his whole existence to its welfare, and endured sufferings equal to those which I had undergone for mine. To be able fully to enter into my feelings, it is necessary, in addition, that his country should be inexpressibly unfortunate, and that it should once have been as great as was my own Italy!

After taking a painful leave of my kind host, Monsieur Denis, I reached Toulon. Having given a gratuity to the captain of the vessel that was to have conveyed me thence, I proceeded to Marseilles. Now that the Government was aware that I could not think of proceeding to Italy, I no longer found myself harassed by spies. On the first opposition to my departure from Marseilles, before I had gone to Toulon, I wrote warm

complaints upon the subject to my friends and protectors, Lafayette and Lamarque. But their influence with the Government had greatly sunk since they could no longer secure a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. The following are their answers which I found at Marseilles.

"Paris, 9 Mars, 1831.

"Il est superflu, mon cher Général, de vous exprimer tous les sentimens que j'ai éprouvé en recevant votre lettre. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, à qui j'ai porté mes plaintes, m'a dit que la conduite du gouvernement envers vous avait été provoquée par une mesure de votre part contraire aux lois de l'état sur l'embauchage et la levée d'hommes; que vous aviez réuni une cinquantaine de compagnons, que vous aviez déroulé tout un plan de mesures proscrites par le code pénal; que ces circonstances seules avaient déterminé les autorités à ne pas vous laisser sortir par les portes de la Méditeranée; mais en même temps j'ai lieu de croire qu'il a été pris d'un autre côté des mesures favorables à votre sortie de France, et je ne vous écris aujourd'hui que pour accuser la réception de votre lettre, et vous renouveller l'expression de l'amitié que je vous ai voué de tout mon cœur.

"LAFAYETTE."

The fifty companions assembled by me were a mere invention of the ministry to justify the arbitrary act of which they had been guilty. The steps taken to facilitate my departure from the country were nothing but a fable of the Government to silence the clamour of the opposition: other inventions tending to the same pur-

pose will be perceived in the following letter from General Lamarque.

"Paris, le 12 Mars, 1831.

"Mon cher Général,

"Au moment où nous allions monter à la tribune pour nous plaindre de l'acte arbitraire dont vous avez été victime, nous avons appris qu'un aide-de-camp du Roi venait de partir pour se rendre près de vous. Nous avons donc jugé convenable de nous abstenir d'une plainte devenue inutile.

"Agréez, je vous prie, mon cher Général, les nouvelles assurances de tout mon attachement.

"LAMARQUE."

That the Austrian army had crossed the Po, invaded the states of Modena and Bologna, and were preparing to pursue the small column of patriots towards Ancona, were circumstances not calculated to please France. The deputies of the opposition were making a great outcry upon the subject, which was no less warmly re-echoed by the whole press. From this I was induced still to hope something from the French, not from a defect of judgment, but because I was blinded by the love I bore my unfortunate country. I hastened to Paris to prove the falsity of the pretended facts they had grounded illegal measures upon, by which I was prevented from leaving France, and which had increased the indignation of the deputies against the wretched policy of the ministers. Lafayette told me, that when he explained to the King the manner in which I had been prevented from leaving France, his Majesty replied by asking why I did not go over to England, whence, without compromising his Government, I might

proceed wherever I thought fit. To this remark of Louis Philippe, Lafayette answered: "Sire, il me paraît que ce n'est pas son chemin." That the world may know how much the French nation was aggrieved by the conduct of the Government with regard to Austria and Italy, I insert the following letter written to me by General Lamarque with his own hand.

"St. Sever, 30 Mai, 1831.

"Mon cher Général,

"Je m'empresse de répondre à votre lettre du 26 Mai. A votre place je détesterais et je mépriserais les Français, et je vous remercie bien de conserver pour quelqu'un d'eux des sentimens d'estime et de bienveillance. Notre conduite a été infâme, et nous écrivons depuis neuf mois les plus sales pages de l'histoire de France. L'Autriche a trop beau jeu pour n'être pas exigeante; je ne serais donc étonné qu'elle demandât la destruction de la route du Simplon, et même celle de la Corniche, et je ne doute pas que Monsieur N. N. a élevé ainsi de nouvelles barrières entre nous et la malheureuse Italie.

"Vous connaissez mieux que moi l'Angleterre, et votre opinion doit l'emporter sur la mienne. Je ne vous cacherai cependant pas que je ne partage pas toutes vos espérances sur l'avenir. L'esprit de cupidité et de jalousie anime les Anglais de toutes les classes, et sous ce rapport les boutiquiers de la cité pensent comme les grands seigneurs deRegent Street. Tous veulent que l'Angleterre domine le monde, et que son industrie ait pour tributaire tous les peuples; tous conservent un vieux levain de haine contre la France, et ils voudront la tenir dans l'état de dégradation et

d'abaissement où l'ont mises les traités de 1814 et de 1815. Soyez sûr que sur cet objet Lord Grey pense comme Wellington, et que notre ami Bowring, s'il arrivait au pouvoir où l'appellent ses talens, penserait comme Lord Grey.

"Adieu, mon cher Général, ne perdons pas l'espérance d'un meilleur avenir; il y avait long-temps que le Vésuve sommeillait quand arriva les éruptions qui detruisit Pompeia, et dévora Pline. Un volcan plus puissant est allumé sous Parthenope, et le moins qu'on y pense il pourra consumer ses oppresseurs.

"Donnez-moi de vos nouvelles, et croyez à mes sentimens affectueux.

"M. LAMARQUE."

It was not only my dear and illustrious friend, General Lamarque, with that fervid imagination which embellishes the profession of arms, who trembled for the honour of France. All the citizens of heart and feeling loudly blamed the calculating inaction—I may almost call it pusillanimity—of the Government, which had given audacity even to the Austrian cabinet.

I must not omit to furnish a rapid but accurate sketch of the beginning and unfortunate termination of the political movement which took place in central Italy, with the desire of destroying the arbitrary power, shamelessly exercised, of her little Princes and fanatical priests, no less abject than absolute.

Towards the middle of the sixteenth century, the Italians, who had lived in continual dissensions, fell from a state of freedom which they had long enjoyed, into servitude. It was only about the end of the eighteenth century, when the Peninsula was invaded by the French forces, that the Italians manifested a desire

of shaking off the yoke which enchained them. In those days we sought for freedom, without giving even a passing thought to the union of Italy, forgetting that from this want of union alone, Italy was become subjected.

The fall of the Neapolitan republic of 1799, that of the kingdom of Italy, and of the Constitutional Government of Naples, together with the repression of the movement in Piedmont, made us all deeply feel the necessity of union. But before the desire of unity could take root in our hearts, it was necessary that in every province the will and the power to put down absolute government should be shown. Central Italy alone left in doubt its disposition to concur in the general sentiment, so much so that the Pontifical power was regarded as unshaken. The noble revolution of 1831 dispelled all doubts upon this subject. Although this insurrection was put down by the aid of foreign force, as had been the case both in the North and South, it was still of immense avail to the cause of Italy. The experience of their own strength, bought, however dearly, during the last few years, will effectually tend to the eventual freedom and union of the people of the great divisions of the Peninsula. I must now transcribe, word for word a sketch of the events in central Italy, for which I am indebted to the high-minded Italian, the Advocate, Filippo Canuti, of Bologna, who took an active part in the insurrection, and who was sent into the Province of Ascoli as Prefect. To this notice I shall add a few rapid observations by a man whose genius and learning I held in the highest veneration. The following is by Canuti.

" The French Revolution of 1830 had given such an impulse to the people of Italy, that an insurrectionary

movement became indispensable, especially in the central part of Italy, where it was only retarded by the want of a proper understanding as to the manner of executing it. The prevailing opinion was, that France would have caused the principle of non-intervention, which it had so solemnly proclaimed, to be respected; but many, restricting the sense of this clause, supposed that each state, each province even, was to rise without giving or receiving either impulse or assistance from the rest or any of them. Others imagined that the principle of non-intervention was to prevent the Austrians from crossing the Po, but not to impede the various States of Italy from a common action, and coming to a fusion under a single government.

The patriots of Bologna, Romagna, the Marches, Parma, and Tuscany were of this latter opinion. Having determined to assemble their respective forces, Bologna was to form the centre of the first faction, until the revolution should have spread over all the rest of Italy.

But the plan thus arranged was prevented from being put into execution by the obstacles which presented themselves in the moment of action. The insurrection of the Papal States took place from those of Modena and Parma, whilst in Tuscany nothing occurred but a slight agitation, without any decided revolution.

Towards the end of 1831, the affairs of the Italian liberals were so far advanced, that Ciro Menotti of Modena, chief of the patriots of that duchy, revealed to the advocate, Canuti, deputy of the patriots of Bologna, where the centre of the conspiracy was ready to burst out on the evening of the 5th of February. Canuti immediately imparted this intelligence to his party, inculcating upon its members the urgent necessity of a

simultaneous insurrection in their district, so as to give greater importance and validity to the national movement.

Unfortunately, the committee of Bologna was not unanimously agreed upon this determination: more than one member doubted the good faith of Menotti's intentions, because he was known to have been in connection with persons who had shown themselves agents of Francis IV. of Modena, with the purpose of proclaiming this Prince, King of Italy. The serious and constant persecution of the liberals exercised by Francis IV., caused him to be universally detested, and it was not therefore wonderful that those who had listened to the insinuations of his emissaries should now hesitate to place confidence in their protestations of having given up the cause of the Duke, to embrace the better one of the regeneration of Italy.

Actuated by such, and by no evil motives, many exerted themselves to prevent the revolution of Bologna from breaking forth at the same time as that of Modena.

Nicola Fabrizio, of Modena, having been arrested by order of the Duke on the morning of the 3rd February, Menotti esteemed it necessary that the insurrection should immediately take place. To this effect he assembled, on the same evening, upwards of thirty of his followers at his own house. They were all provided with arms and banners, and only awaited the arrival of the patriots from the surrounding villages, who had been warned of what was to take place, to raise the first shout of liberty.

The Duke, however, informed of the intentions of the liberals, put a stop to them, and recalling the troops quartered in the vicinity, they surrounded the house in

which these young men were assembled. The house was assaulted and overpowered by the force of numbers; the patriots were obliged to yield after a long and vigorous resistance. They were all carried off to prison, exposed to the most dastardly and insulting treatment, and were immediately brought to a court-martial.

Vague intelligence of these events having reached Bologna, the greatest agitation was felt in that city. The youthful part of the population, and the students of the university were eager to lose no time in following up the example of the Modenese; others, for the reasons already stated, strenuously opposed themselves to such a course.

The Papal throne being at that moment vacant by the death of Pius VIII., the Cardinals were all assembled at Rome to form the Conclave. The province of Bologna was governed by the Pro-Legate, Monsignor Paracciani Clarelli, who, terrified at the popular agitation manifested throughout the district, consulted with the superior of the police as to the course to be pursued. Far from deriving any relief from this, he only became more conscious of the extreme gravity of the case. Following the opinion given by the chief of the police, he convoked a species of council, formed of the most distinguished members of the different classes of the population. He assembled, on the evening of the 4th of February, the Marquis Bevilacqua Ariosti, a senator of the city, and fourteen other considerable personages, to whom were added the directors of the police, the chiefs of the armed force, and the *assessoire criminale*.

The Professor Orioli and the senators were the first to speak. They urged the Prelate earnestly to elect a commission of citizens, upon whom he should bestow authority to resort to every possible measure

calculated to restore peace and to maintain public order. The Pro-Legate hesitated to adopt such a course, which was unanimously voted by the assembly; but upon hearing the shouts of the populace assembled under the windows of the hall where he sat in council, and on learning that various bands of armed young men were scattered through the town, and collected around the royal palace, he signed, although not without considerable reluctance, a decree, appointing a provisional committee of government, and establishing a provisional guard of citizens. This intelligence appeared in the public prints the same evening, and was received with unanimous applause, and with shouts of "Viva la libertà."

In the night a courier extraordinary passed through Bologna, bearing the nomination of the new Pontiff, Gregory XIII., but this intelligence did not interrupt the course of events. Early in the morning, the committee assembled and constituted itself into a Provisional Government of the city and province of Bologna. On the 8th of the same month, this Government adhered to the universal desire of the whole population, and declared that, *The temporal sway exercised by the Pontiff of Rome over the city and province of Bologna had ceased for ever.*

The government was composed of the Advocate Giovanni Vicini, President; the Marquis Bevilacqua Ariosti, the Count Cesare Bianchetti, the Professor Francesco Orioli, the Advocate Antonio Zunolini, the Count Alessandro Agucchi, the Advocate Professor Antonio Silvani, and the Count Cesare Pepoli, all men distinguished for their probity and liberal opinions.

The Italian tri-colored flag was hoisted upon all the public buildings, and in all the public squares. The troops of the line and the carbineers, who had willingly

adhered to the new government, substituted the national cockade for the Pontifical one.

A military committee was created for the department of war, under the direction of an old and honourable officer of the army of Napoleon, Colonel Grabinsky, a Pole, long established in Bologna; Major Barbieri, another remnant of the same army was created General of the National Guard.

The movement of Bologna had extended itself to Imola, Faenza, Ravenna, Forli, Cesena, and the following day to Rimini and Pesaro on one side, and to Ferrara and Comachio on the other; although in these two latter cities, owing to the Treaty of Vienna, there was by stipulation an Austrian garrison. The Austrians, as soon as the change of Government became known, withdrew into the fortress. The revolution was thus instantaneously accomplished throughout the legation, and without any loss of blood. At Forti alone, the troops who were on guard at the palace offered a feeble and unavailing resistance.

On the morning of the 5th, the Government of Bologna sent the advocate, Canuti, to the further limits of the province, as Commissary Extraordinary to examine into the real state of the Modenese insurrection. At the same time he was charged to take every possible measure to ensure that the strict preservation of the principle of non-intervention should be respected in the two neighbouring countries.

On reaching Castel-Franco, Canuti, one of the most ardent adherents of the Italian cause, learned with extreme pain the failure of Menotti's attempt, as well as the circumstance of himself and his comrades being about to become victims of the tyranny of Francis IV., and that the whole city was in consternation.

He immediately imparted this intelligence to the Government, exhorting it in the name of humanity, not to keep to the strict interpretation of the non-intervention system to the prejudice of their own countrymen, but to lose no time in giving prompt and efficacious aid to the Modenese.

But the Government, not to give by such a step any pretext to the Austrians to interfere with the affairs of the legation, refused, and called back their Commissary Extraordinary to Bologna.

The insurrection extended itself nevertheless to the Duchies of Modena and Parma, because Francis IV., on learning, on the morning of the 5th, the success of the Bolognese revolutions, lost no time in securing his own safety; and departed on the same evening, taking with him, as prisoner, the unfortunate Ciro Menotti.

On the following day the municipal authority ruled the city. The tricolor floated from the walls, the prison doors were opened, and the political delinquents were set at liberty. A National Guard was organized, and finally on the 9th, by a deliberation signed by seventy of the most notable citizens, a Provisional Government was formed. This Government was composed of a dictator, the advocate Biagionardi, and of a diet of three Consuls, Colonel the Chevalier Pietro Maranesi, the advocate Ferdinand Minghelli, and the Marquis Giovanni Marano.

In the meanwhile, symptoms of agitation, since the 10th of February, had manifested themselves at Parma, and continued to increase, although the garrison had been kept under arms for three days, until on the evening of the 13th a deputation presented itself to and was received by the Archduchess. At the same

moment the cry of liberty burst out on every side. A National Guard, wearing the tricolour cockade, was immediately formed; and on the following day, Maria Louisa, escorted by five hundred soldiers of the line, departed for Piacenza, where she established the seat of her Government. The municipal power immediately constituted a Provisional Government, presided over by Filippo Linati, and composed of G. F. Castagnola, T. Sanvitale, F. Malegarci, E. Orselli, and M. Melloni.

Whilst the revolution had extended itself from the north of Bologna as far as Parma to the south; from the four legations and Pesaro it had passed on to Urbino, Fano, Fossombrone, Sinigaglia, Osimo, Chiaravalle, and various other cities of the Marches. The rapid progress made in the Papal States is not to be wondered at, as the population of these provinces, wearied of the Papal despotism, hated the ignorant and harrassing Government, the administration of which was full of irregularity and disorder. The fort of San Leo having been yielded by the Pontifical troops to the patriots on the 12th of February, there now remained Ancona alone, along the line taken by the revolution, faithful to the Pope; and this fidelity can only be ascribed to the strong garrison of the fort which commanded the city. The Commandant of this fort, Lieutenant-Colonel Sutherman, would not yield at the first intimation of Colonel Sarcognani, who had attacked the fort at the head of a few hundred volunteers; these having been soon joined by a considerable reinforcement, after a few days—on the 17th of February—the garrison capitulated. The troops had full authority to follow which banner they chose, or even to be dissolved altogether. They almost all passed over to the new

Government, leaving their commander to return to Rome in company with the reverend delegate and several other officials.

Meanwhile, the Papal Court was organizing a counter-revolution, and for this purpose had sent Cardinal Benvenuti, Bishop of Osimo, in the capacity of secret legate, for the purpose of exciting war and bloodshed everywhere. When the population became acquainted with the instructions of Cardinal Bernetti, Minister of State, to the new legate, they were horror-struck. Cardinal Benvenuti was arrested in his diocese, and brought prisoner to Bologna, and the cities of Macerata, Perugia, Spoleto, Foligno, as well as all the others of Umbria, answered the proclamations of the Court of Rome, by casting off the Papal yoke, and constituting in each town a popular authority.

Sercognani, elevated to the rank of Major-General after the capitulation of Ancona, marched towards Rome with a body of two thousand five hundred men, partly troops of the line and partly National Guards from the various provinces which had risen; by these means giving an impulse likewise to the insurrection of Fermo, Ascoli, Terni, Narni, and Obricoli. Having reached Civita Castellana, he there awaited the arrival of new forces, resting his right upon Perugia, his centre upon Terni, and his left upon the Velino, two leagues from Rieti.

In this neighbourhood the national party had several successful conflicts with the Papal troops: they were particularly fortunate in the partial events of Borghetto, Calvi, Magliano, San Lorenzino, and the Grotte.

In the course of little more than three weeks, the whole of the Papal States, with the exception of Rome,

Rieti, and some few cities of the Comarca, had followed the example of Bologna. But as in this place the new authorities had declared themselves from the first a Government of the Province of Bologna alone, the result was that there were a great number of small Provisional Governments formed in all the cities that had risen, all independent of each other.

Before long, however, the necessity was felt of concentrating the various free provinces in one State, and forming there a common centre of action, composed of all the moral and physical forces, until then scattered. To this effect, many cities had already sent their representatives to Bologna, and the others were invited to do the same, which course was immediately acted upon with the greatest good-will, and as little delay as possible.

The first assembly of the notables and deputies from the provinces, took place at Bologna on the 26th of February. After having legally constituted itself, the assembly unanimously voted, First:—The total emancipation of all the provinces hitherto held under the temporal domination of the Pope. Secondly:—The perfect union of the provinces amongst themselves.

This determination was solemnly proclaimed on the 2nd of March, and on the 4th, the provisional constitutional statutes of the Italian Provinces, emanating from the same assembly, were published. The tenor of this Constitution divided the power of the State into three branches, the executive, the legislative and the judicial. The Government was composed of a President, a Council of Ministers, and a Legislative Assembly.

The members of the Government, elected by the assembly, were the following.

The Advocate Giovani Vicini, President.

The Advocate Count Leopold Armaroli, Minister of Justice.

Count Urenzio Mammiani della Rovere, Minister of the Interior.

Count Lodovico Sturani, Minister of Finance.

Count Cesare Bianchetti, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

General Piero Damiano Armandi, Minister of War.

Dr. Pio Sarli, Minister of the Police.

Professor Francesco Orioli, Minister of Public Instruction.

During the temporary absence of Count Armaroli, the portfolio of the judicial department was held by the Advocate Professor Antonio Silvani, and the Advocate Antonio Zanolini was elected President of the Assembly of Deputies.

The new Government appointed and immediately despatched Prefects into the different provinces. No time was lost in organizing the army, and every branch of the administration of the new State was attended to: but such measures came too late.

There now appeared little chance that an expedition against the capital would be attended with any degree of success; for Rome, assured of the armed assistance of Austria and of the support of the French diplomacy, had inspired new courage to the troops and to that part of the population which still adhered to its interests. In fact, the imperial army had already commenced hostilities against the insurgent States. On the 28th of February, a body of eight hundred Austrians, infantry and cavalry, composing the garrison of Piacenza, surprised the small forces the Government of Parma had at Firenzuola. After a short contest they remained in possession of the country, having driven the national

party back upon Parma. A few days afterwards, on the 26th of March, a column composed of several thousand of the imperial troops, commanded by General Geppert, and preceded by the D'Este battalion, attacked Novi and Carpi, when the national party offered a stout resistance, being eventually obliged to yield to an enemy four times superior to them in number,

Although the members of the Modenese Government had retreated the same night upon Bologna, the Austrians did not venture to occupy Modena, because immediately after the events of Nuovi, General Lecchi, one of the most celebrated of the Generals of Division of the ex-kingdom of Italy, had arrived on the 24th of February from Milan to offer his services to the Italian revolution. With the small forces at his disposal, he had moved upon Modena, which town he had entered on the 6th, and which he quitted on the 9th. It was only after his departure thence that the Austrians were enabled to re-establish the ducal authority. The D'Este National Guards abandoned the city and then sought refuge in the territory of Bologna. There they were received as strangers and immediately compelled to lay down their arms.

On the 5th and 6th of March, another body of Austrians, composed of six thousand infantry and one thousand two hundred cavalry, commanded by General Bentheim crossed the Po and occupied Ferrara and Comacchio. Finally, the first corps which had entered Firenzuola from Piacenza, having been increased by the addition of several thousand men, marched towards Parma, which city it entered on the 13th of March.

The occupation of Parma, Modena, Ferrara and Comacchio, the proclamations of the Austrian Generals, and the secret correspondence of Rome, which had been

intercepted, sufficiently revealed that the object of the imperial power was to occupy Bologna, Romagna, and all the Papal States. This rendered the active organization of every possible means of defence and resistance indispensable. General Lecchi was made General-in-Chief of all the forces of the united Italian provinces; the Minister of War, General Armandi proceeded to Romagna, to establish with the small forces at his disposal several posts of observation along the Po of Primaro, with the object of preventing the enemy from penetrating into the heart of Romagna, which would to a certain extent leave Bologna unprotected.

The Major-General Ollini, with a body of two thousand men, the greater part of them National Guards, took up his station at Ravenna, and the Divisional-General Grabinsky, who commanded the whole line of observation, was established at Forli.

For ten or twelve days the Austrians seemed to have suspended their movements. They made some unimportant demonstrations towards Argenta and beyond the Primaro.

It was at this period, that the Prince Napoleon Buonaparte, eldest son of Louis, Ex-King of Holland, died at Forli, in the flower of his youth. This young man, who was endowed with every virtue, had, on first learning the revolution in the Papal States, hastened to quit Tuscany with his brother, and came to join the body of General Sercognani, at Terni. Both were actuated by the desire of fighting in the cause of Italian freedom. But the government of Bologna, fearful lest their presence in the vanguard, which was marching towards Rome, might give umbrage to the other governments, and especially to that of France,

sent directions to General Sercognani, to induce the young Buonapartes to quit the head-quarters. They accordingly went to Bologna, whence they retreated towards Forli with the national party. At the latter place, the Prince Napoleon died, deeply lamented by all who knew and appreciated his virtues.

On the 20th of the same month, the Austrians advanced in considerable strength in the direction of Modena, Ferrara, and Comacchio. The mass of the troops followed the via Emilia, and occupied Bologna on the 21st. The members of the government had quitted the city the day before, and sought refuge in Ancona. Here they deliberated on the 23rd upon the necessity of dissolving themselves, and transferring the power to the hands of a Triumvirate, appointed by themselves, and composed of General Zucchi, Count Pietro Ferretti of Ancona, and the Chevalier Tiberio Borgia of Perugia. This determination was not, however, carried into effect, owing to the absence from Ancona of two members of the Triumvirate.

On the 20th of March, the Prefect, Savini, the General of the National Guard, and the other authorities at Bologna, had meditated upon placing at liberty Cardinal Benvenuti, who was still their prisoner. Such a measure was most strenuously opposed by the Advocate Petruzzi, Colonel of the Guard, to whom the custody of the Cardinal had been confided. Assisted by several young soldiers of his legion, he succeeded in conveying his prisoner to Ancona.

All the troops of the line in Romagna, as well as the Bolognese, Romagnuoli, and Modenese volunteers, forming a corps of scarcely four thousand men, were directed upon Ancona, in the hope of being able to

resist the enemy, and, in fact, during the retreat which finally took place, an engagement occurred which reflects great honour upon the Italians.

The two columns of the national forces retreating towards Bologna and Ravenna, reached Rimini in the night of the 21st of March. Their first thought was to adopt such measures as would preclude their being taken by surprise. To effect this purpose, a battalion of the line, and several National Guards, had been stationed outside the city, where the two roads of Bologna and Ravenna join, forming a rear-guard, and a post of observation. The remainder of the Italian forces had proceeded towards Cattolica. At three o'clock in the afternoon, a corps of five thousand Austrian infantry, and about five hundred hussars and dragoons, with four pieces of artillery advanced, under the command of General Geppert. Thus, only the rear-guard, of scarcely twelve hundred men, remained between the line and the national troops to offer any resistance. Their bravery, however, stood in the place of numbers, and the combat was obstinate and bloody. Three times did the Austrians endeavour to get possession of that post, and thrice were they driven back. The dead and wounded were numerous on both sides; but the loss of the Austrians was greater than our own. The latter, seeing the impossibility of overcoming the patriots, owing to the manner in which their column was placed, and the spirit with which they maintained it, now thought of retreating.

The retreat of the liberals was thus protected, and the valour displayed in this encounter was a proof of what they were disposed to do in the cause of their country. But unfortunately, at the very moment when on one side the troops were fighting at Rimini, on the

other, the Government was capitulating at Ancona with Cardinal Benvenuti, yielding up their power, and again subjecting the insurgent provinces to the dominion of the Court of Rome.

The only one of the ministers who refused to sign such a capitulation was the learned and honourable Count Mammiani. In this he adhered to the wishes of most of the patriots, and of many ardent young men who, with their arms still in their hands, saw every hope, not only of saving the cause of the revolution but even the national honour, dashed from them at a blow.

The love of truth obliges me to say, however, that the Government only adopted such a course after it had obtained certain information that France had abandoned the Italian cause, by permitting the intervention of Austria; and that it had been informed by a brave old officer of the army of Napoleon, General Basi, Commander of Ancona, that that city, scarce of provisions and wanting every means of defence, could not have stood out against the numerous force of the enemy.

The Revolution of 1831 presented throughout its whole course a character of order, moderation, and moral dignity beyond praise. The chiefs of the patriotic party deemed it right to avoid all useless bloodshed, as well as the excesses which usually accompany a desperate defence.

The good will of those who had entered into a contract with them did not avail to make the Austrians respect the conventions agreed upon, the principal object of which was to arrest the progress of the imperialists, and to protect the persons and property of all such as were compromised in the revolution.

The Austrian General who commanded the army of intervention, regardless of the capitulation, which had been sent him with a letter from Cardinal Benvenuti, continued his march towards Ancona, and pushed his troops beyond Macerata. At the same time, the Austrian navy captured in the Adriatic the vessel which had on board the greater part of the individuals who had composed the governments of Modena and Bologna, General Zucchi, and other military chiefs, as well as about a hundred of the most compromised of the citizens. All these persons, without regard to any principle of humanity or justice, were cast at once into the prisons of Venice.

The Papal troops, and a horde of the satellites of the Court of Rome, advanced from the direction of Rieti, Assoli, and Terni, exciting everywhere the population against the patriots. In Terni the hordes of peasants, encouraged and assisted by the priests, rushed suddenly upon the patriots, who, disarmed by virtue of the capitulation, were returning into their respective provinces.

On the 28th of March, a counter-revolution broke out at Ascoli, and the tricolored flag, which was still kept flying by the Prefect Canuti, was torn down with the greatest fury. In many cities of the Marches the Centurioni persecuted the liberals, who were surprsied, although not conquered by a powerful foreign army.

Finally, the Court of Rome published edicts which declared that the Convention consented to by the Pontifical representative was null and void, and threatening thousands of citizens with death.

Thanks, however, to the good offices of the Cabinets of Europe, especially that of France, this rigour was in

some degree mitigated. The ministers of the different powers, resident in Rome, seeing the justice of the complaints of the subjects of the Pope, presented in May, 1831, to Cardinal Bernetti, Secretary of State, a memorandum containing the reforms to be introduced in the mode of government. Rome made promises which it did not fulfil, so that the National Guard, which had been re-organized in July, 1831, at the period of the first evacuation by the Austrians, now put itself again in open opposition to the Government of Rome.

Things proceeded to that degree, that in January, 1832, the Austrians were obliged to come for the second time to the assistance of the Pope, and occupied the four legations. It was then that Casimir Perier decided upon sending an expedition to Ancona, where the French landed in February of the same year.

The occupation of this post by France was not to serve as a check to Austria, but as a guarantee of the reform to take place in the people of the Pontifical States. But after holding it for seven years, the French have abandoned this important post. Not only has the Pope not granted the promised concessions, but he has even done away with the trifling modifications he had been obliged to make after the revolution of 1831. From this period has commenced a retrograde march in the Papal Government; the disorders of the administration have been doubled, the public debt increased, the taxes raised, and the rigorous system of persecution pursued, which has been continual, and is insupportable. Consequently, the discontent is become general, and new political commotions again agitate the provinces of Central Italy.

I will now transcribe the words of an intimate friend, an eye-witness, and a man celebrated both for his learning and his patriotism.

"The revolution which broke out in Central Italy, in 1831, originated from the public hatred experienced towards the government of Rome; but the occasion which gave rise to it was the French Revolution of July. The *momentum* was given to it by the principle, solemnly proclaimed, of non-intervention. Without a faith in this principle, which was then unbounded, it does not appear at all probable that any serious political commotion would have arisen in that portion of Italy, not, indeed, from any lack of aversion to absolute governments in general, and especially to that of the priests, but because a formidable force, ready to extinguish every latent spark of freedom, was at the gate, ready to rush in upon us. The insurrection of Central Italy was based upon a rotten foundation, and the expectation—which was deemed a certainty—of French assistance, caused it to proceed with the most inexcusable languor. It had, however, a great advantage over the revolutionary movements which had preceded it at other times, inasmuch as it was conducted in a true Italian spirit, without the taint of mere civic, or municipal, or local interests. This was manifested in the spontaneous elevation of the Italian tricolor everywhere, and the universal cry of "Viva Italia!" no less than by the fact, that the principal government which was formed, assumed the title of *Provisional Government of the United Provinces of Italy*, which meant that it was in expectation of a higher form of government, under the rule of which the different States of Italy would have become provinces of one country. Certain phrases published in the publications of that period,

and certain injurious and hostile acts of the government of Bologna against the poor Modenese, are not to be attended to. Everybody, both in and out of that government, regarded them and saluted them as brothers; but the silly fear of not giving scope to Austria to interfere, or to France not to prevent such a course, caused several useless and foolish acts of dissimulation to be written and committed.

As the hope of non-intervention died away, so did the centre of Italy lose all faith in herself, and all her desperate energy to attempt to insure her liberty. It is my opinion, that more than one fortunate accident might have remedied or prevented the misfortunes, and changed for ever the fate of the Peninsula. If the movements of Bologna and Parma had taken place some months earlier, when the ardour which animated the public mind in France had not yet been chilled; or if two Princes had possessed the means of alluring the pusillanimous among the patriots, who are always the most numerous, with hopes of a more liberal government, there is no doubt that the affairs of Italy would have taken another turn. Likewise, if at the very first outbreak of the insurrection in the united provinces, there had been an officer of talent and experience, who would have collected together the few good troops at his disposal, and marched towards the Abruzzi, which he would have made to rise; had he, moreover, marched upon Rome, the fear, confusion, and disturbance of the prelates were so great, that the capital would most likely have fallen into our hands, and such a fact would in all probability have excited serious commotion in the neighbouring Kingdom of Naples.

A month later, the whole aspect of things was changed; so necessary is it to be rapid in revolutionary

proceedings. I present these various suppositions—each of which would alone have sufficed to cause Italy to rise—to show that the disposition of the country is not as inert as some are wont to say. In fact, none have a right to say that a country is immature and unprepared for freedom, when an accident may cause that very country either to gain or to lose its liberty.

But to return to the revolution of 1831. It is necessary to state that towards the end of March, the Court of Rome was informed by autograph letters from eminent personages, that Austria had permission to come and support them and crush the general revolt. This unexpected permission sufficed to raise the spirit, and set in action some energetic measures. The rough peasants of Sabina were armed; money and indulgences were scattered about in Trastevere, assertions were resorted to to subject the public mind, and all the usual arts which have ever been found successful were now again brought into play with marvellous success. When this was the case, it was no longer possible to occupy Rome with a handful of soldiers and youthful volunteers. The cause of Italian freedom fell, teaching to future generations that the welfare of a country is always in her own hands; that liberty is never found, but must be gained.

During the brief course of the revolution of the Roman States, three things are on my mind of great moment. Firstly, that great as was the inexperience manifested, the forbearance, probity, and disinterestedness were no less great; secondly, that little confidence was placed in the common people, and the means which might have engaged them to join us were neglected. This latter error has been more than once committed in Italy: thirdly, that the total abolition of

the temporal rights of the Pope scandalized the multitude, and excited against us the great mass, which was both numerous and ignorant. The incredulous rejoiced, the credulous and pious perceived the hand of God punishing the old sins of the clergy and reforming the church. From this latter cause the insurrection of central Italy, in 1831, although feeble in its effects, and unfortunate in its result, signalizes a fact of great importance in modern history, by declaring to the Christian world, that the Pontificial State, which during many centuries had been the main cause of the misfortunes of Italy, and of the vices and disorders of the Church, no longer exists by its own force, but that it is more and more hated and despised by its own population, and that on the very first disturbance of the present repose of Europe it must inevitably perish."

CHAPTER X.

I settle in Paris, and publish some Treatises on Italian topics—My irrevocable determination.

THE attempts made in Central Italy having proved abortive, and the French revolution of 1830 having diverged from the point to which the common hopes of all those were turned who desired the overthrow of absolute governments, I settled in Paris in the expectation of better days, and to enjoy there at least that solitary repose which, according to Bacon, is more easily found in crowded capitals than in smaller towns.

To conspire against the foreigner who oppresses our country, and against a government which uses the foreigner as a prop to prolong slavery, is not only the right but the duty of every good citizen, and especially of men of lofty minds. Yet they should not conspire or revolt, unless there appear sufficient probabilities of success; to act otherwise is but the agitation of children incapable of acting seriously and judiciously, or of men coveting fame even at the risk of injuring the cause which they desire to see triumphant. If in spite of my experience, I had lent myself to inopportune, if not injurious machinations. I should have forfeited

the confidence of my compatriots, which in happier times might still be useful.

In 1833, to make some use of the leisure to which the sad destiny of Italy condemned me, I published in my own language, a small treatise, on the means which might conduce to Italian independence, and which was translated into French. On this occasion many superior officers and Italian Generals candidly confessed to me, that the ideas which I had developed on the subject of our Peninsula warfare, and especially on the best method of organizing our defence, had never occurred to them. Not choosing to put my name to this work, yet desirous of avoiding the disadvantages of anonymous publications, I had recourse to my friend Armand Carrel, who added a preface to my treatise.

Three years later, perceiving in this short tract I had not exhausted the arguments, I published *L'Italia Militare*, afterwards translated into French, in which I described at length, all the advantages offered by the Italian Peninsula above every other country in Europe for defensive warfare, principally on account of its geographical formation. In the second place, I pointed out the manner in which the National Guard and standing army in Italy ought to be organized. I concluded this short work with various considerations regarding the system of warfare most suited to the characters and conditions of the Italian people. I learnt with great satisfaction, that General Haxo, and a valued friend living in Italy, approved this work. As I was again unwilling to prefix my name to this treatise, my valued and respected friend Thibeaudeau of the Convention, was so obliging as to write a preface to it.

It has always been my opinion, that well-informed Italians should discuss, *ex professo*, two important problems; the one, regarding the government best suited to Italy free; the other, respecting her absolute unity of confederation. I repeatedly entreated my two friends, the philosopher of Manfredonia and him of Pesaro to write on this subject. I told them, that when the active moment for action should arrive, time would fail for meditating and writing on questions of so much importance, and the members of an Italian Congress would be unprepared to deliberate on it with entire knowledge of the subject, and according to the true interests of the country. Both were deaf to my entreaties; yet they encouraged and solicited me to write on the topic, urging, that an earnest will and profound affection, would inspire much knowledge. I ventured therefore to print a little volume in French, in six chapters, entitled "L'Italie politique," in which I discussed the two subjects I have indicated. Before publishing this treatise, I submitted it to my most learned and esteemed Italian acquaintances in Paris, begging them to point out in what their opinions differed from my own: they all solemnly assured me, that in substance their views coincided with what I had written, which gave me fresh courage to issue this little volume, which I did in 1839.

Some months later, in order to refute a sentence of the illustrious Châteaubriand in his "Congrès de Veronne," and at the same time to answer a letter sent to me by an English baronet, in which he entertained me with reflections on the state of Italy, I published in French, a small pamphlet in which, I think, I have succeeded in the design I proposed to myself.

Subsequently, discoursing often with my Pesarese friend, on the calumnies which outrage the Neapolitan troops, and the extraordinary ideas which many Italians, for want of experience, have formed of the war *per banda*, or skirmishing warfare,—he persuaded me to write a treatise on this subject; also to delineate the history of the troops of the Two Sicilies, with that of Charles, of the Spanish House of Bourbon; and thirdly, to explain succinctly, the facts of the Neapolitan revolution of 1820; and this, in order to contradict, by the way, the injurious aspersions contained in the works of Colletta and Carascosa, which must have been inspired, either by the bitterness of exile, or other unhappy passions. My little volume appeared in 1840, and was entitled "Sull 'escrito delle Due Sicilie, et sulla guerra Italica di Sollevazione:" it was not translated into French. I willingly write on such subjects, not deeming it presumptuous to hope, that in so doing, I am giving my countrymen exact information on events in which I was myself an actor, and of which I was a witness; and of declaring at the same time some opinions produced and engraved on my mind by assiduous examination, by deep love of my country, and by long years of experience in public life.

In the current year, 1846, I have terminated these Memoirs, which I commenced in London, towards the end of the first year of my long banishment. More than once I have hesitated between consigning them to the flames, or to the press. More than once I have said to myself, "why encounter such trouble and disquiet? Soon I shall have disappeared from this world, which may one day be itself transformed and changed from its present state." Yet, though my imagination does

not shrink from the idea of the annihilation of the universe, it cannot conceive, or bear the thought of the destruction of my own unhappy country. Alas! it seems to me that she will, after my death, be found engraven on my heart! For her, then, I have determined to publish these Memoirs, and trust they may not be fruitless, since they relate the deeds of a man, who from his earliest youth has acted and felt for her alone. The only sorrow I experience in giving them publicity is, that this act is not approved by the man I most love and esteem.

Oh! you who have perused these sorrowful pages, if you are a son of Italy, let me entreat that the acquaintance with my many sad adventures may not lessen your ardour to act in her cause, or constancy to suffer for it. Know, that in the most dismal days of my life, I never felt sorrow or repentance for what I had done or attempted for the good of Italy, nor in any case would I have saved myself from the caprice of fortune, and retained possession of my worldly goods at the price of remaining a passive spectator of the humiliating servitude of my country.

The soil, the climate, the disposition of the inhabitants—all that is beautiful and sacred in Italy—I love: even the evils which are found there, and which are the fruits of bad government, excite my sorrow, but do not diminish an iota of the love I bear her. Yet, in spite of this love, while she languishes in ignoble servitude, under Princes subject to Austrian influence, and averse to liberal institutions, even should it be permitted me, I am resolved never to set my foot in Italy again. The conduct of my whole political life gives me a right to believe,—that were the King of the Two Sicilies to cancel the sentence of death, which for six-and-twenty

years has been suspended over my head, and recal me to the highest honours in my country, none who know me would deem me capable of accepting such offers, or of revisiting that beloved land before she has received institutions suitable to the civilization of the present century.

THE END.

LONDON:
Printed by Schulze and Co., 13, Poland Street.

00022294

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 06 February, 2016